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ABSTRACT 
This research is founded on an enduring interest in the concept of 
dilemma. This interest is in'part philosophical (e.g. is it 
"inconceivable", as Kant believed, to have two equally valid moral 
obligations?); partly it derives from a concern to enhance the 
educational experience of adolescents, by giving greater attention to 
their preparation for the ambiguities of adulthood; partly, it is due to 
a fascination with its universality. There are dilemmas of personal 
relationships, 'public life, medical ethics, military tactics, or the 
"dirty hands" decisions of politicians. The experience has been captured 
in literature from Abraham and Agamemnon to Ibsen's Norah and Styron's 
Sophie. Defined briefly as "a choice between two alternatives which are 
equally unfavourable",_dilemma usually carries as its aftermath a sense 
of regret or guilt. 
There were three research objectives: to illuminate our understanding of 
the experience, to establish a case for including consideration of 
dilemmas more methodically in the curriculum, and to assist college 
counsellors and tutors. The method adopted has been phenomenological. 
Six perspectives were selected: four theoretical (moral philosophy, 
political ethics, psychology and social psychology); two empirical 
(student experiences, and a survey of the teaching strategies of Heads of 
Department). The intention has been to cross check the conclusions by 
illuminative evaluation and triangulation. 
The research considered questions about the rationality of believing that 
two moral obligations can exist simultaneously, the difference between 
public and private morality, and whether a typology of dilemma can be ~erive~. Further, the coping mechanisms of students and the benefits of 
1nclud1ng these matters in the curiculum are explored. 
Students were interviewed and Heads of Departments surveyed. Amongst the 
conclusions drawn were: that pluralism accords more closely with 
experience than monism or single principle solutions; that ideological 
conflict is an essential precondition of being able to argue or think; 
that there is a need to prepare for the dilemmas of public office. The ~tud~ ends with a plea for reflective common sense as the final arbiter 1n d1lernmatic situations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
This research is the cUlmination of a long-standing interest in dilemmas 
as a concept and the way value judgments are made by young people. Of 
particular concern has been the effect of decisions being taken under 
pressure to choose between difficult but valid alternatives. It is 
derived from experience gained in a number of different roles: as a 
priest in Portsmouth organizing a youth club, as a chaplain at the 
University Church in Cambridge, Great St Mary's', as a teacher of sixth 
form students at Manchester Grammar School and, later, in Sixth Form 
. Colleges in Basingstoke, Sunbury and Esher. 
This first led to an informal investigation with colleagues in the 
context of our work with 16-19 year old students, helped by a four month 
secondment granted to the researcher by Surrey Education Authority. 
Subsequently, a more formal study was devised but, as it progressed, its 
objectives developed and were recast. This process is described here 
together with a discussion of how the methods were adapted accordingly. 
First, how~ver, it may be helpful to provide some preliminary definitions 
of the concepts "dilemma" and "recognition". 
1.1 Preliminary Definitions of Dilemma 
This is the study of a particular type of predicament which is 
experienced by everyone at some time or another. It occurs when the 
pressing alternatives available to us, or serious obligations we face, 
seem so evenly balanced that it is hard, and sometimes impossible, to 
make a choice. In ordinary conversation we may speak of being "between 
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the devil and the deep blue sea" or "between Scylla and and Charybdis". 
We call it a dilemma. Originally, it had a precise meaning and referred 
to two and only two alternatives, each with unpleasant consequences. The 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a dilemma as "a choice between 
two (or loosely several) alternatives which are or appear equally 
unfavourable". If there were three alternatives, strictly speaking it 
would be a "trilemma" and, if four, a o"quadrilemma"; many alternatives 
could be referred to as a "polylemma". Now, however, "dilemma" is the 
word for all cases. 
Occasionally this may be-a dramatic moral problem, such as in Sophie's 
oChoice (Styron 1980), where a mother can save one of her two children 
from death but not both and she alone must make the choice. More 
frequently it will be an everyday situation, such as when you must decide 
which tender for a contract you will choose, the cheaper or the one with 
the higher specification, or which of two clashing diary engagements you 
will keep (Foot 1983 p382). 
1.1.1 The interest of this study is not in the occasional irksome 
trifles in life (which travel route to take? which hors d'oeuvres?) but 
intractable quandaries requiring urgent solution. Rare though these may 
be and despite their level of perplexity, dilemmas of this kind are 
nevertheless widely reported and experienced. As Davidson (1980) 
commented: 
~ife is crowded with examples of the following sort: 0 11 1 ought to do l~ be~ause it will save a life, I ought not because it will be a 
lle; lf I do it, I will break my word to Lavinia, if I don't I will 
break my word to Lolita"; and so on. (p34) 
Arguably, such experiences are a more common part of everyday life than, 
say, employment or marriage, which after all can elude many of us. Some 
.. ',.., 
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situations will indisputably be moral dilemmas (where the alternatives 
are a conflict of obligations or "oughts"); others will be nonpmoral 
dilemmas, where each alternative carries with it an unacceptable 
opportunity cost (although, as will be seen, the difference is not always 
clear-cut). All, however, constrain us to make an urgent decision on the 
issue. They are most obviously seen in the biographies of those who hold 
important posts of responsibility, where we may read of politicians 
forced into making compromises, commanders in the field making tough 
calculations about acceptable loss of life, surgeons faced with hard 
choices. 
It would, however, be a mistake to limit dilemmas to the lives of the 
great and the good, because they occur just as frequently in everyday 
life, decisions about jobs, about bringing up children, keeping promises, 
forming friendships, telling the·truth, divorce and much else besides. 
They are the stuff of popular journalism. In the summer of 1993 the 
Independent carried a weekly column by Virginia Ironside, entitled 
"Dilemmas" which discussed such everyday issues and successfully invited 
mass participation. light opera and romantic novels carry numerous 
examples of the kind: "How happy I'd be with either were t'other dear 
charmer away" (The Beggar's Opera, Act 2, Sc. 2, Air 25). 
1.1.2 Despite this evidence from practical living or common sense, many 
moral philosophers have questioned whether it can actually be possible 
that a person morally ought to do one thing and morally ought to do 
another, when"both cannot be done. This point of view is discussed in 
greater depth in SA and 58. It will be shown, however, that "dilemma" 
refers to a reality so widely experienced that to regard it as a misnomer 
or irrational would be unacceptably artificial. 
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The very fact that the occurrence of dilemma is universally reported is 
also used here as an argument for the greater use of dilemmatic 
situations in our· schools and colleges, as a worthwhile, indeed 
essential, component in the education of young people. 
1.2 Resolvable and Irresolvable Conflicts 
Put briefly, anp the question of definitions is discussed in more detail 
in chapter 2, it is assumed from the outset that a dilemma describes one 
of two situations: in the first the problem appears to be irresolvable. 
This may be when the choices ~vailable are difficult to compare. For 
example, in a moral dilemma, they may involve different principles. Plato 
(1974) gives the instance of whether you should return some weapons to 
the owner who will probably use them to kill. In this case the principle 
of promise keeping conflicts wi~h that of life saving (p66). This is not, 
of course, the end of the argument (see 2.4). 
Alternatively, there are some who claim that an irresolvable moral 
dilemma may describe a conflict within the same principle; for example, 
there could be a situation in which a team of surgeons has the duty of 
" ' 
trying to save the lives of both Siamese twins when they must, for 
contingent reasons, choose between them (we will ignore for the present 
the argument that this is not a moral question at all reg Donegan 1984 
p305]). In a different case, single principle dilemmas may simply be 
evenly balanced situations presenting symmetrical alternatives such as 
the choice between two good applicants for a post. 
1.2.1 A second type of dilemma is often said to arise even when the 
issue is in fact resolvable and a decision can be taken. There are many 
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kinds of resolution: it may be achieved by reconciliation between the 
alternatives, or by elimination of one of them; perhaps a solution can be 
found by conducting further enquiry. Each of these in theory cancels the 
original, apparent dilemma. It can, however, be argued that although it 
is clear, all things considered, which is the preferable course of 
action, and that therefore theoretically the matter can be resolved, the 
agent is left afterwards with serious doubts, a sen'se of regret or 
perhaps guilt about the rejected alternative. There is, as it were, a 
"remainder", even when a decision has been taken for the best. In these 
cases the problem has not been eliminated. The existence of this 
remainder is considered"by some to be evidence of a genuine dilemma 
situation. (Williams [1973], though it will be seen that Foot [1983 p382] 
and Conee [1982 p90] argue strongly that this is a faulty argument). 
1.3 The Recognition of Dilemma ' 
The expression "recognition of dilemma" (or RD) is frequently used in 
this study and may need some explanation. It refers to two very different 
abilities, the first being to perceive the existence of an alternative 
and the second being to accept its validity. "Recognition" implies not 
only awareness but also taking cognizance of, "the action of 
acknowledging as true, valid or entitled to consideration" (Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary). It can therefore be said to have these two 
components: 
(a) Knowledge: The awareness that there exist alternative perspectives. 
This is simply a recognition of reality in the sense that different 
people do as a matter of fact hold different opinions on the same issues .. 
(This is referred to later as RDl)., 
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(b) Acceptance: The acknowledgment that at least some of these points of 
view are legitimate, valid perspectives. This is the force of "entitled 
to consideration". (This is referred to as RD2.) 
1.4 Rationalism and Phenomenology 
It was pointed out above (I.I) that many moral philosophers question 
whether genuine dilemmas, the conflict of ultimate principles, can 
actually exist (whatever may appear to be the case). Depending on the 
philosophical standpoint taken, different views are taken on this issue. 
If one's approach to ethics is rationalist (in the tradition ~f Plato, 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant or Mill) one's inclination will be to adopt a 
more restricted view of what constitutes a moral problem. For instance, a 
moral problem will be distinguished from a contingent question such as 
how to decide which of two clashing engagements to keep, or an epistemic 
issue, such as which operation is the best for a surgeon to decide on in 
the circumstances, and examples of practical problem solving; then, 
having narrowed the definition of "moral", one will be inclined to argue 
that there is always a preferred alternative and to deny the possibility 
of a moral dilemma altogether. 
In a rational scheme of ethics to tolerate the existence of genuine moral 
dilemmas will seem to some like tolerating inconsistency (Donegan 1984. 
p291ff). On the other hand, others such as Brennan (1977) use the open 
I 
textured nature of moral concepts to argue that a rational scheme of 
ethics need not be cut and dried, thus leaving room for dilemmas. This 
will be discussed in chapter 5. 
If, however, one's standpoint is intuitionist or one's method 
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phenomenological (which is the case in this study), at least to the 
extent of taking seriously the individual experiences of those 
interviewed or observed,' one is likely to be convinced of the existence 
of genuine dilemma. Even after clarifying misconceptions, errors and 
inconsistencies it is both necessary and desirable to respect their 
descriptions of regret, guilt or remorse (see chapter 7). 
1.5 Why 16 -19 ,Year Old Students? 
Students of the 16-19 age group are at a distinctive period in their 
development, forming a-bridge between adolescence and adulthood (see 
10.5). Although they are still in full or part time education, they would 
regard themselves as young adults; they may have, in Piagetian terms, 
passed beyond the stage of formal operational thought and have adopted 
many of the characteristics of adult cognition (Rybash 1986 p56 et 
. 
passim). In chapter 8 and 10, it will be argued that they are a 
particularly interesting age group whose thinking has been valuable to 
study (see chapter 10, Louizos [1994], Marcia [1980] and Erikson [1959]). 
1.6 Former Research Objectives 
The purpose of this research developed significantly as it progressed and 
the objectives were altered (see 3.2). Originally, it was hoped to 
establish a connection between RO and ability. It was intuitively 
supposed that able students might be better at being aware of dilemmatic 
situations (R01), but would not necessarily be better at accepting that 
they were "entitled to consideration" (R02). It wai further speculated 
that resolving dilemmas was a skill that could perhaps improve with 
practice. It was also supposed that ability at RO might prove to be a 
good predictor of future outcomes, such as examination success or adult 
,r 
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achievement. It proved too difficult, however, to establish proper 
operational objectives for such hypotheses (and even unethical to attempt 
it); moreover, the quantitative method proposed, even had it been 
feasible to implement, would have done little to advance our 
understanding of the experience of dilemma itself. It gradually became 
clear, therefore, that not only were the objectives impractical, but the 
methodology inappropriate. The recast objectives and the change in 
approach are described below in the chapters on research objectives and 
methodology (chapters 3 and 4). 
1.7 The Current Purpose 
In this way, the overall aim of this research became a qualitative one, 
namely to illuminate the nature of dilemma, especially as experienced by 
16-19 year old students. There were three objectives (refined and 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 3): 
1.7.1 The first and main objective was to provide insights into the 
experience of dilemma. This was carried out in two ways: partly by 
attempting to clarify the concept as understood by philosophers, 
psychologists, dramatists and other writers (chapters 5, 6, 8 and 9). In 
addition, and to counterbalance these theories, the experience of dilemma 
as described by 16 - 19 year old students themselves was explored in 
order to illuminate the phenomenon as lived in practice (chapter 7). 
1.7.2 A second objective was to establish the case for including 
examples of dilemmas more methodically in educational programmes; this 
should be both a matter of increasing self knowledge and a preparation 
for adult responsibilities (chapter 10). 
,,'-
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1.7.3 The third research objective was to assist counsellors, tutors and 
others whose work puts them in daily contact with young adults, by 
providing a better understanding of the kind of experience young people 
go through when faced by serious predicaments in their studies or in 
their personal lives (chapters 7 and 10). 
1.8 A Phenomenological Approach and Multi Perspective Method 
It was decided that the most appropriate approach to achieve these ends 
would be phenomenological and the multi perspective method, or 
"triangulation", was adopted (chapter 4). In order to understand an 
experience it is necessary to begin by listening to those who describe 
it; that is self evident. Many people, however, are more articulate in 
the written word. Therefore the formulation of theories, the 
classification of other people's experiences, and rthe formation of 
categories, though a separate component of research, is also a valid way 
of clarifying the experience. Thus, it was necessary to look at what 
philosophers have written (chapter 5). The responsibility for taking 
/ 
decisions in dilemmatic situations leads frequently to compromises and 
"dirty hands", which is why the debate about political ethics wa~ also 
important (chapter 6). Likewise, dramatic literature has a contribution 
to make, in that it reflects and exemplifies life experience; the 
psychology of decision making (chapter 8) is also a relevant perspective, 
considering the process and the experience itself. The occurrence of 
contradiction-and ideological dilemma in Western societies is also an 
interesting phenomenon and may arguably be an essential prerequisite for 
the development of debating skills, the ability to argue and the 
, nurturing of common sense itself (chapter 9). Then", in order to relate 
the study directly to the classroom and the post 16 curriculum, a review 
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of relevant teaching strategies is also included (chapter 10). 
In summary, then, these were the six perspectives which were used to 
provide the insights into dilemma. The definitions were steadily refined 
as the perspectives were considered. Together they provided a cross check 
(or "triangulation", see 4.8) on the ideas about dil,emma which are put 
forward in the conclusion and helped to enhance our understanding of the 
experience. 
1.9 Conclusion 
It might be thought that to write about dilemma at all was either 
injudicious, by professing to know solutions to problems which escape 
others, or insignificant, by giving undue attention to commonplace 
troubles. However, it should now be clear that this study makes no claim 
to offer panaceas or ways of resolving problems, nor was it undertaken in 
order to establish the effectiveness of any particular technique for 
decision making; nor again was it to prove or disprove any quantitative 
hypotheses about dilemma. Inevitably, many questions remained unanswered 
and in the concluding chapter some suggestions are made about further 
. ' 
research which could usefully be carried out. At the end, an analysis of 
the accumulated data is offered, indicating some structure to dilemma 
thinking with different levels of perception, recognition and resolution. 
In so far as insigh~s emerge, it is hoped that their application will be 
found useful in the field of counselling and general post 16 education. 
Practitioners may find it helpful to bring to their work a framework for 
the analysis of dilemmatic situations and guidelines for approaching 
their interviews. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 WHAT IS DILEMMA? SOME WORKING DEFINITIONS 
This chapter will have two aims: to develop the initial meaning of 
dilemma which has been proposed (l.l) and to look at some other 
definitions provided by the literature on the six p~rspectives which, 
together with related terms and concepts, were selected for this 
research. First the key terms and concepts which are used will be 
defined. Then some of the underlying issues will be introduced, as 
debated by moral philosophers (which will be the subject of chapters 5 
and 6). The chapter will end with two summaries: one consisting of the 
separate elements contained in the working definition, as used for the 
remainder of the study; the other being a list of descriptive 
characteristics from the literature which have guided the research 
throughout. 
Given that the purpose was to gain a deeper understanding of the 
experience of dile~ma, whether described in interviews or analysed in 
philosophical debate, it was not necessary at this stage to decide 
finally between the various meanings given by others, nor to reach a 
~. 
clear definition, (indeed it would be contrary to the chosen approach to 
prejudge these issues); rather, the aim was to select the more 
significant examples of definition encountered and draw attention to 
their assumptions. 
It could be argued that to include definitions at this stage is 
inappropriate, that it goes against the grain of a phenomenological 
approach to set out with preformed concepts of th~s kind. This, however, 
would be to misunderstand the part they have played. It would be 
- 11 -
ingenuous and dangerously self deceptive to attempt to forget previously 
known definitions; it was therefore important to acknowledge their 
existence at the outset (to "bracket" them out, see 4.6.6) and 
deliberately to hold them in mind, not in order to provide tidy pigeon 
holes into which to catalogue each future observation and occurrence of 
dilemma, and by no means to close off further questioning of the 
assumptions made by those definitions, but to be alert to the different 
possibilities of interpretation and analysis. 
As regards the working definitions, it was a matter of practicality that 
some assumptions should be made; otherwise it would not have been 
possible to converse at all. When students and others were interviewed, 
therefore, they were usually asked at the beginning a rough grained 
question, such as, "What do you yourself mean by a difficult decision, 
one where the alternatives are evenly balanced?" In other situations, the 
view which was held at the start of this researcnwas adhered to, that 
dilemma was a common occurrence and could be described as: 
A particular kind of predicament, which is experienced by everyone 
at some time or another (which) occurs when the pressing 
alternatives available to us, or serious obligations we face, seem 
so .evenly balanced that it is hard, and sometimes impossible, to 
make a choice. (1.1) 
2.1 A Common yet Serious Experience 
That dilemma is a common experience must be beyond question. In addition 
to the examples quoted in 1.1 may be mentioned Barbara, in Shaw's Major 
Barbara, who was caught in the choice between giving up her work on 
behalf of the poor and accepting money that might have come from profits 
on drink and arms manufacture. Susan Howatch in Glittering Images 
portrays Archbishop Lang defending himself against a modernist's attack 
on his attitude towards the divorce laws: 
.r. 
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Caught between the Scylla of my moral inclinations and the Charybdis 
of my political duty," declared the A~chbishop, unable to r~s~st a 
grandiloquent flourish, "I had no cholce but to adopt a posltlon of 
neutrality."(1988 p6) 
The meaning of "pressing" or "serious ll need hardly detain us. Whatever 
the agent regards as such will be sufficient criterion for the purpose of 
this research. Several writers have tried to ·ensure that the trivial is 
excluded, especially in the debate on the appropriateness of guilt 
feelings, (see 5A 5 and eg Statman 1990 p206). To attempt to discover 
some objective criterion of seriousness would be absurd in a study 
centred on the experience of dilemma. The claim itself is self 
justifying, even if the interviewer considers the opinion to be over 
scrupulous or precious, for that is not his or her concern. We can now 
add to this preliminary definition some other qualifying concepts. 
2.2 Moral and Non-Moral Situations 
In the first place, as was made clear (1.1) we are reviewing many kinds 
of dilemma situation; some could be described as moral and others as 
non-moral. In a moral dilemma the choices are normally referred to as 
obligatioris, duties, commitments or lIoughtsll. In a non-moral dilemma they 
.. 
are simply referred to as alternatives. The distinction may not always be 
clear, but this is not critical; the concern here was not to establish at 
the outset a precise boundary between moral and non-moral; indeed, this 
might not be an achievable aim. Nussbaum (1985) stated the problem like 
this: 
The use of the two categories IImoralll and IInonmoralll suggests to 
numerous writers on the topic that the cases to be investigated fall 
into two neatly demarcated and opposed categories. They accordingly 
structure their discussions around this sharp division .. By 
contrast .. in everyday life we find, instead, a complex spectrum of 
cases, interrelated and overlapping in ways not captured by any 
dichotomous taxonomy. (p239, also 1986 p27f although Brennan argued 
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that the distinction is crucial to our thinking about morals, 1977 
p55f) 
Once again, it was considered sufficient to accept the agent's own 
description of the experience. If that was perceived as "mora l" or 
"non-moral" then it was important to begin the analysis by considering it 
as such. 
2.3 Resolvable Dilemmas 
Reference has been made on several occasions to dilemma being either 
resolvable or irresolvable. If a dilemma is resolvable, it is taken to 
mean that a rational preference between the available alternatives can be 
given. This may be articulated in a variety of reasoned arguments: 
"option A has these favourable outcomes which make it superior to option 
8." Or "mora l principle X has priority over principle Y". Or it may 
simply be expressed as an intuition: "I know this·to be the right course 
of action", perhaps through introspection or some form of insight 
(leaving aside for the present the difficulties in maintaining such a 
position). 
2.3.1 There may be objections to defining some dilemmas as resolvable. 
It might be asked whether this is not a contradiction in terms. Surely at 
the instant a solution is seen, the original dilemma disappears? The 
answer most frequently put forward is that there are different kinds of 
resolution. Sometimes, for example, in cases of extreme perplexity, a 
decision may be taken in desperation, spontaneously and with no attempt 
at reasoned deliberation. In these cases, the dilemma remains even though 
some relief may be felt at making a decision. The fact that a decision 
has been taken does not by itself eradicate the dllemma; it is possible 
that although a decision has been taken, no real solution has been found . 
... r I 
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In this case the dilemma has remained unresolved. 
Other dilemmas may be eliminated by finding a reconciliation (for 
example, by accommodating two engagements), or by finding a compromise 
between two seemingly irreconcilable points of view (for example in 
national territorial disputes). Hegel (1975) saw the role of tragedy as 
being to seek such a reconciliation (see 9.2.2). 
2.3.2 More important, (and this is used by some as a justification for 
speaking of genuine dilemma) there are other occasions when, despite 
careful thought being given to the decision, there is some remainder 
attaching to the overidden obligation which makes the agent feel a sense 
of regret, guilt, remorse or even anguish. It is argued (eg Statman 1990 
p206) that these sentiments are often appropriate to the case and that 
therefore they establish the reality even of an oyeridden obligation; 
thus the situation, though it had a reasonable solution, was indeed a 
"real" dilemma and perhaps continues to remain so. In these cases, the 
dilemma may be said to be resolved objectively but not eliminated 
subjectively. 
To give an example: Diogenes Laertius tells the story of a young man who 
was much perplexed about whether or not to get married. He takes his 
problem to the philosopher Socrates and asks his advice. Clearly he hoped 
to receive some words of practical wisdom and guidance from the great 
man; instead,.however, he received the somewhat stark reply: "Whatever 
you do, you will regret it" (Laertius 1972 pI63). 
Breaking a relationship is even more likely to leave regrets, guilt or 
remorse. Whether to terminate a partnership or not may be resolved by 
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decision but this by no means cancels out the dilemma, either at the 
point of decision or subsequently. Norah, in Ibsen's A D077's House 
(1958), is faced with the problem whether or not to leave Helmer, her 
home and her children. She struggles with herself and eventually decides 
she owes it to herself to return to her former home. Helmer thi~ks she is 
mad, and chides her harshly. "All your father's want of principle has 
come out in you. No religion, no morality, no sense of duty ... " Nora 
says, "I must stand quite alone, if I am to understand myself and 
everything about me ... " Helmer calls her, "You blind, foolish woman! ... 
It is shocking. This is how you would neglect your most sacred duties". 
Nora asks what they are. "Do I need to tell you that?", says Helmer, "Are 
they not your duties to your husband and your children?" Nora replies, "I 
have other duties just as sacred ... duties to myself." (Act 3) Even 
though her mind is made up, the dilemma remains. "It gives me great 
pain," she says to Helmer, "because you have always been so kind to me, 
but I cannot help it. I don't love you any more." 
2.4 Irresolvable Dilemmas 
It was suggested above (2.3.1) that some dilemmas may be unresolved even 
.' though decisions have been taken, either because they were inadequate to 
the situation, or taken in desperation, or simply being the best 
available. A dilemma is described as "irresolvable" usually because there 
is no rational way of comparing the alternatives or obligations. They 
cannot be weighed against each other (see 1.2). They may involve two or 
more different principles, such as loyalty to one's friend and honesty. 
Pluralists, who argue that such a variety of principles is a normal part 
of the reality of practical living (eg Hampshire 1983 pI51f), or a matter 
of common sense (Billig 1988), would therefore say that these are 
irresolvable because they are incommensurable. This means that it is not 
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merely difficult in practice to find a solution to the conflict but 
impossible in principle.,Gaut (1993) gives the example of a mother whose 
son has committed a crime and he asks her to shelter him from the police. 
In some cases, depending on his crime, she will know what she ought to 
do. But in others her duty will be unclear: 
In these cases the agony she may feel is a product of her 
recognition that she is caught in the vice of two independent moral 
principles - to save her son and not to harbour criminals- each of 
which is deeply embedded in a role she identifies with: as a mother 
and as a citizen. (p35) 
It is as difficult, or so it is argued, to find a common standard by 
which to compare these "two independent moral principles" as to compare 
apples with pears. Of course, put like this, the challenge will 
immediately be taken up; in practice, just as we can compare the latter 
by price, or weight, so we can prioritise the former by a straightforward 
value such as her overriding obligation as a mother (see 58.4,5,9). 
2.4.1 Another type of dilemma which can be described as "irresolvable" 
is the conflict which arises when there are incompatible obligations 
derived from the same principle. Marcus puts it like this: 
Under the single principle of promise-keeping, I might make'two 
promises in all good faith and reason that they will not conflict, 
but then they do, as a result of circumstances that were 
unpredictable and beyond my control. All other considerations may 
balance out. The lives of identical twins are in jeopardy, and 
through force of cirumstances, I am in a position to save only one. (Marcus 1980 p125) 
Donegan, how~ver, argued that this is not so much a moral conflict as a 
practical problem (see 5A 4). From the fact that I have a duty to save 
either a or b it does not follow that I have a duty to save a and a duty 
to save b. 
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2.5 Equal and Symmetrical Alternatives 
These examples raise the question of whether, as many would argue, equal 
and symmetrical alternatives, obligations which weigh the same, are 
genuinely "irresolvable". The dictionary definition quoted in 1.1 refers 
to a choice between alternatives "which are or appear equally 
unfavourable". What is the meaning of "equally" her'e? If it were 
interpreted strictly, as meaning of equal weight on a scale, it would 
suggest that there could be no rational grounds for preferring either 
decision. The choice might just as well be settled by a toss of the coin. 
We could not seek a rational solution by selecting the more favourable of 
the two alternatives, because there would be, as we might say, nothing to 
choose between them. If the choice is in fact an equal one (which of two 
children to save from a burning house, or which of two equally deserving 
patients to operate on), it can be argued that it ceases to be a moral 
dilemma and becomes a·matter of practicality. 
Absolute equality of two obligations is in fact extremely unusual, and 
Sophie's choice is remarkable for its dramatic rarity. Moreover, 
symmetrical duties are the supposition of an impartial observer, someone 
who can withdraw himself or herself from the situation. In reality, this 
is unlikely to be the case. Dilemmas are sometimes resolved by a 
prejudiced participant, unjustly perhaps but still rationally because 
judgments will have taken place about the participant's feelings, or 
interests. The mother has a special involvement when asked to hide her 
son. She will resolve the dilemma by consciously rejecting the moral 
standpoint and the coldness and impartiality of justice. Or perhaps the 
moral dilemma is rejected by emphasising a different point of view 
altogether. Abraham may have perceived a moral dilemma but could see no 
religious one; the former he put behind him in favour of the absolute 
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obligation of the latter to obey God's command. 
2.5.1 Etymology alone cannot settle issues of current meaning 
("etymology is slight evidence of what the idea signified now is" [Mill, 
1954, p43]) but it may shed light on this question of "equality". Dilemma 
in Greek (I) t.. - twi ce and ~?p,p,a - assumpt i on) imp 1 i es, that there are two 
alternative premises which may be adopted. The two premises are usually 
referred to as "the horned syllogism", both of which prove a contrary 
point. There is no suggestion here that they are symmetrical and there is 
no reference to equality in this derivation, let alone equality on a 
calibrated scale. Thus, it is quite possible to make a rational preference 
for the best assumption. The agent can simply say "Let us take the first 
assumption, the consequences of which are such and such and compare it 
with the second, the consequences of which are less favourable. It is 
clear to me which is preferable and my decision is,determined 
accordingly." 
2.6 Alternatives Equally Unfavourable? 
The next question to consider is whether dilemma should be defined 
negatively or positively. The decision to be taken may be between two 
equally favourable alternatives, but what makes us describe it as a 
dilemma is that each will have some cost; if it is a moral dilemma that 
cost may be a sense of guilt. It will have been noticed that the Oxford 
English Dictionary describes the alternatives as being equally 
unfavourab7e, so let us now consider this supposed negative 
characteristic of dilemma. Must it always have undesirable outcomes? Is 
it always the case that whatever you choose will have equally unpleasant 
implications? We have many expressions derived from common sense that 
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would suggest this was the case: we speak of "jumping out of the frying pan 
into the fire", or being "in a cleft stick", "in a tight corner", or 
between "Scylla and Charybdis", or "between a rock and a hard place." 
There is a Latin saying which reinforces the same idea: "In front the 
precipice, behind the wolf" (quoted in Billig 1988 p9). It is also 
interesting to see how many synonyms for dilemma carry a negative sense 
("fix, jam, hole, mess" etc). 
2.6.1 A negative dilemma, however, can sometimes be reversed by 
producing an equally cogent dilemma to the contrary effect. There is an 
example, in Aristotle's-Rhetoric, of an Athenian mother who advised her 
son "Do not enter into public business; for if you say what is just, men 
will hate you; and if you say what is unjust, the Gods will hate you." To 
this Aristotle suggested the following retort: "I ought to enter into 
public affairs; for if I say what is just, the Gods will love me; and if 
I say what is unjust,. men will love me" (1975 p313). Aristotle may 
achieve a debating point with this argument, but it does not alter the 
fact that speaking justly or unjustly will in either case bear a negative 
cost. 
2.6.2 Dilemmas may therefore sometimes appear to present favourable 
alternatives. Often they are expressed as choices between positive poles: 
deciding between two possible marriage partners, selecting which of two 
excellent candidates for a post, choosing between a job now with 
immediate income and further education with deferred advantages, these 
are all positive choices in themselves. However, in so far as dilemma is 
defined as a "situation" which has undesirable consequences as an 
opportunity cost benefit, it would appear correct to characterise it as 
unfavourable. 
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2.7 Dilemmas versus Problems 
Another point which is often raised is whether it is necessary or even 
possible to distinguish between a "dilemma" and a "problem". Certainly, 
students are more likely to approach a tutor or a counsellor saying that 
they have a "problem" than a "dilemma", which is hardly their normal 
language. If asked, they will frequently make no further distinction. 
Some, however, are quite careful in their choice of words. One, for 
example, when asked what he regarded as a difficult decision, replied it 
is "when you have to make a choice between something that you want to do 
and something that you 'don't want to do and you have to decide which is 
the right way to go" (interview 3). 
Another, in answer to the same question, said "It is one where you 
don't know which way to go, you don't want it to turn out wrong in the 
.. 
end, but you just think, am I going to regret this? But I don't know how 
to explain it" (interview 7). It was therefore assumed during this study 
that a distinction between a problem and a dilemma was not simply a 
technical philosophical point but could very well be made in everyday 
conversation. This led to a search for the distinguishing features. 
2.7.1 The conclusion reached in this thesis was that "problem" can be 
distinguished from "dilemma" by focusing on the question of a post 
decisional "remainder". Some problems are resolvable,· others are not. But 
the distinguishing characteristic of all problems is that, once solved, 
they disappear. A problem does not remain once it is resolved, nor leave 
the agent with a sense of loss or regret. "Dilemmas", on the other hand, 
require choices which will leave "remainders", in the form of regret, 
guilt or simply a poignant memory of personal involvement (see 58 16). 
Therefore, a "dilemma" is not simply a problem with a difference; it is a 
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distinct category on its own, one in which "whatever you do you will 
regret it". A problem may range from a straightforward brain teaser to a 
complex personal quandary, but it will always carry the presumption that 
there is a correct solution to be found; once this is done, any remainder 
felt will not be regret, or guilt or sense of loss but, if anything, will 
be a sense of satisfaction that the task has been completed. 
2.7.2 This raises the question, does not the remainder depend on the 
character of the person rather than the nature of the dilemma? This 
certainly seems to be the case. For example, if Abraham was the kind of 
person who cared little for morality but a great deal for religion, he 
might understand the moral dilemma but follow the religious duty of 
obedience. He would have no regrets. Alternatively, Abraham might be both 
deeply moral and religious. In which case, he might see the moral 
dilemma, struggle with it, but eventually follow~the religious path. He 
would then be ashamed that he had forsaken the moral standpoint. This 
option, however, would not be open to anyone who (with Kant) defined 
"moral" as an overriding concern. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
character of the agent will determine the nature of remainder and, to 
that extent, the nature of the dilemma experience. We should however 
avoid the trap of seeing dilemma as "merely subjective" simply because it 
is impossible to disentangle the two elements, dilemma and a person's 
reaction to it (see 4.6.4). 
Some definitions from different philosophical standpoints and academic 
perspectives will now be given. They will show how, according to the way 
the idea of obligation is defined, it is possible either to rule out 
dilemma altogether or to allow for its genuine ex.istence. The first will 
be used as the starting point in the discussion from the perspective of 
, r. 
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moral philosophy (see chapter 5). 
2.8 Ultimate Standards 
Gowans (1987) defines dilemma in a way which highlights the 
incompatibility of conflicting obligations: 
A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent S morally ought to 
do A and morally ought to do B but cannot do both, either because B 
is just not~doing A or because some contingent feature of the world 
prevents doing both. (p3) 
It is, clear that, if by "ought" we mean a recommendation for action, and 
"ought" implies "can", then S is being recommended to do somethi'ng which 
he'or she cannot do, which ex hypothesi is impossible (but see 58.7 where 
Gowans offers as a clarification of the inconsistency the suggestion that 
there is a distinction between "ought" and "must" and that only the 
latter is an all-things-considered obligat'ion which cannot conflict with 
another "must"). 
Kant (1964) based his ethical philosophy, which has probably been the 
most influential rationalist system of the past two centuries, upon 
"categorical imperatives". These are "unconditional practical laws" 
according to which certain actions are, "morally possible or morally 
impossible", of which some are "morally necessary, i.e. obligatory. Hence 
for morally necessary actions there arises the concept of a duty" (p21). 
"The categorical imperative, which in general only expresses what 
obligation is, is this: act according to a maxim which can at the same 
time be valid as a universal law!" (p25). It is, according to Kant, an 
idea wh ich is, founded upon the concept of freedom., "Ob 1 igat ion is the 
necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason" 
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(p21). By this is meant that, if it were not free, that is if the agent 
was prevented by some constraint from performing the action, it could 
not be described as an obligation. For this reason, in Kant's system 
"ought" implies "can" and the argument can be developed that dilemmas are 
inconceivable (see also SA 3.1). 
Since duty and obligation in general are concepts which express the 
objective practical necessity of certain actions, and since two 
opposite rules cannot be necessary at the same time, then if it is a 
duty to act in accordance with one of them it is not only not a 
duty, but contrary to duty, to act in accordance with the other. It 
therefore follows that a conflict of duties and obligations is 
inconceivable (ob7igationes non co77iduntur). (p2S) 
Kant then goes on to say, however, that two "g~ounds" of obligation can 
be "conjoined in a subject and in the rule which he prescribes to 
himself", but in such a case we do not have two conflicting obligations 
but two conflicting "grounds", the weaker of which is overridden by the 
stronger and what we are left with is one obligation (see SA 3). 
2.9 All Things Considered 
However, "ought" is only one, and perhaps the most undifferentiated, way 
in which we can express the obligation we feel. Searle (1978), for 
instance, listed those statements about obligation or duty which, in his 
view, it was important not to confuse: 
(a) X has an obligation to do A. 
(b) X has a duty to do A. 
(c) It would be a good thing if X did A. 
(d) X ought, other things being equal, to do A. 
(e) X ought to do A. 
(f) All things considered, X ought to do A. (p87) 
Clearly the obligation expressed in (a) entails (d) and would conflict 
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with a demand to do something different, such as "other things being 
equal X ought to do B"; howevever, it does not entail (f) and would not 
conflict with a demand "all things considered, X ought to do B". 
Therefore, a dilemma containing the twin obligations "X ought to do A" 
and "All things considered, X ought to do B" does not present X with 
incompatible demands. Clearly, these definitions all~w us to speak about 
dilemma without self contradiction (see also Gowans 1987, Foot 1983 and 
SA 7). 
2.9.1 There is another similar attempt to distinguish between the types 
of obligation or "ought" which one might face. A "non overridden moral 
reason" is much like a reason which "all things considered" justifies the 
agent's choice (see above 2.3). It does not rule out that there may be 
other "oughts", duties or obligations. But it argues that in this 
particular circumstance the other sources of obligation do not override 
the decisive moral reason for the agent's choice. 
Moral dilemmas can be defined as situations where there is a moral 
requirement for an agent to adopt each of two alternatives and the 
agent cannot adopt both, but neither moral requirement is overridden 
in a morally relevant way. Such situations vary from trivial to 
tragic, but what makes them all dilemmatic is that each alternative 
violates a moral requirement that is not overidden. (Sinnott-
Armstrong 1985 p322) 
2.10 . Beliefs and Desires 
In a very different definition, the ethical goal is likened to one of 
desire not belief. Williams (1973) argued that desires are not true or 
false in the same way as beliefs are. If you believe it is raining but 
go outside and find you are mistaken, your belief then terminates. Not so 
with desires: 
A moral conflict shares with a conflict of desires, but not with a 
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conflict of beliefs, the feature that to end it in decision is not 
necessarily to eliminate one of the conflicting items: the item that 
was not acted upon may, for instance, persist as regret, which may 
(though it does not always) receive some constructive expression .... 
Moral conflicts are neither systematically avoidable, nor all 
soluble without remainder. (Williams 1973 p182) 
From this standpoint, Williams seems to be arguing two cases: that there 
exist some genuine dilemmas which are resolvable without remainder; also 
that others exist which are resolvable with a remainder (in the sense 
that a choice could resolve the two conflicting obligations much as it 
could resolve two conflicting desires). This would imply that he allows 
"objective" dilemmas, with no remainder, and "subjective" dilemmas which 
have a remainder. A post· decisional cost is therefore a sufficient but 
not a necessary characteristic (see 58 16, Al and 81). 
2.10.1 Taking Williams' point further, Statman (1990) argued that 
dilemmas are both genuine and resolvable. Indeed, he considered the 
disagreement over the "so-called reality" of moral dilemmas to be 
misplaced. His own definition draws attention to what he sees as the 
essential distinguishing characteristic, which is the sense of "high 
moral loss" and the reasonableness of feelings of guilt. There is nothing 
inconsistent in saying, "It was the right action but I still have 
I 
remorse", for this refers to a rational estimation of one's feelings. As 
he explained: 
1. P ought to do A and ought to do B. (Or, if one prefers the 
terminology of reasons: P has a reason to dO.A, and a reason to 
do B.) 
2. A and B are incompatible. 
3. DOing A and doing B each (separately) involves a high moral 
loss. 
4. It is rational for P to have guilt feelings whatever he does. (p206) 
- 26 -
2.11 Dilemma in Traditional logic 
In traditional logic, a dilemma is a form of argument in which the 
participant is caught between two difficulties (the "horns"); he or she 
is committed to accepting one "of two propositions each of which is 
undesirable because it contradicts his/her original· contention. It can be 
defined as "a syllogism, having a conditional major premise with more 
than one antecedent, and a disjunctive minor" (Jevons 1913 pI67). As 
Stebbing (1965) defined it: 
-A dilemma is a compound argument consisting of a premiss in which 
two hypotheticals are conjunctively affirmed and a premiss in which 
the antecedents are alternatively affirmed or the consequents 
alternatively denied. (pSI) 
2.11.1 There are at least three forms in which such a logical dilemma 
may be stated. The first is the Simple Constructive Dilemma: 
If A is B, C is D; and if E is F, C is D; 
But either A is B, or E is F; 
Therefore C is D. 
For example, one can argue as follows: "if marriage promotes stability in 
society, it should be encouraged; and if it provides the most 
satisfactory environment within which to raise children, it should be 
encouraged; but either marriage promotes stability in society or it 
provides the most satisfactory environment within which to raise 
children; therefore it deserves to be encouraged." 
2.11.2 There are two further forms of logical dilemma; the Complex 
Constructive Dilemma which is of the form: 
If A is B, C is D; and if E is F, G is H; 
But either A is B, or E is F; 
Therefore either C is D, or G is H. 
, 
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For example, take the argument, "If a politician, who discovers that his 
first standpoint on an issue of public concern is founded on falsehood, 
does not change his policy, he will be misleading the people; and if he 
does change his policy he is open to the accusation of inconsistency; but 
either he does not change his p~licy or he does; therefore he is either 
misleading the people, or he is open to the accusation of inconsistency." 
In this example, as in the majority of dilemmas, the terms A, B, C, D etc 
are not all different. 
2.11.3 The Destructive Dilemma, which is always complex, is in this 
form: 
If A is B, C is D; and if E is F, G is H; 
But either C is not D, or G is not H; 
Therefore either A is not B, or E is not F. 
An example would be "If this man were prudent, he would not make racist 
remarks as a joke; and if he were a good man, he would not do so in 
seriousness; but he does make racist remarks, either as a joke or in 
seriousness; therefore he is either not prudent or not a good man" (the 
examples have been adapted from Jevons 1913 pp167-169). 
This excursion into the definitions of traditional logic has been made 
not because the details are particularly relevant to our present concern, 
but because they support the view that, if the alternatives are two 
premises, a rational choice can be made between them just as between any 
other two value_principles and it is not in itself logically inconsistent 
.that they should co-exist as alternatives. This approach also prepares the 
ground for the next definition. 
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2.12 Dilemma and Rhetoric 
In traditional rhetoric, such as in Quinti1ian's The Training of an 
Orator (1958), the emphasis lies upon the instruction of those who wish 
to communicate. In modern rhetoric, the focus shifts to the listener or 
reader and, especially under the influence of Existentialism or 
Phenomenology, considers that our basic method of judgment is through 
argumentation either in dialogue with others or with a text, or even with 
ourselves. The outcome of this transaction will inevitably be a 
relativistic one, temporary and dilemmatic. As Billig (1988) stated it: 
The characteristic of a dilemma which makes it significant for 
social analysis is that it is more complex than a simple choice or 
even a straightforward technical prob1em .... the characteristics .. 
are revealed as fundamentally born out of a culture which produces 
more than one possible ideal world, more than one hierarchical 
arrangement of power, value and interest .... in this sense social 
beings are confronted by and deal with dilemmatic situations as a 
condition of their humanity. (Billig 1988 p163 researcher's italics) 
Billig in this definition (which incidentally makes no distinction 
between moral and non-moral dilemma, see above 2.2) argued that genuine 
dilemmas are a natural part of our human existence. We have to learn how 
to deal with them. We shall consider this further in chapter 9 a1~ 
taking up his claim, made elsewhere, that common sense itself contains 
the seeds of dilemma and that a thinking society depends on conflict and 
debate to exist and to be sustained. 
2.13 Summary of the Salient Features of Dilemma 
It will now be useful to summarise the salient features of dilemma, both 
in our working definitions and in the selected literature, at this stage 
in the research. It is worth bearing in mind that any differences seen in 
this selection of definitions from the preliminary reading may arise 
" . 
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either from variations in world view (some of which will be mutually 
incompatible, as with the pluralist and the utilitarian) or simply from 
differences in the objectives of the particular perspective in question 
(in which case they may only reflect the interests of that perspective). 
2.13.1 The working definitions in the initial stages 9f the research 
required that dilemmas would exhibit the following characteristics. 
They would all be:-
(1) Everyday occurrences, yet pressing and serious to the 
participant, not-trifling or inconsequential. 
(2) Conflict situations, presenting evenly balanced choices or 
obligations. 
(3) Conflicts derived from the incompatible demands of either a 
single principle or a pluralist ethic. 
(4) 
(5) 
Situations which cause unfavourable consequences, i.e. leaving 
I 
some remainder, whichever alternative is selected. 
Distinguishable from problems in that only the latter leave no 
remainder and are eliminated when solved. 
(6) Either resolvable or irresolvable. 
2.13.2 Some dilemmas will be: 
(1) moral conflicts (e.g. is it right to kill in ~hese 
circumstances?), whilst others will ostensibly be non-moral 
(e.g. which operation has fewest side effects?). 
(2) Situations. where the-existence of alternatives is perceived but 
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where their validity may not be acknowedged. 
(3) Symmetrical in appearance, while others will have an ostensible 
preferred option. 
2.13.3 Finally, depending on one's philosophical sta~dpoint or 
particular perspective, dilemmas may be described as: 
(1) Either "real", in some objective sense, or a construct of the 
agent. 
(2) The "horned syllogism" of traditional logic. 
(3) Inherent in a thinking society and implied by common sense 
reasoning. 
(4) Bearing a post decisional remainder, sometimes expressed as regret 
or guilt. 
(5) Philosophically unacceptable or logically untenable. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The intention in this chapter is to elaborate on the research objectives 
briefly described previously (I.7), giving the reasoning behind them, the 
questions and the assumptions adopted, together with what it is hoped to 
achieve. There then follows a summary of the subsidiary aims contained 
within the six perspectives on dilemma, which were selected in order to 
provi?e as complete a picture of the subject as possible (within the 
constraints of such a study and the limits on time and finance). 
3.1 Objectives, Questions and Assumptions. 
"The first and main objective was to provide insights into our 
understanding of the experience of dilemma" (I.7.I). By this was meant 
being aware of the different connotations to the term and also 
appreciating what it is like to experience it. There were therefore two 
cardinal questions to ask: 
3.1.1 The first was, what are the various strands of meaning which can 
be teased out of the word "dilemma"? In the section on definitions (I.I, 
2.0) it was seen that, taking the philosophical perspective alone, there 
were those who regarded dilemma as a situation which, however it was 
resolved, would leave the agent with regrets; others saw it as meaning an 
irreconcilable conflict, which in turn led them to question whether such 
situations could "really" exist and to conclude that dilemmas (so called) 
could always be resolved rationally and satisfactorily. In a later 
chapter, on the "dirty hands" debate (6.0), it will be shown how yet 
other writers have regarded dilemmas as the clash between two moralities, 
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one applicable to public office and the other to private life. 
It is clear, therefore, that dilemma is a multi faceted term, interpreted 
variously, with elements of urgent decision making, moral soul searching, 
practical problem solving and educational experience, amongst others. The 
-' 
most effective method of diagnosing that experience was judged to be by 
adopting a number of different perspectives, for example philosophical, 
psychological and political, each with its own questions and interests. 
This is further explained in chapter 4.0 on methodology, especially in 
relation to the "triangulatjon" method. 
3.1.2 The second question within this objectiv~ was, what is it like to 
experience dilemma? This required an investigation amongst those students 
who were prepared to describe and discuss it. After very few discussions, 
it was apparent that dilemma was also understood by these agents in very 
different ways, which reinforced the same diverse and multi faceted 
characteristic found in the literature. The issue for one student was 
whether or not to leave her family, raising questions of income for 
living expenses and location near the college (interview 2);~Another 
student was fretting about which A levels to study, primarily a case' of 
careers advice and self knowledge (interview 3); another was torn between 
breaking with former friends and forming new ones, a personal cost either 
way with old loyalties being strained by new circumstances (interview 
15); another wanted to break a promise to her mother but felt guilty 
about it (interview 10). Clearly these issues could not be encompassed or 
adequately investigated by a mono disciplinary approach •. Thus again, it 
was considered to be more effective to use a number of different 
perspectives. 
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3.1.3 The second research objective was "to establish the case for 
including examples of dilemma more methodically in educational 
programmes". To do this, it was first necessary to ask what opportunities 
already existed in the post 16 curriculum. For this purpose the 
curriculum was understood in the widest sense to include programmes of 
study, general educational experience, examination syllabuses and also 
the hidden curriculum. 
The two assumptions being made here were that such predicaments are 
embedded in our culture (s~e chapter 9.0) and occur very commonly (2.1); 
also that education should in some way prepare for this and that much 
could be learned from reflecting upon the experience of dilemma. This 
objective implies that we establish the importance in'adult thinking of 
coping with such phenomena, the common acceptance of dilemmas in the work 
place, whether professional, white collar or manual. 
3.1.4 An earlier study gave some encouragement to the assumption that 
dilemmas existed in specific disciplines or domains (Miller 1990). They 
required different skills. For example, an instantaneous dec'ision between 
options whilst playing football is clearly not relying on the same skill 
as a measured selection of the best translation, or a resolution of a 
difficulty in craft or design. All, however, shared the basic 
characteristic of being a situation in which one of two evenly balanced 
decisions had to be taken, each leaving a costly remainder, regardless of 
which choice was made. This earlier study provided some evidence that 
dilemmas can be incorporated directly into educational programmes for 
post 16 students. But why should it be important to do so? The evidence, 
discussed in 8.0, indicates that predicaments of this'kind are so 
intrinsic to adult cognition that any educational system purporting to 
"prepare" for adult responsibilities should take dilemma seriously, and 
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rather more so than appears to be the case at present. 
3.1.5 In the USA especially, much work has been done on critical 
thinking, on problem solving, creative thinking and lateral thinking (see 
chapters 8 and 10) but none of these is precisely what is meant by 
.' 
"dilemma". Thinking logically, discovering the correct solution, thinking 
divergently, however valuable as skills, is not the same as learning to 
"recognise dilemma". It is rare to discover programmes which encourage 
the idea that two or more solutions can sometimes be equally valid and 
entitled to consideration, or that students should be prepared for the 
consequence that many decisions they take will involve living with regret 
(or worse). 
Some of the best educational materials available are those prepared for 
the "enrichment" courses-for "gifted pupils". However, the assumption 
taken in this thesis has been that such materials are best regarded as 
examples of normal good teaching; they should therefore be available for 
all pupils and not reserved solely for "Gifted and Talented" programmes 
or special needs purposes. This argument is developed further in chapter 
10. 
3.1.6 The third objective was "to assist counsellors, tutors and others 
. 
whose work puts them in daily contact with young adults". The use to' 
which an increased understanding of dilemma will be put in schools and 
colleges will depend greatly on the opportunities which exist in those 
institutions for counselling, 'careers advice and individual tutorials. 
This in turn will reflect their organisation and misston. The question 
being asked here is how a better understanding of the concept and the 
experience of dilemma can provide guidelines and a framework for analysis 
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and diagnosis. 
There are a number of assumptions being made here: one is a particular 
view of the tutor's role, which should, it is claimed, include the 
obligation to treat the personal,'pastoral issues which trouble students, 
in addition to the academic; indeed it is assumed that, with this age 
group, no distinction between the pastoral and the academic can 
ultimately be drawn and the responsibility of tutors inevitably covers 
both spheres. 
These, then, were the three research objectives adopted. A fair summary 
would be: to look at the way dilemma has been understood by 
theoreticians, for example by moral and political philosophers, by 
psychologists and dramatists, as well as by those who can describe their 
own experiences; in this way a greater understanding of this phenomenon 
.. ' 
should be achieved in order to support the work of counsellors and others 
and to be of some practical assistance especially to those involved in 
the education of 16 - 19 year old students. 
3.2 Early Stages in the Research 
A considerable distance has been travelled since starting out on this 
research and a significant shift in objectives and method·has taken 
place. At first the interest centred on the relation between dilemma 
thinking and (a) academic ability and (b) maturation. The questions which 
were important at that time were: was it the case that very able students 
were better at recognizing alternatives (RD1) than average ability 
students, but no better at acknowledging their validity (RD2)? Did higher 
scores at RD2 corrrelate with better results at public examinations, and 
if so, what was the implication of this? Is it possible that older or 
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more mature subjects were more relativistic in their thinking than 
younger? Were there gender differences in attitude towards dilemma? Was 
RD domain specific in· the sense that students would prove better at it in 
their chosen A levels than in the general dilemmas put to them in 
interviews, or in their personal lives? 
3.2.1 In the earlier study (Miller 1990), five hypotheses had previously 
been devised and an attempt made to operationalise the research (p48-56). 
It was soon apparent that the methodological problems were immense: in 
the first place, there was ~e definition of "gifted" or very able; even 
when this was overcome in an educationally acceptable way, there was the 
notorious question of identification. What criteria other than 
intelligence could be relied upon? Hardly any easier was the concept of 
maturation as applied to our subject; were there "stages" in cognitive or 
moral development (as .proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg. for. example)? Did 
they occur consecutively, or cumulatively? Was it possible to advance 
(in, say, RD) and then to regress? In the end, the difficulties 
encountered proved insuperable, although much that was useful was learned 
in the process. 
3.2.2 At first it was hoped to take some of these objectives further in 
the current research, but such were the operational difficulties and the 
planning of appropriate fieldwork that it became clear that a radical 
revision of these objectives was required. If the goal was to understand 
more about judgment and dilemma, what need was there to make such huge 
assumptions? This research therefore made no attempt to reach 
quantifiable conclusions or to establish the kind of hypotheses 
previously considered. 
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3.2.3 Another assumption that should be made clear is that this was not 
a study in "grounded theory"; no assumption has been made that a "core" 
meaning, common to all dilemmas, would be found. In fact it was soon 
clear that, from such a multiplicity of examples and experiences, it was 
unlikely that one could distill an "essence" of the concept of dilemma. 
Indeed, as one listened to the descriptions of quandaries and 
perplexities which fell within the preliminary definition, the opposite 
seemed to be ,the case. Common sense suggested that there was a plurality 
of experiences rather than a single category, a cluster of different 
types, some irresolvable, so~e resolvable with remainder, some with 
preferred solutions, some with no clear escape from the perplexity, some 
raising moral issues, others not. 
3.2.4 It was hoped that this research would provide a typology of 
dilemma with different levels, perhaps even a hierarchy, but the 
assumption at this stage was that no categories would be found that could 
be imposed upon other people's experiences or override their decription 
of them. The argument of this thesis is that it is one thing to seek 
agreement by persuasion (for instance, that a particular cause of 
perplexity is better described as a practical and solvable problem than a 
dilemma); it is quite another to insist that an agent could have reached 
a clear solution by more careful analysis and the adoption of a 
recognized standard (utility for example). The first is to seek 
consistency in language, in the use of coding, words and images; the 
second is to attempt to alter a person's value system and reveals a 
disrespect for the agent's own choice of language. 
3.2.5 One asumption which might have been adopted, but" was rejected, is 
that we could decide a priori on a particular definition of dilemma, thus 
giving it an "objective" meaning 'unaltered by differing human perceptions 
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or constructs of it; it was clear, however, that on the contrary, the 
recognition of dilemma (RD) was "subjective" in the sense that it was a 
relationship between the agent and the situation. If this was correct, a 
study of dilemma would be either a concern for the correct definition (as 
in much of classical ethical debate, especially from a deontic point of 
view) or else it would be a consideration of the perceived experience of 
the subject. The first would be a subject considered by moral 
philosophers whilst the second would be addressed by psychologists and 
sociologists. 
This however, would have placed the study in a "subjective" versus 
"objective" polarity and assumed that such a distinction could be 
consistently maintained. On the contrary, in th'is study an important 
assumption is that no such division would be helpful, even if possible; 
if an agent considers an experience to be dilemmatic, it is not 
appropriate, at least not in every case, to assume some definitional 
error and try to persuade the agent that he/she is mistaken. The cause of 
the disagreement may lie not in faulty coding but in the different value 
systems held by interviewer and agent • 
. 3.3 A SUlllllary of Intentions, Questions and Assumptions 
Turning now to the perspectives themselves, it was soon apparent that 
each would inevitably possess its own interests, assumptions and 
questions; the following is a summary: 
3.3.1 The interest in the chapter on moral philosophy_(5) lies in 
clarifying the concept of dilemma. The main question was, what types of 
dilemma can usefully be distingu~shed? Much would depend on the 
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confidence that could be placed on the definition. Bearing in mind the 
practical application of the research, it was also asked, which of the 
meanings given provides the most appropriate definition, for example the 
one adopted by Williams (1973) or by Mill (1910). How closely does' the 
theoretical debate accord with the phenomenology of the experience? 
One assumption was that it would be helpful for tutors and cousellors to 
be aware of the different philosophical standpoints in this debate. 
Certain ethical codes, if adopted by the agent would either disperse the 
dilemma or exacerbate it (an obvious example would the different 
attitudes towards war that might be taken by Buddhist or Moslem 
adherents). It would therefore be important for counsellors to be aware 
of the kind of tradition which had the most influence upon the agent. If 
possible, a typology would be suggested to aid analysis. 
3.3.2 The intention in chapter 6, on political ethics, was to consider 
the application of a moral code to posts of public office. Colleges and 
schools would normally have such positions within their own structure 
(student president, council member, society secretary, team 'captain, 
prefect and such like). The question is, should students learn to 
acknowledge two moralities, the one permitting actions which the other 
might condemn? One for public posts and the other for private lives? 
Should students be accustomed to considering two, possibly conflicting, 
codes? Or is it more appropriate for them to practise regarding such 
situations as two examples within the same overarching moral system? 
3.3.3 The interest in the section on phenomenology (chapter 7). lay 
primarily in the experiences of students themselves. Fifteen interviews 
were recorded and followed up. The overall question was the 
straightforward one, what was it like to experience a dilemma? Within 
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this a number of specific points were investigated in order to try and 
elicit information on such matters as: what was the context? How much 
pressure was there to reach a decision? What coping strategies were used? 
Did students distinguish dilemmas from ordinary problems? Were there any 
second thoughts, regrets or feelings of guilt? Had anything been learnt 
which might be of help in another similar situation? Was the expressed 
dilemma a cover for other deeper problems? Was there support for the 
typology derived from the interviews, and was this helpful when analysing 
the evidence? 
It was difficult sometimes to avoid concluding that the student was 
mistaken, that he or she had been over scrupulous, worrying unecessarily, 
or that another solution had been overlooked. It was, however, crucial to 
this study to repress any instinct to "correct" the interviewees and 
simply to record their descriptions as given. The presumption was that 
they all deserved respect, at least initially. 
3.3.4 In chapter 8, on the psychological perspective, there are a number 
of studies which shed light on the process of decision making and on . 
other aspects of what young people experience when they face perplexing 
. situations. This is a large and potentially hazardous area, especially 
since no speicialist knowledge was claimed; it was important to limit 
one's interest to those theories most likely to be fruitful regarding the 
three main research objectives. 
The foremost questions here were, what decision making or coping 
strategies might one expect to observe? What signs are there of post 
formal operational thought or of relativistic approaches? Are there any 
signs of development in moral awareness, or of cognitive dissonance? Did 
~ 
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psychological theory assist the understanding of dilemma thinking? Would 
it support the case for educational materials being available? Would it 
assist tutors and counsellors in understanding their clients? 
3.3.5 In the section on the perspective from social psychology (chapter 
9), it is argued that much can usefully be learnt from the approach of 
the Loughborough Discourse and Rhetoric Group, who make it clear that 
their interest lies not in the process of resolving dilemmas, the agonized 
mental state of the decision maker, but the need to experience dilemma 
and to develop the ability tq argue, to think and debate: 
Our concern is not with decision-making as such, but with the 
general preconditions of decision-making. In addition, the focus is 
upon social preconditions, as revealed in common sense or in 
ideology. As a consequence, attention is directed not to the 
individual thinker as such, but to those aspects of socially shared 
beliefs which give rise to the dilemmatic thinking of individuals. 
(Billig 1988 p8) 
Students tend to be reluctant to admit to problems (Louizos 1994) and to 
describe situations essentially from a common sense standpoint. Therefore 
the question asked in this chapter is whether there is any relevance in 
this new analysis, cutting across the normal boundaries of sociology and 
social psychology; it also draws heavily on a modern interpretation of 
classical rhetoric. One assumption was that the existence of 
contradictory strands within common sense, as seen for instance, in the 
apparently antithetical advice of many proverbs (Billig 1988 pI6), is indeed 
evidence for the universal nature of dilemma, as least within a liberal 
society. It was considered that argumentation and skill in debate is but 
one· side of the case for including the deliberate awareness of conflict 
as part of any person's education and development. 
3.3.6 Throughout this research it was apparent that conflict, especially 
moral conflict, abound~ in dramatic literature from the classics to the 
- 42 -
modern novel. It was only possible to include a few examples: Abraham, 
Agamemnon, Antigone and Orestes reveal agonising choices between 
conflicting duties and moral standpoints; similar hard choices confront 
the heroines in Ibsen's A D077's House, Shaw's Major Barbara, Styron's 
Sophie's Choice. It may be disputed whether they are all "genuine" 
dilemmas but it can hardly be denied that" these stories reflect emotions 
which are universally recognisable. 
The assumption is that these examples provide valid evidence of the 
existence of dilemma. The suoject matter of drama is the substance of 
human life and it must surely assist tutors in their work to listen 
to what Nussbaum has called "lived, practical reason" (1986 p5); to be 
aware of the complexities of dilemmas, the subtleties of response, the 
nature of guilt and remorse; to appreciate the variety of situations 
containing unfamiliar social conventions and to assess the case for and 
against a pluralist and relativist morality. 
3.3.7 The section on the educational perspective, chapter 10, considers 
the dilemmas that occur in different academic disciplines. These are 
mostly non-moral (but see chapter 5 below). It was asked whether RD was a 
-skill which was specific to different subjects and courses; whether a 
student might not be sensitive to dilemma in, say, the study of History 
but seemingly slow to recognise it in Physics. Was there anything to be 
said for the argument that the very able student will be more aware of 
conflict situations and better at handling them? A number of disciplines 
were investigated to see what opportunities existed or could be created 
to develop this awareness both in formal classroom situations and in the 
less overt curriculum of schools and colleges. 
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The main assumption was that, since part of the purpose of education was 
the development of a person's character, and the preparation for the 
exigencies and perplexities of adult life, there are many benefits to be 
derived from the experience of dilemma (see Nussbaum 1985 p260f). 
This concludes the Research Objectives, with the summary of questions 
raised and assumptions made within each of the six perspectives selected. 
The next section con~iders those methods which were considered the most 
appropriate to this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter an explanation will be given for the change from a 
quantitative to a qualitative approach, parallel to the change which took 
place in research objectives. This is followed by a description of the 
multi perspective met~ods and triangulation techniques, chosen as being 
most appropriate to this study; there is then a digression on 
Phenomenology, outlining its development and philosophy, and the chapter 
ends with a brief summary of some elements of Personal Construct Theory 
as used in the analysis of the interviews. 
4.1 Why the Change? 
If the objectives had remained as was once proposed, an experimental 
approach" would have been essential. It was originally the intention to 
explore further some of the questions raised in an earlier informal study 
(Miller 1990). As explained in 3.2, it was hoped that it might be 
possible to show that, whereas "very able" students (VA) might be bett~r 
than average ability students at perceiving the alternatives in a 
dilemmatic situation (ROl), they would not be significantly better at 
acknowledging them (R02). Amongst the other objectives, it was also hoped 
to show that RO together with ability would prove to be a better 
predictor of good A level results than ability on its own; that RO tends 
to be a context specific skill rather than a generalised one (ie students 
would be found to reveal a greater ability at RO in their A levels than 
in the general dilemmas put to them in their interviews); also, that 
ability at RO could be taught and improved with practice. 
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It was clear that any attempt to establish these kinds of hypotheses 
would require some form of measurement. An attempt was therefore made to 
identify a stratified random sample of "very able" students and a control 
group of "average ability" students. However, as explained earlier (1.6, 
3.2.1), the operational and other difficulties proved insuperable. Quite 
apart from the notorious problems of defining ability, professional 
ethics would debar a researcher from deliberately denying to one group of 
students a form of teaching which it was believed would be beneficial to 
them; there were also practical problems of coding and scoring ability at 
RD; then the A levels themselves proved to be a shifting target, 
constantly developing, with some requiring more dilemma type judgments 
than others; this meant that evidence of success or failure could turn 
out to be a circular proof (being good at RD meaning no more than showing 
ability at those A Level examinations which were already requiring RD). 
Finally, insufficient attention had been given to the concept of dilemma 
itself; there was little consideration of previous theories and virtually 
no flexibility permitted in the working definition as the study 
progressed, so that exposure to the actual experience of students made 
little or no difference to the understanding of dilemma; indeed, 
"investigating the experience as such was not a particularly important 
part of the original plan. It was taken for granted that everyone would 
understand both the concept and the experience so that all that was 
needed was a test of outcomes such as the impact of ability at RD on 
students' academic and personal lives. 
4.1.2 It was therefore decided to shift the focus of the study and it is 
now the intention to find out more about the experience itself; the 
recurrence within the present obje.ctives of words like "interpret", 
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"investigate", "discover", "illuminate", "understand", indicate a 
different approach altogether. These are the hallmarks of a naturalistic 
or qualitative enquiry, in which it is important before all else to 
listen to, observe and record the phenomenon lest we assume that we 
already understand it and have only to test it against our propositions. 
Moreover, as cronbac~ (1975) argued, human behaviour cannot 
satisfactorily be reduced to laws; researchers would obtain more 
effective results if they concentrated on "interpretation in context" 
rather than on generalisation (p116). Similarly, in respect of nursing 
research, which has a number of interesting parallels (in the study of 
pain and isolation for example) Cohen (I987) has written that therapists 
should begin "to see the patient as he (sic) really is, knowing him in 
his own reality" rather than "seeing merely a projection of our own 
theories about him" (p33). 
4.2 Qualitative versus Quantitative Enquiries 
It soon became apparent that the change in approach would have far 
reaching effects; Guba (1978 pp11-18) has listed fourteen characteristics by 
'which a naturalistic enquiry can be contrasted with a conventional or 
scientific enquiry. Those most relevant to this study include: 
Philosophical base - "the naturalistic investigator is a phenomenologist 
while the conv~ntional inquirer is a logical positivist." , 
Purpose - "the conventional inquirer deals with variables and their 
relations, his (sic) purpose is thus essentially that of 
verification" (pI1). 
Stance - "the conventional inquirer takes a structured,~focussed, 
singular stance, while the naturalistic inquirer tends to be open-
minded, exploratory, and complex in his position." 
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Style - "the basic style of the conventional inquirer is intervention. He 
manipulates the situation .... the basic style of the naturalistic 
inquirer is selection .... He is less a stage manager than a member 
of the audience. He watches the entire play and then selects from it 
those aspects which he considers critical for his purposes" (pI4). 
Reality manifold - "the naturalistic inquirer is likely to take a much 
more flexible view of the nature of reality ... much of the reality 
with which the naturalistic inquirer must deal exists only in the 
minds of individual people and depends heavily on their separate 
perceptions" (pIS). 
Value structure - "the naturalistic inquirer recognizes that his own 
values are very much part of his inquiry and that he needs to be as 
explicit about tnem as he can" (pI6). 
Methods - "the conventional inquirer strives for objectivity in the sense 
of inter-subjective agreement ... The naturalistic inquirer, for a 
variety of reasons, not the least of which is the belief in a 
multiple reality places little store in that objectivity and strives 
instead for confirmability, ie agreement among a variety of 
information sources" (pI8). 
In order to comply with these points, the underlying assumptions and 
values in this research are described as frankly as possible. It was also 
interesting to see the ext~nt to which the students' reported experiences 
agreed with the attitudes of the staff (10.3) and supported the 
philosophical standpoint adopted (58). 
4.3 Implications of the Qualitative Approach 
Some of the implications for this study were immediately clear. In the 
first place, it seemed a matter of common sense, without even considering 
methodological theory, that, if we are genuinely trying to learn from 
descriptions of experiences, we have to be flexible enough to adapt our 
ideas as we listen. As Parlett and Hamilton (1981) wrote there is a need 
to allow changes in our forms of evaluation as the study proceeds. "In 
practice, objectives are commonly reordered, redefined, abandoned or 
forgotten" (pI4). 
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4.3.1 Another implication is that one should, as far as possible, set 
aside the preconceptions that will tend to distort one's sense of 
discovery and willingness to adapt; one should let the investigation take 
effect on one's developing understanding. The alternative would be to 
deny the need for new insights, or-fresh conclusions, by proceeding down 
a predetermined path. This may be desirable, even essential in a physical 
science; human perceptions, reactions and behaviour, however, are less 
susceptible to categorisation, there is always the element of surprise, 
providing data that does not readily fit into prior formulations. 
4.3.2 A common criticism raised at this point is that the results of 
such an approach will yield no valid conclusions, are too subjective. It 
might be asked, if it is not the intention of this thesis to provide the 
basis for generalisation, to establish the probable validity of 
hypotheses, what claim can._be made for it being reliable? How authentic 
can any research be without predicted outcomes, repeatable experiments 
and external validity? 
4.3.3 A number of answers can be offered. First, we have selected as the 
object of our study a particular aspect of human experience (dilemma); it 
is not possible to repeat in a controlled environment, or in identical 
circumstances any two dilemma experiences. Neither the parameters nor the 
variables can be adequately controlled. This should be no surprise; it 
would be the same if we were to investigate, say, the experience of pain, 
or phobia, or disorientation. No two migraines are quite the same; no two 
experiences of drowning are identical, the dizziness felt by one person 
on a high rise roof top, the terror for another of crossing a minefield, 
or whatever situation it might be that could be guaran~eed to generate 
the symptoms of fear, cannot be precisely replicated; similarly, it is 
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not possible to reproduce exactly those experiences which habitually 
cause confusion to a person, whether it is being faced by a mathematical 
problem or having to find one's way in the dark. It is not feasible (some 
would add, not even in theory) to isolate all the possible independent 
variables in order to control such" human experiments. 
Does this limitation, common to most human enquiry, mean that we cannot 
in any way research such experiences as pain, phobia, disorientation or 
dilemma? Clearly not. It is simply that other, more appropriate 
safeguards must be sought against formulating untestable theories or 
making unchallengeable statements. Guba (1978) has listed a number of 
potential causes of distortions: the researchers presence at the site, 
the involvement of field workers with their subjects, bias on the part of 
the field workers or their subjects, the manner in which the data 
gathering techniques are employed. He comments that, whereas various 
tactics which may be employed will not "finally establish the intrinsic 
adequacy of study findings to an outside observer, ... keeping these 
caveats in mind during the course of a study will undoubtedly be helpful 
in assuring the overall adequacy of the inquiry when it is put to a more 
definitive test" (p63). Guba himself recommends especially 
"triangulation", cross examination and persistent observation. 
4.4 Triangulation 
Triangulation has be:n defined by Cohen and Manion (1980) as "the use of 
two or more methods of data collection in the study of som~ aspect of 
human behaviour." They explain that in "its original and literal sense, 
triangulation is a technique of physical measurement" used by maritime 
navigators, military strategists and surveyors. In the social sciences, 
however, by analogy: 
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Triangular techniques attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the 
richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more 
than one standpoint and, in so doing, by making use of both 
quantitative and qualitative data. (1980 p208) 
More specifically as regards this ~tudy, Denzin (1970) extends this view 
of triangulation to include the multi method kind which"he terms 
"methodological triangulation". He then describes six types, one of which 
has particular relevance for this study, namely theoretical 
triangulation, which draws upon alternative or competing theories in 
preference to utilising one viewpoint alone. 
In this research into dilemma, it is claimed that the aim of 
triangulation has been achieved by selecting six different perspectives, 
each of which (especially that of moral philosophy) includes a number of 
different standpoints, to~nrich our understanding of the phenomena and 
to reinforce the conclusions finally offered. 
4.5 Illuminative Evaluation 
Illuminative Evaluation uses a similar approach, viewing the object of 
research from different perspectives. This allows for cross checking 
one's conclusions, which would otherwise seem subjective, tentative and 
invalid. Parlett and Hamilton (1981) describe Illuminative Evaluation as 
"not a standard methodological package but a general research strategy ... 
At the outset, the researcher is concerned to familiarize himself (sic) 
thoroughly with the day-to-day reality of the settings he"is studying" 
(we may think of these as the dilemma situations). 
I~ thi~ he is ,similar to social anthropologists or to natural 
hl~t~rlans. ,Llke,them he makes no attempt to manipulate, control, or 
ellmlnate sltuatlonal variabJes but takes as given the complex scene 
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he encounters. His chief task is to unravel it; isolate its 
significant features. (pI7) 
As a technique, Illuminative Evaluation grew out of a dissatisfaction 
with more traditional methods, which tended to require that test scores 
and performance data were used, with tightly defined objectives 
structured in advance. The authors criticize this appro~th for being an 
"agricultural-botany paradigm" (pII). 
The method has been found particularly appropriate where there are 
complex goals, difficult to define. Its emphasis is on investigating and 
interpreting, using the experience of participants. The study of dilemma 
has features in common with this. Not all the questions can be defined 
tightly in advance. It is important therefore to be able to use a variety 
of approaches in order to build up what is a complex area of experience. 
For these reasons, Illuminative Evaluation has been one of the main 
theories underpinning the use of different perspectives in this study. 
4.6 Phenomenology 
The generic name most often given to the family of ideas within the kind 
of qualitative approach we have been discussing, is Phenomenology, an 
elusive term to describe, easy to misunderstand and clumsy to articulate. 
Spiegelberg (1965), the historian of Phenomenology, remarks~ "The fact is 
that until about 1910 the word was practically everyone's for the asking. 
Even now the only protection for the at times all too fashionable term is 
its ponderousness and tongue twisting ugliness" (p3). He adds that 
Hartmann, an early phenomenologist, was even asked by his publisher to 
omit the name on the grounds that "there are people who can be scared by 
a title which gives them trouble even in pronouncing it" (pIS). 
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It is necessary to digress somewhat in order to describe what is meant by 
the word and how it is relevant to the study of dilemma. The usage of the 
word itself is not of much help in its definition. Derived from the Greek 
~l\(O p.~"~ (appearances) its first occurrence as a techn i ca 1, 
philosophical term is probably in 1764 by Lambert, for whom it was a 
theory of illusion; Spiegelberg claims that this probably inspired Kant 
when he made his distinction between phenomena (the appearance of things) 
and noumena (things in themselves). This undoubtedly formed part of his 
critique of human knowledge but it bears little relation to the way the 
word is currently used. Hegel also gave a central place to 
"phenomenology" in his philosophy of consciousness, which seems more 
promising. However, his concern was mainly ontological; for Hegel (1977), 
appearances are stages in the realization of the ultimate ideal 
consciousness. This too was a very different usage (although it must be 
said that the French school of existential phenomenologists have accepted 
both Hegel and Kant as early members of the movement). 
4.6.1 It was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), widely accepted as1the founder 
of Phenomenology, who gave the word the distinctive meaning which marked 
the genesis of a new movement. His aim was lito establish a rigorously 
scientific philosophy, which could provide a firm basis for all other 
sciences" (Misiak and Sexton 1973 p6). In order to achieve this, he 
established an approach to investigation which has become the distinctive 
phenomenological method. 
Phenomenology arose as a critical reaction to the view known as 
"scientism" and prevalent at the end of the ninetenth century, that 
philosophy is reducible to a factual science. Husserl particularly 
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attacked psychologism, which is the idea that the rules of logic and 
mathematics can be reduced to psychological generalisations about the way 
in which people actually think (Husserl 1964 p.x). He was equally hostile 
to "biologism" and "anthropologism". He argued that any theory that 
reduces logic to psychology is vicfously circular ..... "We cannot reason 
in psychology without presupposing some rule of logic or"other; in fact, 
we cannot reason at all, in any subject matter, unless we use the laws of 
logic. Or, to say the same thing in still another way, we cannot derive 
any rule of logic without assuming the rules of logic" (1964 p.xi). 
Husserl criticised this kind of scientific reductionism which, in 
addition to being circular, in his opinion, dismisses the value of any 
data which cannot be quantified (predominantly data about human 
behaviour) on the grounds of being subjective. Phenomenology develops a 
method which first and foremost respects the data of interpreted 
experience. This method: 
Focuses on the data (or phenomena) of consciousness in order to 
clarify their role in the process of meaning-construction, and, as 
well, to set them aside - or to "bracket" them - in order to arrive 
at a more adequate (if still necessarily incomplete) knowledge of 
reality. (Spinelli 1989 p3) 
~.6.2 At this point and before going further, we should be particularly 
careful not to misunderstand the relation between "phenomena" (or 
appearances) and reality. Both in philosophy and in everyday use, 
"appearances" are thought of as being in contrast with reality, which is 
beyond the phenomena: Not so with phenomenology. Its descriptions of 
phenomena "are not of what is distinct from the real, but ~imply of how 
one experiences things" (Hammond 1991 p2). 
We should also take care not to think of "experience" in phenomenology as 
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an inner, private world of consciousness, to be contrasted with an outer 
world of objects, a Cartesian duality of mind and body. Phenomenologists 
would reject this dichotomy; for them, "experience" is always experience 
of something (see on "intentionality" below), and should not be 
distinguished from it. Conversely, they would argue that we cannot think 
sensibly of any so-called outer world of objects independent of 
consciousness. 
4.6.3 Are there any core concepts to Phenomenology, a body of beliefs or 
a philosophy to which all self proclaimed phenomenologists would 
subscribe? Most writers either deny this possibility or evade the 
question, settling rather for a historical survey of the different types 
of phenomenologists (Cohen 1987, Spiegelberg 1965). Spinelli 
distinguishes between the transcendental or the existential "branches" 
(1989 p.xi); Cohen describes different "phases", namely the Preparatory, 
the German and the French (1987 p32). 
This is an attractive solution. Spiegelberg (1965) says that there is 
some truth in the view that "all there is to phenomenology is its history 
as expressed in the multifarious and fluid ideas of sundry 
phenomenologists." As a consequence, he gives up the search for the 
"invariants of the different versions, ignoring the variables" in his two 
volume history of the movement preferring to conclude that "at the 
present stage its most characteristic core is its method" (1965 p655). 
For the same reason, Spiegelberg considers that phenomenology should not 
be regarded as a "school", which he describes as "a label which has been 
., 
imposed .. only from the out~ide and is certainly not at all called for 
in'view of the actual structure of the group" (1965 pI); he prefers to 
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use the word "movement" in order to indicate that the ideas are not 
static but in constant development. Similarly Spinelli writes: 
It is more helpful and accurate to consider phenomenology not 
strictly as a school or doctrine possessing a set body of agreed-
upon tenets, but rather as a general approach which encompasses a 
variety of doctrines whose common focus is directed toward the 
investigation of our experience of the world. (1989_p3) 
This view is supported by the definition in the Encyclopaedia 
Brittannica: 
Phenomenology is mainly used as the name for a philosophical 
movement the primary objective of which is the direct investigation 
and description of phenomena as consciously experienced, without 
theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from 
unexamined preconceptions and presuppositions. (1974 14 p210) 
Hammond (1991), on the other hand, believes that "there do exist common 
denominators", as do many other commentators (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 1969, 
Spiegelberg 1976 and Oiler.1982), although each tends to provide a 
different list. Four characteristics or fundamental issues, which are 
widely accepted as the philosophical stance shared by members of the 
movement, can be identified and will now be described: descriptions of 
reality, reduction and bracketing or epoche, intuiting the essences, and 
intentionality. 
4.6.4 Descriptions of reality. It is often said that Phenomenology is a way 
of describing rather than explaining (Merleau-Ponty 1969 p14, Spinelli 
1989 p17). By this is meant that it respects the data as reported and 
interpeted. "Zu den Sachen. se1bst [to the things themselves]" is the 
goal, the aim being to find the true nature of reality (Husserl 1931 
pl03). As Oiler (1981) puts it "the goal of describing is to communicate, 
to guide the listener by giving distinctive guideposts to the phenomenon. 
A successful description directs the listener to his {sic} own experience 
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of the phenomenon" (pI80). 
Nevertheless, the data (phenomena) are always an interpreted reality, a 
fact which, it is claimed, should be acknowledged in our statements about 
it. Moreover, it is important to realise that this reality is unique to 
each person. Spinelli gives the example of.visiting a gallery to see a 
particular painting. "You might even say something like: "This is the 
-painting that I've been meaning to see for years, but have seen only in 
textbooks, and now I can see the real thing" (1989 p8). What happens to 
the painting, he asks, when you walk away? Does it continue to exist as 
it did when you perceived it? Or is that particular perceived painting no 
longer in existence?" This is reminiscent of the epistemological debates 
of the eighteenth century, well captured by the two nonsense limericks: 
There once was a man who said, "God 
Must think it exceedingly odd 
If he finds that this tree 
Continues to be 
When there's no one about in the Quad." 
"Dear, Sir, Your astonishment's odd 
I am always about in the Quad; 
And that's why this tree 
Will continue to be 
Since observed by Yours faithfully, God" (Letts 1973 p50). 
Returning to Spinelli's example, phenomenologists on the one hand believe 
that there is some kind of 'raw' matter which is the stimulus for our 
perceptions of the painting and that this remains. On the other hand, the 
painting you perceiv~d (or in fact the painting anyone perceives) can 
never be perceived again in exactly the same way. Our expe~ience of the 
world is always made up of an interaction between the raw matter and our 
mental faculties. We always experience this interaction between the two. 
Nevertheless, "each of us adds a number of variables derived from our 
individual life experie~~es" (Spinelli 1989 p9). Furthermore, the next 
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time we returned to the gallery our experience would not be a replica of 
the first visit; it could not be so because we would inevitably be 
bringing to it a fresh set of circumstances. In this way, the 
descriptions of reality, it would ~e claimed, are always interpretations, 
which are both unique and constantly liable to change. 
4.6.5 Developing thi~ concept further, Merleau-Ponty (1969) adds another 
characteristic of phenomenology, the attitude to the "world". This is a 
complex concept. In one sense the world is already there before we 
perceive it as raw data, as lived experience. But in another it is 
something we create by reflection. In Merleau-Ponty's phrase, "The world 
is not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I 
have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess 
it; it is inexhaustible" (1969 p26). ~nd elsewhere, "The world is what we 
~ 
perceive" (p24f). To put it another way, men and women are in the world 
and only in the world do they know themselves. 
4.6.6 Reduction, bracketing and epoche. Phenomenological reduction ;s a 
way of combatting the reductionism of science, and is used to "bracket. 
out" the question of whether or not something "exists" in order to 
concentrate on the question of its meaning. We are asked to put aside 
issues of interpretation or existence in order to increase our 
understanding of the phenomenon itself, to obtain a pure and 
uncontaminated intui~.ion. Bracketing does not eliminate assumptions but 
rather brings them into view. Husserl also used to Greek t~rm epoche to set 
aside our preconceptions and assumptions, in other words, to bracket out 
as far as possible all bias and prejudice. 
It is, of course, impossible to be, totally free of all bias but it is 
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feasible, claims Oiler (1982 p179), to control it. She gives as examples 
a nurse asking a patient, "Tel~ me what you mean by the worst thing that's 
ever happened to you?", or, in an argument, saying, "On the other hand ... " 
This research has attempted to do t~is both in the interviews with 
students and in the use of alternative standpoints on dilemma. 
There are many other w~ys of trying to eliminate bias, all to some extent 
defective. We can ask, "What is meant by" a word or phrase (in this case, 
"dilemma"). We can bring our assumptions into the open or question what 
presuppositions are being made in any argument. Researchers should first 
examin~ themselves, to try and discover their own beliefs, commitments 
and prejudices. Whatever is done, however imperfectly and even though 
some bias will inevitably remain, will enhance the immediate experience. 
If by bracketing (or epoche) is meant peeling away one by on~ the layers 
of interpretation, it was important to avoid asking the students leading 
questions, to try and dismiss from one's mind any preconceptions about 
the nature of dilemma in the interests of understanding the phenomenon 
itself. Where this was unrealistic the assumptions (or at least the 
conscious assumptions) were brought into the open and admitted. 
4.6.7 Intuiting the essences. The next stage was called by ~usserl 
(1964) eidetic reduction, which is intended to enable the transition from 
particular facts to general essences. In this way the phenomenologist 
aims to reconstruct an ultimate reality for himself (though not all 
accepted this later transcendent stage in Husserl's thinking). 
The phenomenologist grasps meaning through intuition. This has often led 
to the accusation that ph:nomenology is founded upon hunch and 
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"subjective" opinion; it is possible, however, to compare views with the 
consensus, to reach a judgment which is consciously based upon a given 
culture or social norm. It is on grounds such as these that we regard the 
mentally ill, the criminally insane, the hypochondriac as outside the 
norm; a phenomenologist, however, would always avoid speaking of a 
"correct" or "incorrect" view of those conditions, but would rather base 
any proposed intervention upon a publicly acknowledged mental framework 
or shared reality. This is what would be required if we sought the 
ultimate meaning of dilemma. 
As Oiler (1981) put it, intuiting is "looking at the experience with 
wide-open eyes, with knowledge, facts, theories held at bay; looking at 
the experience with astonishment. Concentrating .•. becoming absorbed in 
the phenomenon without being possessed by it ..• As descriptions are 
compared and contrasted, recurring elements are noticed. This allows 
identification of the ingredients of the phenomenon and the way they 
relate to each other II (pI78f). For example, it was found that each 
interview contained a number of implicit meanings, which it ~as not 
always possible to draw out. Intuiting the sense and significance of the 
language used was an inevitable part of the interpretation. 
The phenomenologist is normally in search of 'a "reduced", pure datum, 
unvarnished by preconceived assumptions, the essence of the 06ject under 
consideration, be thi~.an object such as a chair, an abstraction such as 
beauty or a sentiment like, guilt. With respect to the experience of 
dilemma, it should be emphasised that no attempt was made in this study 
to discover an essence, or core meaning, to the exclusion ~f all else (as 
would have been the case had Grounded Theory been employed, for example). 
Rather, the aim was to fi~d a way of· categorising the variety of 
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individual experiences of dilemma which were being described. 
4.6.8 Intentionality. This concept, which Husserl owed primarily to 
Franz Brentano (1838-1917), is the assertion that everything we consider 
to be psychical refers to some object. There is no mental .. activity which 
does not have an object towards which it is directed; there is no such 
thing as thinking, without thinking about something, no pure feeling 
which is not feeling something. 
In this way the phenomenologist unites subject and object, rejecting any 
attempt to divide them. For the purpose of this study, we should avoid 
the idea that dilemma is simply in the mind of the agent and is not also 
an object "out there". The only way we can "get at" the experience or the 
concept of dilemma is, according the phenomenologist, through the 
interpretations people give to their thoughts and feeling abo~t it. 
4.6.9 In conclusion, rather than to describe phenomenology as a 
philosophy, as if it possessed a set of shared beliefs, it is better to 
present it as an approach to research, with philosophical implications; 
and techniques of application. Many summaries have been offered, suitable 
for different purposes (see Knaack 1984). However, as Ornery (1983) warns, 
"One must not and cannot develop a set of steps, but rather must proceed 
as the direction of the experience indicates without the restrictions 
such a structure would impose" (p54). 
4.7 Applying the Method 
Th: approach at the outset is crucial. Spiegelberg (1976) says that 
phenomenological enquiry pegins in silence and Merleau-Ponty advocates an 
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attitude of wonder, peace and respect in front of the evidence, before 
the researcher can expect to be illuminated: 
The attitude of the phenomenologist, therefore, is not the attitude 
of the technician, with a bag of tools and methods, anxious to 
repair a poorly operating machine. Nor is it the attitude of the 
social planner, who has at his control the methods for straightening 
out the problems of social existence. Rather it is an attitude of 
wonder, of quiet inquisitive respect as on attempts to meet the 
world, to open a dialoque, to put himself in a position where the 
world will disclose itself to him in all its mystery and complexity. 
(Bettis 1969 p12) 
4.7.1 As was remarked earlier, there are many common points between 
nursing and education. Nursing "embraces a holistic approach to patient 
care. The individual is valued .... the nursing profession advocates the 
individual as author of his (sic) own world, definer of his own reality" 
(Oiler 1981 pI78). In the same way a tutor attempts to establish a one to 
one relationship with students and to treat each person holistically and 
as an individual. Qualitative approaches are seen as a supplement to 
other, scientific methods of enquiry. The latter serve best the nurse's 
aim to predict and control, while the former is most effective in serving 
the nurse's goal to understand experience. 
4.7.2 Oiler follows this by listing six techniques, intended to aid 
description (taken from Paterson and Zderad 1976). For example, the 
researcher is advised imaginatively to vary the phenomenon, .identify its 
central characteristics, explain through negation {contrasting it with 
other similar ideas),~explaining through analogy, and classifying. An 
attempt has been made to incorporate each of these techniques in this 
research by the careful choice of questions to ask in interviews, the 
manner in which they were asked, by the variety of definitions 
considered, by bringing assumptions into the open and by the different 
perspectives and analysi~ offered .. 
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4.8 Personal Construct Theory 
Within the many applications of phenomenology, none is more important or 
relevant to this study than Kelly's Personal Construct Theory (PCT), 
which was especially useful in analysing the student interviews (chapter 
7). It is not intended·to go into this theory in any great detail but, 
briefly, Kelly describes his philosophical position as "constructive 
alternativism", which he contrasts with the positivist standpoint which 
he calls "accumulative fragmentalism" whereby truth is collected piece by 
piece. o He elaborates th i sin these terms: 
Whatever nature may be, or howsoever the quest for truth will turn 
out in the end, the events we face today are subject to as great a 
variety of constructions as our wits will enable us to contrive. 
This is not to say that one construction is as good as any other, 
nor is it to deny that at some infinite point in time human vision 
will behold reality out to the utmost reaches of existence. But it 
does remind us that all our present perceptions are open to question 
and reconsideration, and it does broadly suggest that even the most 
obvious occurrences of everyday life might appear utterly 
transformed if we were inventive enough to construe them 
differently. (1970 pI) 
The basic postulate of PCT is that "A person's processes are 
psychologically channelized by the ways in which he (sic) anticipates 
~vents". From this Kelly claimed that there are eleven corollaries which 
may be "loosely inferred" from this. The four most interesting from the 
point of view of this study, were found to be the following:" 
(2) The Individua1ity Coro11ary. "Persons differ from each other in 
their construction of events" (Kelly 1970 pI). As this implies, a 
dilemma for one person is not necessarily going to b~ the same for 
someone else and it was obviously important not to impose a rigid 
definition of dilemma upon the student. The letter of invitation used 
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the phrases "difficult decisions" where "the alternatives are very 
hard". As was to be expected, students interpreted this in various 
ways, some allowing for problems which clearly could be resolved 
with or without cost, others for irresolvable and costly problems. 
(4) The Dichotomy Corollary. "A person's construction system is 
composed of a finite number of dichotomous constructs" (pI2). By 
this Kelly meant that a construct is the "basic contrast between two 
groups", that is to say, constructs have two poles, an emergent pole 
and a contrasting pole. All constructs have contrasts built into 
them and being able to articulate an awareness of the contrasting 
pole is often the only way to understand the emergent pole itself. 
Where it is a case of conflicting values which give rise to the 
dilemma, it is often best to see them as pairs of opposites. 
Applying this to the interpretation of the interviews, it was 
important, in, order to understand the ideas being expressed, to 
discover if possible the opposite pol~. 
(7) The Experience Corollary. "A person's construction system varies as 
he successively construes the replications of events" (pI7). This 
means that a person is constantly altering the construct system 
within certain (also self constructed) limits. If students were 
aware of this possibility they could be liberated from the 
constraints which are often imprisoning them in their dilemmas. 
(9) The Fragmentation Corollary. "A person may successively employ a 
variety of construction sub systems which are inferentially 
incompatible with each other" (p20). An understanding of this can 
often be of great help to a tutor seeking a "rational" explanation 
- 64 -
for an apparently inconsistent set of opinions or conflicting 
values. 
Beyond these corollaries there are other notions of a more specific and 
limited application such as anxiety, guilt, hostility, decision making, 
creativity. It is assumed in this study that dilemma may also be placed 
and effectively interpreted within this frame of thought see 8.7). 
4.8.1 To any person facing what appears to be a dilemma, the PCT 
approach is invaluable both as -a source of support and a means of 
interpretation. Kelly puts it like this: 
Events do not tell us what to do, nor do they carry their meanings 
engraved on their backs for us to discover. For better or'worse we 
ourselves create the only meanings they will ever convey during our 
lifetime. The facts of life may even be brutal, but they are 
nonetheless innocent of any evil intent and we can scarcely accuse 
them of taking sides. (1970 p3) 
This kind of analysis is acutely pertinent to the experience of dilemma 
for it is through their dilemmas that students reveal the structure that 
they have erected. To understand that they themselves "create the only 
meanings they will ever convey" and that therefore they can just as 
easily recreate them, can also be a most liberating realisation. 
In such ways, PCT has proved particularly useful in analysing the 
interviews (chapter 7). Although the most commonly used tool of analysis 
is probably the Repertory Grid, it has not been used in this study; on 
the other hand, it has been found useful to approach the analysis of the 
interviews through Kelly's teaching that all constructs should be seen in 
a bipolar relationship, that is to say a construct is often best 
understood by grasping its opposite. It was also instructive to note the 
degree of commonality shared by the' students' constructs as well as their 
- 65 -
"individuality". This and other tenets of PCT are introduced and applied 
in the chapters on student interviews. 
This completes the digression, necessarily brief, into Phenomenology and 
Personal Construct Theory. It is now time to turn to the sjx perspectives 
themselves and the differing forms of interpretation and understanding 
which each offers to the experience of dilemma. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY: ARE MORAL DILEMMAS GENUINE? 
The debate about conflict between moral duties has been called "the most 
intriguing problem of moral philosophy" (Raphael 1974 pI2). It has its 
roots in classical thought but recently has been been revived amongst 
philosophers, one of whom, writing about his fellow contenders in the 
debate, regards it as a sharp test of "the comprehensiveness and 
penetration of their thought about morality; superficiality is perhaps 
more quickly revealed by what is said about this problem than in any 
other way" (Hare 1981 p26). 
The philosophical perspective is concerned with analysing the concept of 
dilemma and defining as clearly as possible the nature of moral conflict. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, will be to examine some of the major 
arguments for and against the existence of genuine dilemmas in order to 
apply this to the practical issues of teaching and counselling. The 
assumption is that some understanding of moral philosophy is necessary to 
help tutors to appreciate what students mean when describing their 
predicaments; taken together with other perspectives, it should be 
possible to clarify their experiences by approaching them more holisti-
cally. 
It may seem strange that anyone should question whether or not moral 
dilemmas genuinely exist" but it has been one of the most influential and 
pervasive traditions in our philosophical culture to regard the idea of 
dilemma as in some way incoherent and incompatible with moral reasoning. 
On the one hand, a phenomenologist 'would be disposed to begin by 
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accepting that dilemmas exist whenever they are seriously claimed to 
exist; whichever use of the word the student adopts should, at least at 
the outset, be respected as the description of an experience. The 
interviewer may be prepared to clarify confusions but not to question the 
attitude itself. 
On the other hand, rationalist philosophers would tend to deny the 
existence of genuine moral dilemmas (with the notable exception of 
Brennan 1977). They are more d~sposed to stand back and look upon any 
such claim as if they were correcting a malapropism perhaps, or a 
mispelling; they perceive it as a kind of a logical inconsistency, an 
~ 
error in computation. They might well sympathise with a person agonising 
between two alternatives, but, however understandable this may be, they 
will be more inclined to consider this a question of confusion. Prima 
facie conflict of duties may be common, but genuine moral dilemmas simply 
do not exist; a crooked argument, after all, can always be clarified by 
straight thinking. 
It is important to stress that opponents of genuine dilemmas do not deny 
that painful moral decisions have sometimes to be made or that serious 
perplexities are at the root of practical living. It is readily admitted 
that we are not able to avoid conflict situations, hard choices from time 
to time (e.g. Mill [1910] speaks of "knotty points", Conee [1982] of 
"competing considerations"). Some of these can be discounted, th~y would 
claim. Practical conflicts such as which of two promises to.keep, which 
of two persons to select are indeed daily occurrences but such 
perplexities should not be regarded as moral dilemmas. Th~y are just 
evidence that life can sometimes be tough. On closer inspection, they 
will turn out to be simply examples' of misplaced emotion, semantic 
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confusion or subjective delusion. It would be better to cease using the 
term "dilemma" and ~egard such predicaments as solvable, though painful 
problems. Students should be taught how to live with marginal decisions, 
relative judgments and the resulting painful regrets. 
In summary, the case for dilemmas will be found to rest on a respect for 
reported experience (it could be called a phenomenological approach). The 
case against, on the other hand, is based on a rational, cognitive 
approach to moral problems, pl~cing reason above the experience of the 
agent. Perhaps he or she is too young, too uneducated, blind, confused, 
illogical, uninformed, emotionally involved or simply inexperienced to 
see the solution. As Hare (1981) put it: 
It will not do to say "there just are situations in which, whatever 
you do, you will be doing what you ought not, i.e., doing wrong". 
There are, it is true,-some people who like there to be .what they 
call "tragic situations"; the world would be less enjoyable without 
them, for the rest of us: we could have much less fun writing and 
reading novels and watching films, in which such situations are a 
much sought after ingredient ....... In such a conflict between 
intuitions, it is time to call in reason. (p31) 
A THE CASE AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE DILEMMAS 
SA 1 A Summary of the Arguments 
Let us then "call in reason" and consider some of the arguments against 
the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. Co nee (1982) states the· case 
thus: 
Moral dilemmas are of no special assistance in acco~nting for moral 
sentiments or in promoting good behavior. And .•. their existence 
would confound us with the prospect of impermissible obligations. 
The reasonable conclusion is that they are impossible. (p97) 
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The arguments, which are amplified in the sections which follow, can 
conveniently be grouped under five headings: 
5A 1.1 Prioritism. Here it is claimed that conflicting obligations can 
almost always be ranked in order of priority, and where they are of equal 
importance, they cancel out. For instance, in Plato's example, whether or 
not to return a weapon to a potential killer, the choice is clear: saving 
life has priority over promise keeping. On the other hand, saving two 
children from fire, or keeping two promises, when in each case only one 
is possible, and there is nothing to choose between them - these are not 
moral but practical problems, since there can be no moral requirement to 
carry out simultaneously two incompatible actions. Guilt, therefore, is 
an inappropriate reaction, however understandable (see 5A 5). 
5A 1.2 Monism. This is the ~laim that there is only one source of moral 
authority, (e.g. divine law) or one ultimate principle (e.g. utility) 
which supersedes all other principles, either in the sense that they can 
be derived rationally from it, or, in a prioritist version of the 
argument, these alternative principles, though logically independent, can 
be compared with one another and intuitively seen to be inferior. The 
fact that God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac was in itself 
sufficient justification of what would otherwise be an abhorrent act. 
Alternatively, in the case whether or not to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki~ 
a careful examination of the consequences will, it is claimed, reveal 
which course would have the' greater utility and benefit to mankind, 
5A 1.3 Deontic logic. The logical application of deontic .. principles, it 
is said, requires that there can only be one all-things-considered 
I 
prescription for action. To believ~ in the existence of genuine dilemmas 
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is to believe that if a person really ought to do A (for example remain 
loyal to his country) and he really ought to do B (say, never tell a 
lie), then, he really ought to do both these things. And, since "ought 
implies can", what is being asserted is that he really can do both these 
things. This, however, is what has been denied. To believe in dilemmas, 
therefore, is to believe in a logical absurdity. A wayside pulpit, quoted 
in Hare (1981), puts it_succinctly: "If you have conflicting duties, one 
of them isn't your duty" (p25). 
5A 1.4 Remainders. As regards the argument from remainders, the 
feelings of regret or guilt, which are evidence, some suggest, of the 
reality of the conflicts, the rationalist may regard these as common 
reactions to taking a difficult decision, but by themselves they are 
insufficient evidence for what is being claimed. Feeling regret does not 
prove that something is regrettable; feeling remorse does not· establish 
guil~ (see below 5A 2.1 on Foot and Conee, also Donegan 1984). 
5A 1.5 Particularism. This is the view that a priori moral principles do 
not exist at all, or at least none that are of any help in deciding 
particular cases, and therefore there are none to conflict. All one can 
db is decide what seems best in the particular circumstances. The 
illustration selected is from Sartre (1948), for whom principles are 
irrelevant or confusing in settling in advance individual cases; an 
obligation is created only at the existential moment of decision, not 
beforehand. These and othe~ arguments against the existence of genuine 
dilemmas can now be looked at in greater. 
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SA 2 Prioritism - The Ranking of Diverse Obligations 
Socrates signalled a crucial change in the classical world view in which 
the gods could place opposing duties on human beings. He considered 
Euthyphro's dilemma (whether to respect his father or to prosecute him 
for killing his servant). Here apparently there was a clear case of 
conflicting obligations; yet the rational approach to take was to decide 
which duty takes precedence over the other. If two obligations conflict, 
at most only one can be binding. This leads Socrates to challenge the 
-prevalent belief that the gods could impose conflicting duties, that 
tragic conflict can indeed shadow and ensnare a human life. He therefore 
advises Euthyphro to obey only those obligations which have unanimous 
backing from the gods (Plato Euthyphro BE). 
Many critics following the rational tradition introduced by Socrates have 
little patience with the world view of an Aeschylean Chorus; they regard 
such an appeal to our emotions as irrational, primitive and a mistaken 
guide for modern man. Thus a rationalist philosopher today will argue 
that an innocent alternative is always available. 
SA 2.1 Another method of ranking diverse and conflicting obligations is 
given by Aristotle who recommended the use of practical wisdom in the 
Nichomachaean Ethics. Every virtue, he considered, was a mean between two 
extremes, each of which was a vice. Generosity is a mean between. 
profligacy and stinginess;_~ride, between vainglory and humility; 
courage, between recklessness and cowardice. (truthfulness, seen as the 
mean between boastfulness and false modesty, does not fit.so easily into 
the scheme, but this is not our concern). The Golden Mean is thus the 
underlying principle of ~ll the virtues (see especially 1109a25-b15). 
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Aristotle considered all the virtues to be interdependent and rationally 
consistent with one another. The Golden Mean, therefore, becomes the 
priority principle for all the other_virtues. It was, for example, 
impossible for someone to have one of the virtues but lack another 
because "the possession of the single virtue of prudence will carry with 
it the possession of th~m all" (1144a25). This implies a rational 
consistency amongst all virtues, which would preclude the possibility of 
ultimate conflict betwen them. At a practical level there may be room for 
argument but not at the level of "eternal facts". This is how he put the 
case: 
00 people deliberate about all issues - i.e. is everything an object 
of deliberation? - or are there some things that do not admit of it? 
... surely nobody deliberates about eternal facts, such as the order 
of the universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal with the 
side of a square; nor about eternal regular processes .... What we 
deliberate about is practical measures that lie in our power .... 
We deliberate not about ends but about means. A doctor does not 
deliberate whether to cure his patient, nor a speaker whether to 
persuade his audience, nor a statesman whether to produce law and 
order, nor does anyone else deliberate about the end at which he is 
aiming. They first set some end before themselves, and then proceed 
to consider how and by what means it can be attained. If it appears 
that it can be attained by several means, they further consider by 
which it can be attained best and most easily. (1112b5-26) 
From this it would seem that Aristotle permitted the deliberation of 
practical issues, i.e. dilemmas of method, but even these can be 
rationally resolved by a consideration of what "can be attained best and 
most easily", namely the ultimate principle of prudence. Elsewhere, he 
also considered the case of a sea captain (lllOa 4ff) who was forced to 
jettison his cargo in bad weather in order to save his ship, the lives of 
his crew and himself. Although there is little doubt in his mind what he 
has to do, he nevertheless might regret the outcome for he is attached to 
the cargo. This, however,~ would be illogical. Prudence provides the 
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solution to his apparent dilemma ("any reasonable person will do it"). 
SA 3 Monism and the Single Principle Argument 
The second line against the reality of dilemma is the single principle or 
monist argument. To illustrate this, examples may be found amongst the 
-
monotheistic faiths, such as Judaism, Islam or Christianity. In these 
religions, the world was created by God who ordered the laws of nature 
and whose essence includes both ultimate goodne~s and rational 
consistency. God created the laws for his creatures to perceive and obey. 
God is thus identified as the source of all moral law; conflict in the 
latter would imply confusion in the former. Therefore, genuine dilemmas 
cannot exist. 
Few theologians, other than perhaps the eighteenth century Deists, 
nourished the rational attitude more fervently than St Thomas Aquinas. 
In his doctrine of Natural Law, he argued that it was possible for human 
beings, exercising natural reason alone, to discover certain truths about 
God (for example his existence, his will) as well as the immortality of 
the soul. What room is there here for dilemma? Moral conflict, the view 
that a person can be required to obey two conflicting laws, would imply 
that God's laws could be inconsistent, and that therefore God himself 
·could tolerate incoherence. This means that when people claim to 
experience dilemmas it can only be a sign of human failing. This might be 
the result of spiritual ignorance, an uninstructed conscience or a life 
caught up in worldly compromises, like the seed in Jesus' parable of the 
Sower (Matthew 13) that fell amongst thorns which rose up and choked it. 
But, in ultimate reality the moral law can have no imperfection. God's 
law has always been understood in both the Jewish and Christian tradition 
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as perfect, pure and changeless (Psalm 119.89, 142). 
5A 3.1 Kant, deeply influenced by his mother, who died when he was 
fourteen, was schooled in the German' Evangelical tradition but emphasised 
the rational perspective. He held that the one true religion comprises 
nothing but laws and principles (1960 p156) and since it is of the 
essence of a principle that it can never conflict with another moral 
principle, it is no surprise to find that Kant declared roundly that "a 
conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable ll (1964 p24). 
The major premise in Kant's argument is that every action falls into one 
of three categories: it is either morally necessary, morally impossible 
or morally indifferent (i.e. permissible). These categories exhaust all 
the possibilities. Thus, it is illogical to suppose that an action could 
~ 
be both necessary and impossible (see 2.8). Furthermore, moral rules are 
unconditional imperatives, that is to say universal binding duties. If, 
therefore, a rule declares an action A to be necessary, it cannot 
consistently be the case that another rule could declare action 
B, which conflicts with A, to be necessary. 
ori the other hand Kant acknowledged that our intuitive feeling is that 
moral conflicts do in practice arise daily. He explained this by his 
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties (1964 p48). Although 
there has been consid~rable discussion of this distinction, it seems 
that perfect duties cover ~ll instances of specific kinds of action. 
There can be no latitude in deciding how to obey these duties. They. 
cannot conflict. But imperfect duties are different, they-do not cover 
specific instances but rather unspecific pursuits of ends (for example, 
the pursuit of happiness~could conflict in individual cases with the 
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pursuit of honesty). This doe~ not permit us to make exceptions but it 
does indicate that·we can limit one maxim of duty by another (p48). These 
ends are the "grounds" of duty. When therefore it appears that we are 
faced with a dilemma of conflicting duties, one of. them is not our 
genuine perfect duty. When the weaker "ground" of duty is compared with 
the "perfect" duty" it retires from the field; it ceases to be binding 
(1964 p24). 
SA 3.2 Another single principle or monist argument is Utilitarianism, 
for example as developed by Mill (1910). Although proceeding from very 
different premises, Mill arrived at a similar conclusion to that of Kant, 
namely the acceptance of practical conflicts in daily life, but the 
denial of genuine dilemmas. 
Mill made two fundamental claims. The first is that there can only be one 
standard of value. "If there were several ultimate principles of 
conduct," he wrote, "the same conduct might be approved by one of those 
principles and condemned by another; and there would be needed some more 
general principle, as umpire between them" (1974 p951). Mill's claim, . 
therefore, was that there had to be a single principle "with which all 
other rules of conduct were required to be consistent, and from which, by 
ultimate consequence, they could all be deduced" (p951). The second 
argument defined that principle as the standard of utility. 
There are many varieties of utilitarians and it is not the. purpose of 
this chapter to provide a survey; tutors may, however, commonly find 
amongst their colleagues and their students the general position held 
that goodness consists in maximising happiness and aciions should be 
judged by their results. Assessment of the consequences, direct or 
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indirect, is the root principle of utilitarianism. Despite variations in 
the interpretation of utility, (as happiness or goodness) it is agreed 
that'an action is right if and only if the consequences have greater 
utility than the consequences of po~sible alter'native actions. 
From this standpoint, conflicting moral obligations are resolvable by 
appeal to the single principle of utility. Although Mill does not comment 
on the rejected alternative or whether it persists as a form of 
sentiment, it is clear that for him there can be no ultimate clash of 
principles; the one absolute principle of utility holds sway over all 
other subsidiary principles. 
There exists no moral system under which there do not arise 
unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real 
difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in 
the conscientious guidance of personal conduct .. (but) .. If utility 
is the ultimate source. of moral obligations, utility may be invoked 
to decide between them when their demands are incompatible. (Mill 
1910 p23f) 
SA 3.3 In order to explain why dilemmas appear so convincingly in daily 
life, Hare introduced a distinction between two levels of moral thinking. 
This was originally found, he argued, in Plato' distinction between 
knowledge and right opinion and from which he justifies different classes 
of human beings, each with their own appropriate education. It can also 
be seen in Aristotle's distinction between practical and intellectual 
wisdom. Hare called the two levels of thinking, the intuitive and the 
critical: 
,Those who say, roundly, that there can just be irresolvable 
conflicts of duties are always those who have confined their 
thinking about morality to the intuitive level. At this level the 
conflicts are indeed irresolvable; but at the critical level there 
is a requirement that we resolve the conflict unless we are to co~f~ss tha~ our ~hinking has been incomplete: We are not thinking 
crltlcally lf we Just say "there is a conflict of duties; I ought to 
do A, and I ought to do B, and I can't do both" But at the 
intuitive level it~is perfectly permissible to ~ay this. (1981 p26) 
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Hare thus accounted for prima facie dilemmas but only at the expense of 
granting them any intellectual respect. Those capable of critical 
thought, like Plato's guardians, can resolve the apparent dilemmas which 
so trouble the intellectually inferior. In practice, in the counselling 
situation for example, it would be counter-productive to question any 
student who claimed to-be in a serious quandary; it is equally doubtful 
whether, in philosophical debate, it is productive to suggest that the 
opposition is deficient in reasoning powers. 
SA 3.4 A rather different approach to prima facie cases of conflict is 
provided by Ross, a writer in the tradition of British intuitionists. He 
distinguished between two senses of duty, prima facie duty and duty sans 
phrase. The latter are actual duties, absolute, possessing a "toti-
resultant attribute", that is to say one which belongs to an ·act in 
virtue of "its whole nature" (1931 p28). Only prima facie duties, 
according to Ross can conflict; he listed seven categories of prima facie 
duties: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self 
improvement, and non maleficence. Each has a self evident authority, that 
is to say it has independent validity and is not deduced from any prior 
ethical principle (p41). When a conflict arises, therefore, we cannot 
refer to a higher principle to settle the issue; we must resort to our 
own individual judgement to decide which of the alternative obligations 
has the greatest "stringency". As Ross described it (p42), quoting 
Aristotle, "the decision.rests with perception" (Nichomache~n Ethics 
1109b23). This means that with prima facie duties there is a resolution 
available (namely intuition) and that there are no real conflicts between 
actual duties. As with Hare, therefore, genuine dilemmas do not exist. 
- 78 -
\ 
5A 4 The Argument from the Pr,inciples of Deontic logic 
Another argument recently advanced against the existence of genuine 
dilemmas, which should be considered (see also a reply 58 15), is derived 
from the logical principles of moral discourse. It is claimed that 
dilemmas are inconsistent with two fundamental premises of deontic logic. 
According to the first; if someone ought to do one thing and ought to do 
another, then that person ought to do both those things. Bernard Williams 
(quoted in Gowans 1987 p130). called this the principle of agglomeration 
According to the second, if someone ought to do something, then that 
person can do that thing (the "ought implies can" argument is attributed 
to Kant [1964 p37]). But if, as is claimed by the upholders of genuine 
dilemmas, S ought to do A; and S ought to do B, then by the first 
principle S ought to do both A and B, and by the second principle, Scan 
do A and B, which is clearly impossible otherwise S would not consider it 
a dilemma in the first place. Therefore moral dilemmas are logically 
inconsistent. 
Donegan (1980) Applied this logic to a case recently put forward by 
Marcus (1980). A doctor is faced with a genuine dilemma, Marcus claimed, 
when the single principle of life saving is of no help in choosirig which 
of two identical twins to save, given that he can only save ~ne. To this 
Donegan replied: 
. 
Where the lives of identical twins are in jeopardy and I can save 
,one but only one, every serious rationalist moral syst~m lays down 
that, whatever I do, I must save one of them. By postulating that 
the situation is symmetrical, Marcus herself implies that there are 
no grounds, moral or nonmoral, for saving either as opposed to the 
other. Why, then, does she not see that, as a practical question, 
"Which am I to save?" has no rational answer except "It does not 
matter," and as a moral question none except "There is no moral 
question"? 
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Certainly there is no moral conflict: from the fact that I have a 
duty to save either a or b, it does not follow that I have a duty to 
save a and b. Can it be seriously held that a fireman, who has 
rescued as many as he possibly could of a group trapped in a burning 
building, should blame himself for the deaths of those left behind, 
whose lives could have been saved only if he had not rescued some of 
those he did? (1984 p308) 
5A 5 The Argument from Remainders and Misplaced Guilt 
It follows, therefore, from the above arguments that, if feelings of 
guilt follow, however understandable, they cannot be regarded as 
rational. It will, however, be-shown (58 12) that Williams and others 
argue from the existence of remainders, that the reality of genuine 
dilemmas can be deduced. The interesting aspect of this line of argument 
is that, if correct, it establishes that even resolvable dilemmas are 
genuine. The case made against it is that, no amount of feeling, guilt or 
regret, can possibly provide evidence for the reality of genu.ine 
dilemmas. Dilemmas, if they exist, may result in guilt or regret, but the 
existence of neither guilt nor regret establishes the validity of 
dilemma. It is impermissible to use post decisional feelings as a 
justification for the substantial existence of dilemma. As Foot (1983) 
expressed it: 
The form of this argument is surely strange ... It is impossible to 
move from the existence of the feeling to the truth of the 
proposition conceptually connected with it, or even to the subject's 
acceptance of the proposition. (1983 p382) 
Conee (1982) similarly argued that it may be reasonable to feel regret in 
those cases where there are harmful results, but such regret does not 
substantiate moral dilemmas: 
Feeling guilty is subjectively appropriate when the belief that one 
has failed which promp~s the feeling fits one's moral principles. If 
your convictions include that every debt morally must be repaid, it 
is appropriate to your morality for you to feel guilty about 
defaulting. When someone does what is morally best while neglecting 
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something his morality requires, his feeling guilty is therefore 
appropriate only because it is called for by morality as he sees it. 
It does not fit the facts. This sort of appropriate guilt does not 
imply that a moral mistake has been made: (p89) 
This would mean, as Williams (1973).put it, that those who believe that 
only dilemma free moralities exist must hold that the only post 
decisional feelings which are appropriate are "relief (at escaping 
mistake), or self-congratulation (for having got the right answer), or 
possibly self-criticism (for having so nearly been misled)" (p175f). 
5A 5.1 In the classroom or science laboratory, teachers will be familiar 
with the situation where students are allowed to make their own errors, 
watching them as they wander down blind alleys, set out on unproductive 
experiments, see problems where there are none (and vice versa). Indeed 
there will often be sound pedagogical reasons for leaving them to follow 
their judgments, however mistaken, and to learn from the experience. In a 
similar way, counsellors will have observed clients worrying about 
problems that seem trivial from the standpoint of the interviewer; just 
as priests meet overscrupulous penitents in the confessional, reproaching 
themselves with feelings of sinfulness, counsellors hear expressions of 
guilt which they personally would regard as mistaken; if protestations of 
innocence do not by themselves deceive the wary tutor, why should 
apprehensions of guilt be any more persuasive? 
The questions asked by the rational observer are: does not the individual 
conscience require tutoring? Should not these subjective j~dgments be 
corrected and clients counselled out of their imagined predicaments? 
Would it not be preferable for them to have their apparent dilemmas 
resolved in the light of wiser advice? More important, could one not 
generalise from such instances and" conclude that every experience of 
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apparent dilemma is a similar example of confusion, an understandable 
emotion but a case of defective reasoning, blindness or mistaken 
definition? Arguments against this position are considered later (58 12). 
5A 6 The Argument from Particularism 
The final type of argument considered here, which may be called 
particularism, is taken from the famous example provided by Sartre 
(1948). In L'existentia7isme est un humanisme, a young man must choose 
between his patriotic commitment to the French Resistance and his duty to 
care for his aging mother (p35). Sartre argued that ethical principles 
and systems are inadequate guides for action. We should therefore discard 
them altogether and improvise our own choices of action, without regret 
or remorse. It is in the making of the decision that the ethical 
obligation is created, but only for that person and that situation. Prior 
to that moment, only a practical predicament exists, but no conflict of 
moral obligations and therefore no genuine dilemma (p48). In 58 2, 
however, the possibility is considered that even a particular decision 
might rest upon two intuitive moral signals, thus giving rise to an 
existential conflict. 
5A 6.1 In summary, each of the arguments against dilemmas contains a 
rejection of the actual (phenomenological) situation, implying in some 
sense that it is not~ real state of affairs. A typical position" is that 
of Conee (1982): "There is no fact of moral life that cannot be accounted 
for at least as well without moral dilemmas, and their possibility would 
cast a shroud of impenetrable obscurity over the concept "of moral 
obligation" (p87). Counsellors and tutors would, therefore, need to be 
clear that in espousing .these standpoints, they would be implying a 
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failure of perception on behalf of their clients, who should be guided to 
use the power of human reason to see through the confusion and to develop 
the will to make the correct decision. 
Those who followed these lines would therefore find it hard not to direct 
students, to admonish the self confident, to interrupt the thoughtless, 
to direct the aimless.-If a dilemma is really perceived as the result of 
youthful inexperience or confused thinking, counsellors would have an 
obligation not to leave clients in their ignorance for longer than could 
be justified by the advantage to their educational or maturational 
development. 
This concludes the review of the case against the existence of "genuine 
dilemmas". The replies to them, and other counter arguments, must now be 
considered. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
B. THE CASE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF "GENUINE" DILEMMAS 
58 1 A Shift in World View 
Gowans (1987) has summarised three kinds of argument in the recent debate 
to support the case for the existence of "genuine" dilemmas: "the 
argument from moral sentiment, the argument from a plurality of values, 
and the argument from single-value conflicts" (p14). Each of these will 
be examined in this section. 
First, it is worth pointing out that the case in favour of the existence 
of "genuine" dilemmas entails a comprehensive shift in our perspective. 
It denotes a new temper of mind, challenges us to think differently about 
the premises of our moral philosophy and invites us to ask fresh 
questions about accepted definitions. 
For example, the distinction between a moral and a non-moral conflict is 
less clear-cut, definitions are viewed as open textured rather than 
closed and complete, the different meanings of "ought" are distinguished 
and the universal claims of moral judgements are seen to depend more 
upon similarity of circumstances than upon identical rules. "These are not 
arbitrary shifts in opinion but an intrinsic part of the new sta~dpoint 
~. 
which can be shown to be related to recent changes in the philosophy of 
science, to a phenomenological perspective, to the naturalistic paradigm 
of enquiry and to qualitative methods of research. Each of these, like 
the acceptance of "genuine" moral dilemmas, starts with a respect for 
what people say; they involve listening to the evidence, observing the 
.. , 
phenomenon itself without the preconceptions that filter and assess the 
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data before it is seriously considered. The whole, in short, is 
tantamount to adopting a different world view, one which invites the 
observer to welcome diversity and give due respect to the validity of 
subjective judgment. 
58 2 No A Priori Assumptions 
It was shown above (5A 6) that Sartre's form of particularism can be said 
to have removed the ground on which genuine dilemmas stand. For him, 
ethical principles are created only at the point of decision, by each 
individual in each particular circumstance; therefore, there is no clash 
of principle for that individual and it can be said that there is no 
dilemma. 
Two counter arguments can be put forward. In the first place, if we focus 
on the whole process of decision, with its possible pain and subsequent 
remorse, Sartre (1948) makes it possible to reinstate the situation, seen 
in its entirety, as dilemmatic. Secondly, by emphasising the point of 
decision, he actually supports the case for dilemma. There is no reason 
why two moral intuitions might not be experienced simultaneously, thus 
causing conflict to that individual. In the respect he accords to each 
person's judgment, he can find no place for an ethical philosophy of a 
priori values and this eliminates the possibility of a conflict of 
principles. There is no reason, however, why the moment of existential 
decision might not be dilemmatic. There was common ground here, he 
thought, with aesthetic values: 
Does a~yone reproach an artist when he paints a picture for not 
followlng.rules.established a priori? ... As everyone knows, there is 
no predefl~e~ plcture for him'to make; the artist applies himself to 
the composltlon of a picture, and the picture that ought to be made 
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is precisely that which he will have made ..... It is the same upon 
the plane of morality .... in both we have to do with creation and 
invention. We cannot decide a priori what it is that should be done. 
(1948 p49) 
We may quarrel with the claim that no rules are followed by artists; the 
Russian Orthodox Church, for example, had the strictest conventions about 
painting ikons and the Academie Francaise expected their canons to be 
followed by the salon ~ainters. The phenomenological point, however, is 
well made, namely that obligations cannot be prejudged a priori. Dilemmas 
are a natural experience and i~ is not possible to remove them by 
rational presupposition alone. 
58 3 Examples from Classical literature 
The phenomenologist will not be surprised that dramatic literature, plays 
and novels deal readily and frequently with individual dilemmas. The very 
messiness, the apparent incoherence, is the stuff of life and does not 
render it any the less "real" or objective; therefore dramatists have no 
difficulty in showing us dilemmas. In classical tragedy the existence of 
conflicting obligations is clearly seen, particularly in situations 
where, through fate or force of circumstance, good people cannot avoid 
evil actions because no guilt-free alternatives are open to them. Hegel 
(1975) considered that the "general reason for the necessity of these 
conflicts" lay in the fact that: 
The substance of ethical life, as a concrete unity, is an ensemble 
of different relations and powers which only in a situation of 
inactivity, like that of the blessed gods, accomplish the work of 
the spirit in the enjoyment of an undisturbed life .•. The original 
essence of tragedy consists then in the fact that within such a 
conflict each of the opposed sides, if taken by itself, has 
justification; while each can establish the true and positive 
content of its own aim and character only by denying and infringing 
the equally justifi;d power o~ the other. (1196) 
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For example, Sophocles' Antigone deals with conflicting duties, the 
familial and the civic; for Antigone, the choice lay between her family 
(and religious) duty to bury her brother Polyneices and her civic duty to 
obey Creon. Creon had declared the burial illegal because Polyneices was 
a traitor to his city and honouring him would threaten law and order, 
while at the same time taunt those who had remained loyal. We can also 
note that Creon had his own dilemma and role conflict between his 
obligation as uncle and duty as king. 
Aeschylus in the Agamemnon considered the clash between paternal and 
military claims; Agamemnon is caught between his human feelings as a 
" father for his daughter Iphigenia and his duties as a commander to his 
fellow countrymen to achieve military success. He is pulled in two 
directions by his divided sense of duty. Either way, Agamemnon cannot 
avoid doing wrong. 
What can I say? 
Disaster follows if I disobey; 
Surely yet worse disaster if I yield 
And slaughter my own child, my home's delight, 
In her young innocence, and stain my hand 
With blasphemous unnatural cruelty, 
Bathed in the blood I fathered! Either way, 
Ruin! (Aeschylus Agamemnon 206 - 13) 
Other famous examples include: Brutus, in Shakespeare's Ju7ius Caesar, 
who defends his murder of Caesar by saying that it was "not that I loved 
Caesar less, but tha! I loved Rome more" (Act 3 Scene 2); Nora, in 
Ibsen's A D077's House, ii torn between duties to her husband and 
"another duty, just as sacred .. ~ My duty to myself" (Act 3 Scene 2 see 
above 2.3.2). Each of these dramatic situations is taking seriously the 
human experience. They do not necessarily expect a clear or tidy solution 
but reveal the phenomen~logy of di.lemma at its most complex and 
heartfelt~ 
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In Aeschylus and Sophocles, the sympathy of the audience is elicited by 
the Chorus on the grounds that, whatever they decide, the dramatic 
characters cannot escape some responsibility for the outcome; their hands 
are not entirely clean, remorse and reparations are expected from them. 
Sometimes, as in the case of Oedipus, there·are deeds too dark to be 
overlooked, even when p~rformed by good people deciding for the best; 
even when forced by necessity, they are ensnared by a fate which decrees 
that, however scrupulously the path of virtue is followed, a terrible 
-
crime will be performed and a penalty is demanded. The Chorus will cry 
out for it in the name of justice. 
As the audience would have known well, the prevailing Greek moral code 
demanded that, when the gods required conflicting duties and evil 
resulted, human beings shourd both make suitable reparation and adopt an 
appropriate attitude. The fact that their snare was determined by the 
gods no more absolved them from guilt than belief in predestination 
exonerates a Calvinist sinner. They are required to make amends, to adopt 
an appropriately humble stance. Clarity of thought, even when coupled 
with bravery in resolve, is not acceptable to the gods when accompanied 
by superficiality, glibness, or hubris. The Chorus, speaking as the 
conscience of us all, must remind Agamemnon of his proper attitude 
(Agamemnon 160-184). Nussbaum (1985) concluded her discussion of 
Agamemnon's dilemma: 
Aeschylus then shows us not so much a "solution" to the "problem of 
practical conflict" as the richness and depth of the problem itself. 
(This achievement is closely connected with his poetic resources, 
which put the scene vividly before us, show us debate about it, and 
evoke in us responses important to its assesment). He has then, done 
the first thing that is needed to be done in order to challenge 
theoretical solutions to the problem. 
But if we recognize what he has put before us, we must recognize, 
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too, that the solutions do not really solve the problem. They simply 
underdescribe or misdescribe it. They fail to observe things that 
are here to be seen: the force of the losing claim, the demand of 
good character for remorse and acknowledgment. We suspect that to 
advance toward a more decisive solution we would have to omit or 
revise these features of the description of the problem. (1985 p266) 
58 4 Pluralism and Diversity 
The theoretical underpinning of this position is pluralism, or the belief 
in the diversity of moral obligations. The moral prohibitions that people 
acquire, in various ways, are not instances of "one or ... a very few 
injunctions, they are irreducibly p1ura1 1t (Hampshire, 1983 p20). This 
view is held by such philosophers as Ross, Davidson, Nagel, Williams, 
Berlin, and Gaut. Pluralists have little difficulty in accepting the 
likelihood, even the probability of there being conflicting obligations. 
Variety in nature is to be ~xpected, as Hampshire (1983) explained: 
The capacity to think scatters a range of differences and conflicts 
before us: different languages, different ways of life, different 
specializations of aim within a way of life, different conventions 
and styles also within a shared way of life, different prohibitions. 
A balanced life is a particular moral ideal to which there 
reasonably can be, and have been, alternatives acceptable to 
thoughtful men at different times and places ...... . 
My claim is that morality has its sources in conflict, in the 
divided soul and between contrary claims, and that there is no 
rational path that leads from these conflicts to harmony and to an 
assured solution, and to the normal and natural conclusion. 
(pI51f) 
The theory that the capacity to think implies conflict and choice will be 
taken up later (chapter g)' and in Billig's argument (1988) that the 
ability to debate and nurture common sense depends upon.the existence of 
contradiction in society. It represents well the pluralist standpoint 
that there is a class of moral dilemmas in which there is a conflict of 
two fundamental princip~es (See also Gaut in 2.4 above). They are 
irresolvable because, .being derived from a plurality of sources, they are 
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incommensurable. 
58 4.1 Another way of describing a fundamental conflict in reality is 
the Yin Yang theory of the universe which Confucianists and Taoists have 
adopted. Originally formulated by Tsou Yen in the fourth century, the Yin 
and Yang are sometimes_seen as night and day, darkness and light and 
symbolised in the circle divided into two pear shaped halves. In some 
explanations, the Yin is the female, passive and negative force, and the 
-Yang is the male, active and positive force. They interract, permeate the 
whole universe as a conflict of opposites, a kind of eternal dilemmatic 
reality. Taoism is the belief that these conflicting opposites can be 
reconciled and transcended by Tao. This results, in practice, in the aim 
of letting things be; humility, non-interference are the best attitudes, 
and all efforts to intervene, whether by commercial competition, 
governments, war or political manifestos, are self defeating and 
impertinent. 
58 4.2 A rather different view is held by the Parsis, whose religion, 
Zoroastrianism, teaches that two great spiritual forces, good and evil, 
exist in eternity. God did not create, or permit evil, as in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. There is a permanent cosmic battle, in which humans 
must play their part and this conflict is a contemporary fact of life, as 
if one lived within ~ perpetual dilemmatic reality. 
58 4.3 Bradley (1927) argued that a collision of duties in particular 
cases was common. As he wrote, "every act can be taken to involve such 
collision" (p156). "The morality of one time is not that of another time" 
(p189). He thus disagre~d with Kant that lying was always wrong. 
Sometimes there are "duties above truth speaking, and many offences 
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against morality which are worse, though they may be less painful, than a 
lie ll (p63). The ultimate good for every human being is IIself-
realization ll , which can take place in several ways, for example by 
fulfilling one's social role and the duties imposed by it. The conflict 
of duties that occurs as a result cannot be resolved by discursive 
reasoning or IIreflect iv_e deduct ion ll in order to arrive at a pract ica 1 
conclusion. Moral judgment is a matter of lIintuitionll or as he puts it: 
liTo the question, How am I to know what is right?lI, the answer must be, 
By the J.tr9?<il S of the ff~-iLfos [By the percept ion of the man of 
1 I ~ 
reason]; and the fPO~t 1'-0$ is the man who has ident ified his wi 11 with 
the oral spirit of the commuriity and judges accordinglyll (pI94). 
The British intuitionists also stressed moral diversity but by no means 
all of them would support the case for genuine dilemmas. As pointed out 
above (SA 3.2), Ross held that the conflicts are only prima facie not 
fundamental. Price (1969), however, claimed that there are six different 
IIheads ll of virtue, each of them IIself-evidentll and despite there being 
the II same eternal reason ll behind all of them, IIthey can lead us in 
contrary waysll. At such times, we may IIbe rendered entirely incapable of 
d~termining what we ought to choose ll (pI86). 
SB 4.4 It can be seen that pluralism has two characteristics: a belief 
in a diversity of fir~t principles, which may conflict and make contrary 
demands in particular casei; and second, an absence of any explicit 
method to resolve them. There are II no priority rules, for weighing these 
principles against one another: we are simply to strike a· balance by 
intuition, by what seems to us most nearly rightll (Rawls 1971 p34). 
Diversity does not, of ' course, of itself entail conflict, although it 
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makes it more likely. In theory there could be a priority principle that 
enabled one to rank the different obligations, 'or even a permanent 
hierarchy of principles (such as duty to God, to one's country, family 
and self). Most,pluralists, however, believe that no permanent priority 
principle exists at all. "Decisions about what to do must appeal to 
considerations about whftt is reasonable in the particular case, what is 
here best on balance, and require a sensitivity to aspects of the 
situation that resist codification" (Gaut 1985 p18, cp Sartre 1948 p35 
and see also 5B 9). Gaut called this process of reasoning "generative 
reflection" which she distinguished from "reflective equilibrium" -
which, she argued: 
Merely adjusts intuitions to principles - since it involves an 
additional empirical claim about the conditions of generation, and 
can undermine some of our intuitions in a more radical way than is 
open to reflective equilibrium. (p29) 
5B 5 Incommensurability 
Pluralism has many implications for dilemma which one should bear in 
mind. The first is the notion of incommensurability. If principles have 
different origins, it is difficult to compare one against another because 
there is no obvious standard to which to appeal (which is why Mill [1974] 
argued that logically we should need another "umpire" to decide between 
them; the pluralist would say that, however convenient it might be to 
have an "umpire", lif~ is just not like that). But being incommensurable 
does not mean we are reduced to inarticulate silence. It is ~till 
possible to provide reasons for one's decisions in a particular case. In 
theory we could not compare life saving with loyalty, honesty with 
promise keeping. In practice, however, (as argued in 2.4) there is 
normally little difficulty because other relevant factors assist us. 
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Sinnott Armstrong calls these cases of "limited incomparability" (1985 
p321f). The fact that one cannot rank certain kinds of moral requirements 
(usually extreme instances) does not imply that one can never rank 
specific cases. A particular moral duty to one's family can be stronger 
than some moral duties to one's country. 
58 5.1 Recently, discussions on medical ethics have centred on "four 
principles plus scope" put forward by Beauchamp and Childress (1989). 
These are purported to be "a sjmple, accessible, and culturally neutral 
approach to thinking about ethical issues in health care" (Gillon 1994 
pI84). The prinCiples are beneficence (the obligation to provide benefits 
and to balance benefits against risks); non-maleficence (the obligation 
to avoid causing harm); respect for autonomy (the obligation to respect 
the decision making capacitjes of autonomous people); and justice (the 
obligation of fairness in the distribution of benefits and risks). A 
similar list of prima facie duties was given by Ross and Price (see 58 
4.2) It is admitted that there is no set of ordered rules, no help if the 
principles should clash, but that we should "consider these in each case 
before coming to our own answer using our preferred moral theory or oth~r 
~pproach to choose between these principles when they conflict" (Gillon 
1994 p184). 
In the correspondence generated by these arguments (British Medical 
Journal 309 pl159-1160), s~veral writers revealed some of the dilemmas 
that-can emerge when these incommensurable principles conflict. For 
example, to practise beneficence and non-maleficience we need empirical 
evidence to assess the probabilities of harm and benefits. This is 
normally obtained by randomised controlled trials. Patients, however, who 
participate in randomised trials would to some extent lose their autonomy 
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unless they gave their consent. Yet, it is not often possible for them to 
be fully informed and it would seem that in those cases the principle of 
autonomy conflicted with the principle of beneficence. 
The principle of scope offers another dilemma. The question arises 
whether those who do not participate should perhaps lose their right to 
treatment when refusing to assist the society that confers that right. 
Gillon replied to the first problem that full consent is not necessary, 
and, to the second, that such refusers should nevertheless always fall 
within the scope of deserving medical care. In this way, it can be seen 
that resolving a conflict between incommensurable principles requires us 
to refer the matter (as Mill pointed out [1974 p9S1]) to another "umpire", 
perhaps the common sense of the agent. The fact of being incommensurable 
does not, as the debate sho~s, make resolution impossible, each person 
must use his or her own personally adopted standard to resolve the 
dilemma. 
58 6 Irresolvable Dilemmas 
Incommensurable dilemmas such those we have been considering, are often 
described as "irresolvable". But what might this mean? To resolve a 
dilemma may mean to eliminate the alternatives by proving that one of 
them has less force. After all, even choosing the lesser evil, assuming 
that one indisputably·exists, is an absolute moral requirement; it is the 
"right" thing to do and solves the dilemma. Again, by resolution we could 
mean avoiding the choice altogether by procrastination; this is hardly a 
satisfactory solution, but inaction is not an uncommon response to a 
difficult decision. Then, again, resolution could also mean that the 
alternative obligations were reconciled in some way, which is what Hegel 
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required of tragedy (see 9.2.2). 
58 6.1 There is a rather different example of "resolution" in the 
Bhagavad Gita, in which Krishna reveals the dilemma·of taking action in 
this world: whatever one does, there are consequences (either in this or 
in another life). If one performs good actions, this produces good 
results; if one performs evil acts, this produces bad results. The 
ultimate effect of either outcome is bondage to the future, the 
inevitability of rewards or punishments, for which one is doomed to be 
reborn. The only resolution of the dilemma, says Krishna, is to give up 
the fruits of action, and to relinquish false desires (1977 p93). 
58 6.2 Another meaning of resolution emerges if we take the view, as did 
Williams (1973) that moral preferences are more like desires than 
beliefs; the rejected alternative does not then disappear or cease to 
apply for it will often continue to be felt in the form of regret or 
guilt. For example, if we take job A rather than job B because of such 
factors as the effect on our family, the prospect of a house move, a new 
environment, we might still be left with second thoughts about job B. 
R~solution in such cases will mean learning to live with compromise and, 
if the decision affects someone else, a broken promise for example, 
resolution may require making amends, apologizing or trying to put things 
right. 
58 7 . Two Meanings of "Ought" 
Let us look at some other related questions which are implied by 
pluralism. Clashes between different "ought" statements are not 
necessarily conflicting recommendations for action. We have first to be 
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clear what we mean by "ought". If it is it an all-things-considered 
prescription to act in a particular way (see 2.9), it would be 
inconsistent to believe that there could be two such final "oughts". An 
example would be the orthodox Roman Catholic ban on contraception which 
applies equally to Christian, Moslem, Hindu.or atheist. This is an 
absolute command, regardless of individual opinion or differences in 
circumstance. 
Alternatively, "ought" may be a duty to do one thing if at all possible, 
an obligation with a built in ceteris paribus clause or, in other words, 
allowing for exceptions. Gowans (1987) described this distinction as 
between "ought" and "must" and considered it as a way of avoiding the 
inconsistency which, according to the principles of deontic logic, would 
otherwise exist: 
Thus, I will suppose that ought-prescriptions may conflict without 
inconsistency, but that must-prescriptions may not conflict; and I 
will suppose that the deontic principles govern only the latter. A 
must- prescription declares what is morally best and hence what, 
from the moral point of view, must be done. (Gowans 1987 p26) 
Foot (1983) also makes a distinction between types of obligation, arguing 
that there are two senses of "ought". The first type expresses a moral 
"ought" that can conflict with other moral "oughts". Clearly this would 
result in a dilemma. The second type, however, expresses "the thing that 
is best morally speaking". Foot holds that it cannot be the case that a 
person both ought and~ught.not to do something in this second sense of 
'ought' (p383f). One meaning expresses what is best morally 'speaking; 
clearly this cannot conflict with any other obligation without 
inconsistency. The other, however, expresses an action that ought to be 
done, other things being equal, or from the perspective of one among many 
~ 
moral values, a view congenial to pluralists. Such "oughts" can conflict, 
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for they are not forbidden by the rules of deontic logic. 
58 8 Epistemological Implications 
Another related issue is the meaning of "reality" in respect of moral 
obligation. Does it represent a belief in an objective set of triteria, 
~ 
as most rationalists would claim, universalizable, provable by an 
observable state of affairs about the world? A pluralist would argue that 
the "reality" of moral values is the belief in a rationale for making a 
decision, a consistent procedure for reaching a conclusion, which applies 
\ 
to anyone else finding themselves in the same set of circumstances. 
Brennan (1977), defending the cognitive stance, argued that it is not 
possible in the case of defining "right" and "wrong", to have an 
exhaustive list of criteria, as some ratioria1ists tend to require, so 
that people know in advance what we mean. He gave as an example the word 
"unsafe"; no experienced mountain climber will have memorised a list of 
"unsafe" criteria because he must regularly be meeting unprecedented 
situations. It is the same, he argued, with moral terms. We do not travel 
with a handy check list of morally neutral facts to guide us. 
Nevertheless, just as a judge uses a wealth of "knowledge" to decide the 
relevance or otherwise of precedents, so also we are not forced to 
abandon a consistent, reasonable approach to deciding moral questions. 
Rather, it means that-definitions are always open textured. 
What the example from Brennan shows is that not all supporters of dilemma 
abandon the claim to cognitive, real or consistent descriptions of 
dilemma. What they do all have in common is the refusal to decide a 
.. 
priori against the possibility of holding consistent beliefs in dilemma. 
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58 9 Situation Ethics 
Another implication of pluralism is that one must consider each 
circumstance carefully and be prepai~d to adapt to it. This has sometimes 
been called "situation ethics". A typical statement, from-a Christian 
standpoint, can be taken from Fletcher (1966): 
There are various names for this approach: situationism, 
contextualism, ocasionalism, circumstantial ism, even actual ism. 
These labels indicate, of course, that the core of the ethic they 
describe is a healthy and-primary awareness that "circumstances 
alter cases" - i.e. that in actual problems of conscience the 
situational variables are to be weighed as heavily as the normative 
or "general" constants ...... The situational factors are so primary 
that we may even say "circumstances alter rules and principles" 
This is the temper of situation ethics. It is empirical, fact-
minded, data conscious, inquiring. It is antimoralistic as well as 
anti legalistic, for it is sensitive to variety and complexity. It is 
neither simplistic nor perfectionist. It is "casuistry" (case-based) 
in a constructive and non-pejorative sense of the word .. ~ It works 
with two guidelines from Paul: "The written code kills, but the 
Spirit gives life" (II Corinthians 3.6) and, "For the whole law is 
fulfilled in one word, "you shall love your neighbour as yourself" 
(Galatians 5.14) ... 
Christian situation ethics is not a system or program of living 
according to a code, but an effort to relate love to a world of 
relativities through a casuistry obedient to love. It is the 
strategy of love. This strategy denies that there are, as Sophocles 
thought, any unwritten immutable laws of heaven. (p29f) 
A similar position was adopted by Bonhoeffer (1955) when he asked what is 
meant by "telling the truth" and what does it demand of us? He began by 
making a distinction: _ 
The truthfulness of a child towards his parents is essentially 
different from that of the parents towards their 
child ... consequently, in the matter of truthfulness, the parents' 
claim on the child is different from the child's claim on the 
parents .... From this it emerges already that "telling the truth" 
means something different according to the particular situation in 
which one stands. Account must be taken of one's relationships at 
each particular time. (p326) 
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5B 10 Pluralism Summarised 
No better summary of the pluralist point of view and its implications has 
been given than by Gaut (1993). She called the belief in independent and 
.' 
diverse moral principles a "return to a COnlTlon sense morality" and used a 
powerful image to reinforce her point: 
From the pluralist's perspective, those philosophers who account for 
morality in prioritist terms, appealing to one underlying conception 
of the morally right, are like those urban planners who demolish the 
messily arranged structures of an old city that has evolved over 
centuries in order to place neat, ordered, planned tower-blocks in 
their place. The result in the moral case is likely to be the same 
as in the urban case: the area becomes uninhabitable. I have urged 
instead a steady programme of home-improvements, with the occasional 
demolition of a habitation when its foundations prove untrustworthy. 
I take it that this approach to ethics is only a return to common-
sense: common sense morality. (p37) 
Common sense morality is one form of pluralism. It has a set of 
principles which fix one's prima facie duties (such as to keep promises, 
not to harm others, not to tell lies, etc.) These are universal in the 
sense that they apply in all cases which are identical in their non-moral 
properties. As Gaut explains: "To establish which principle is the more 
pressing in a particular context one uses, ... highly context-dependent 
reasoning and judgement ... Having established which of the two 
conflicting duties is required in the circumstances, the duty is rendered 
absolute" (pI9). What is required is'a "reflectively improve~ version of 
common sense morality" (p33). 
5B 11 The Single Value Argument 
Another case for the existence of genuine dilemmas, which is sometimes 
put forward, is the single value argument. Here it asserted by some (eg 
.. 
Marcus 1980) that a single principle obligation can give rise to an 
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irresolvable conflict. For example, a doctor may not know which of two 
equally deserving patients he should treat (other things also being 
equal). A fireman may not be able to rescue more than one person from a 
blazing building. In Sophie's Choice the mother did not know which of her 
two children to offer to the camp guard. It is alleged that in each of 
these cases, the single principle (of life saving) gives no guidance 
which course of action to follow. A similar situation allegedly arises in 
the case of two clashing promises. 
As pointed out in 5A 4 a number of replies can be offered to this. In the 
first place, the conflicting promises may be due to the error of the 
agent, in which case the conflict is avoidable. Secondly, it may be 
argued that a promise always has built into it the condition that it will 
be fulfillable in all reasonable circumstances. The promise keeper would 
be excused if another eventuality beyond his control revealed he had 
double booked. His contracted obligation would be deemed to fall. 
But the strongest argument is surely that no fireman, doctor or mother 
can ~e obliged to do more ~han save as many lives as they possibly can 
(see SA 4); if, by definition, itis not possible to save more than one, 
it would be unreasonable to feel obliged to do more, however much you 
might wish you could do more. The single principle does not lead to a 
moral dilemma but to a practical problem. Guilt, therefore, is an 
-inappropriate feeling. It is now necessary to consider the question of 
guilt and remainders in more detail. 
58 12 The Argument from Remainders 
~ 
A very different line of argument to support the case for dilemmas, which 
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has already been referred to in 58 6.2, was put forward by Williams 
(1973). In his view, leaving aside conflicts between a moral judgement 
and a non-moral desire, and the hypothetical possibility of holding two 
intrinsically inconsistent moral principles, Williams held that there are 
. 
two basic forms of moral conflict. "One is that in which it seems that I 
ought to do each of two things, but I cannot do both. The other is that 
in which something which (it seems) I ought to do in respect of certain 
of its features also has other features in respect of which (it seems) I 
ought not to do it"; put concisely, the first is equivalent to: I ought 
to do a and I ought to do b, while the second is: I ought to do c and I 
ought not to do c. 
Williams then went on to show that such moral conflicts are more like 
conflicts of desire than conflicts of ordinary factual belief. A rejected 
belief cannot substantially survive the point of decision that it was not 
true. But when we act on one of two desires, the rejected desire is not 
eliminated; "it may reappear, for instance, in the form of a regret for 
what was missed." This is a moral "remainder" and shows that even when we 
think that we have acted for the best, it would be a mistake to think 
that the rejected "ought must be totally rejected in the sense that one 
becomes convinced that it did not actually apply." Nussbaum, sympathetic 
to this approach, pointed out that what is foregone: 
May sometimes be peripheral and sometimes more central to our 
conception of good living, sometimes what is foregone adversely 
affects only the agent himself; sometimes there is los~ or damage to 
other people •••. sometimes the case may be self-contained, affecting 
little beyond itself; sometimes the choice .•. may bring with it far-
reaching consequences for the rest of the agent's life and/or other 
affected lives. Finally, some such cases may be reparable: the agent 
may have future chances to undo what has been done or to pursue the 
omitted course; sometimes it is clear that there will be no such 
chance. (1985 p238) 
This illustrates well the variety of situa~ions which may occur leaving 
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us with a persistent "remainder"; clearly some of the sentiments felt 
will be those of regret, guilt or remorse. Agamemnon may have had no 
choice, given his post (see chapter_6), but the Chorus expected that, at 
the very least, he made some reparation and adopted a different attitude, 
just we might expect it from our politicians when driven to compromise 
(see 6.5 and 8). Others who support this type of argument include Marcus 
(1980), Fraassen (1973), Nussbaum (1985) and Statman (1990). 
58 13 Justified and Unjustified Feelings of Guilt 
In SA 5 the argument was considered that guilt feelings may be 
unjustified and, in any case, do not substantiate the existence of 
dilemma. Statman (1990), realising that guilt feelings can sometimes be 
,. 
misplaced, being the result of an over scrupulous conscience,- considered 
the attempt to make a distinction between unjustified guilt feelings and 
justified guilt feelings. This, however, involves us in a vicious circle. 
As he put it: 
It tries to establish the agent's guilt by the fact the agent feels justified guilt feelings. And how do we know that the feelings are justified? From the fact that he behaved wrongly and violated a 
(real) moral duty. But how do we know he behaved wrongly etc? From 
the fact he feels justified guilt feelings, and so we go round 
again. In other words, we could tell that guilt feelings are justified only if we already beg the question, and presuppose that 
the agent is guilty. (pI98) 
Nevertheless, his conclusiop about the argument from sentiment, which 
this researcher finds convincing, was that even though one of the 
options which the agent faces is better (or less evil), all things 
considered, than the other (for example, a person might only be able to 
prevent a nuclear war and save millions of innocent lives by cheating, 
violating promises, betriying family and friends etc), "it would be very 
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artificial to deny" that this is a case of a moral dilemma. Hence, some 
dilemmas are real, he claimed, even when they are resolvable. There may 
be a better thing to do (namely to prevent the terrible war) but it would 
be "ad hoc and begg i ng the quest i on 11 (p 198) to den·y that it was a mora 1 
dilemma. Nussbaum (1985) put the case well: 
We have, then, a ~ide spectrum of cases in which there is something 
like a conflict of desires .... We want ultimately to ask whether 
among these cases there are some in which not just contentment but 
also ethical goodness itself is affected; whether there is sometimes 
not just the loss of something desired but also actual blameworthy 
wrong-doing - and, therefore, occasion not only for regret but also 
for an emotion more like remorse. (p237) 
5B 13.1 Greenspan (1983) distinguished two kinds of conflict: there are 
dilemmas of "exclusive requirement", where the doctor, fireman, mother, 
etc, are directed positively towards doing something they ought to do, 
namely saving a life, even though there is no moral ground for choosing 
which life; and there are dilemmas of "exhaustive prohibition", where the 
agent is faced with a set of negative options all of which are 
impermissible. This was the case with Sophie. Whatever she chose it was 
forbidden. Sophie was faced with negative choices, claimed Greenspan, so 
that she was prohibited from doing anything, and, by the same single 
p.rinciple of life saving, from doing nothing. In cases of dilemmas of 
"exhaustive prohibition" it may be appropriate to feel guilty (p123). 
The difficulty about this argument is surely that the distinction is 
unreal. If we judge m6ral choices by their results then to that extent 
both Sophie, with her negative set of options ("exhaustive 
prohibitions"), and the fireman with his positive set of options 
("exclusive requirements") are each faced with the same outcome, making a 
selection which leaves one person to die. If guilt is appropriate in the 
one case, it is also in {he other. 
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58 13.2 Slote (1985) put the case that even the utilitarian can find a 
place for justified guilt. He asks us to imagine "an impersonally 
benevolent person who has devoted his (sic) life to helping people, but who 
learns that he has contracted a particularly virulent form of plague" 
(pI64). Whatever he does, wherever he moves, he will infect people. There 
is no way of isolating him. Slote asked, IIWhat will the conscientious 
person with utilitarian motivation feel about his actions if he learns 
that he has such a disease?1I He concluded that such a person is likely to 
feel not only regret for infecting people, but also guilt about IIwhat he 
has done (and cannot stop doing)." This, claimed Slote, illustrates a 
utilitarian moral dilemma. 
58 13.3 Fraassen (1973) argued that guilt cannot easily be removed from 
the rejected obligation bec~use it would make the doctrine of IIOriginal 
Sin" incoherent. In the Old Testament, guilt is applied to several 
descendants of those Israelites who worshipped idols, "visiting the 
iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's 
children unto the third and to the fourth generation ll (Exodus 34.7). 
Similarly in modern times, many Germans are assumed to be guilty for the 
crimes of their predecessors. But is this convincing? "Original Sin" is a 
doctrine about the human condition, when faced with the perfection of 
God; it applies to everyone; it is not a doctrine about guilt for actual. 
sins committed, still less is it an assertion about what people actually 
feel, a statement about human sentiments. 
58 14 Guilt and Regret 
A more fruitful approach, it would seem, is to distinguish between guilt 
and regret. Even if none 'of the above agents have any reason to feel 
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guilt it would be natural for them to feel bad about not being able to do 
more, to save more; they might even feel guilty at the moment of 
explaining their choice to, say, a relative of the person who had died. 
What is justifiable, and surely unnatural to deny, is the feeling of 
regret. Agamemnon, Abraham or Sophie might be well advised to give up 
blaming themselves; they did what they had to do in the circumstances; 
guilt is not applicable. But it is reasonable for them to feel regret, 
even if they acted for the best in the circumstances. Thus it is not the 
case, as Marcus supposes, that-"you are damned if you do and damned if 
you don't"; that would indeed mean that the gods were irrational. But 
regret about being caught in such a web of circumstances, possibly some 
to which one contributed, is both natural and reasonable. Trigg (1971) 
stated the difference between guilt, or remorse, and regret as follows: 
To feel guilt or remorse one must think one has done something which 
is blameworthy at least in one's own eyes. It does seem odd to say 
that we feel guilty about being faced with a moral dilemma or that 
we feel remorse about having done something we regard as wrong when 
the only alternative was something viewed as a lot worse. It is not 
that we are being irrational. "Guilt" and "remorse" are 
inappropriate concepts to introduce here. If I do not blame myself I 
cannot be feeling remorse ....... Unlike remorse, regret can clearly 
be about events for which I am not responsible, even though I care· 
about them. (p48f) 
58 15 A Counter Argument to Traditional Deontic logic 
There remains the problem of deontic logic. Are there rules that forbid 
the coincidence of tw~ conflicting and genuine obligations? As pointed 
out in the previous chapter' (5A 4), in the rationalist tradition it is 
held that the combination of the principle "ought implies can" (2.8) 
together with the principle of agglomeration, (if you ought to do a and 
ought to do b, you have an obligation to do both a and b), renders 
genuine dilemma inconceiv.~ble. A number of recent philosophers have 
challenged this. Williams relinquished agglomeration (1973) and Lemmon 
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(1965) argued against "ought implies can", but Gowans (1987) considered 
these moves to be mistaken; deontic principles stand or fall together, 
and as they rest on a single assumption his preference is to attack that 
premise. 
The premise in question is that deontic modalities of obligation, 
prohibition, and permission and alethic modalities of necessity, 
impossibility, and possibilit~ are analagous to one another. If ought 
expresses moral necessity, as Kant believed, then it indeed follows that 
moral dilemmas are impossible. Gowans, however, Questioned why we should 
assume that the principles of deontic logic can be treated like the 
principles of propositional logic? Obligation an~ logical necessity are 
entirely different systems. 
Nevertheless, to make the case that moral prescriptions never express 
necessity is difficult, because often it is clearly the case that an 
obligation is felt to apply come what may, whatever the circumstances. 
If, however, one considers that there are two kinds of moral prescription 
as did Foot (1983) and Gowans (1987, see 58 7 above), then it opens the 
way to accepting genuine dilemmas. There are "oughts" which can never 
clash because they describe what one must do (in Gowans' preferred 
terminology "a must-prescription declares what is morally best and hence 
what, from the moral~point of view, must be done"); there are also, 
however, "oughts" which may clash without being incoherent:. 
An ought prescription declares, from the perspective of one among 
many moral values, that an action ought to be done. Hence, 'S ought 
to do A is always an abbreviation of 'from the perspective of such-
and-such value, S ought to do A'. (1987 p26) 
.. ' 
A similar conclusion is reached by Searle: the belief that "I have an 
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obligation to do A~ cannot consistently be held with the belief that "I 
ought, other things being equal do 8". On the other hand there is no 
inconsistency between believing that one has an obligation to do A and 
the statement that, nevertheless, "I ought, all things considered to do 
8" (1978 pa7). 
58 16 A Typology of Dilemmas 
From the foregoing discussion of the arguments in favour of the reality 
of moral dilemmas, it is possible to classify dilemmas into recognizable 
types from the phenomenological standpoint and then to cross check the 
classification against data derived from the interviews with students. If 
one divides dilemmas first into two broad categories, those that are 
resolvable (A) and those that are irresolvable (8) and then distinguish 
between those with no remainder (1), those with a residue of regret (2) 
and finally those more serious dilemmas which leave a feeling of remorse 
or guilt (3), the following classification can be put forward before 
further perspectives are considered: 
AI. Dilemmas which can be resolved without regrets or second thoughts. 
Nevertheless, the experience is still remembered as a poignant one, 
causing some personal concern and urgency, thus distinguishing it 
from a "problem" (see interview 3). 
A2.Dilemmas which can be resolved, but only by leaving sentiments of 
post decisional regret or anguish about the rejected a1ternative(s), 
(see interview 5). 
A3. Dilemmas which can be resolved but only by leaving a remainder of 
~ justified post decisional guilt or remorse (see interview 15). 
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81. Dilemmas which appear from the agent's perspective to be 
irresolvable. Nevertheless, when the choice of action has been 
decided, although there are no· regrets or guilt feelings, the memory 
of the experience is still a poignant one, causing some personal 
concern and urgency (see interview 8). 
82. Dilemmas which are irresolvable. Nevertheless, when the choice of 
action has been decided, the agent· is left with a sense of post 
decisional regret (see interview 1). 
83. Dilemmas which are irresolvable. Nevertheless, when the choice 
of action has been decided, the agent is left with a sense of 
(unjustified) guilt (see interview 2). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
POLITICAL ETHICS: PUBLIC MORALITY AND THE "DIRTY HANDS" PROBLEM 
Ethical philosophy can be applied to most areas of human ~ctivity and one 
of the most interesting to educators and the concern of this chapter is 
whether the moral obligations that a person acknowledges in posts of 
public responsibility conflict with those that the same person accepts 
in private life. 
Does the general who knowingly orders the attack on a village with 
innocent civilians in it, on the pretext that it also contains guerillas, 
act according to a different set of precepts from those he would normally 
follow as a private citizen? Are politicians who obtain office by means 
of a shady deal with an influential pressure group they would normally 
detest, or who exercise their newly acquired power by compromising the 
principles for which they stood before winning it, obeying a different 
moral code? Or are they rather applying the same moral code to a new and 
more complex situation, adapting the commitments which they would 
normally acknowledge with more subtlety, complexity and permissible 
exceptions than would be acceptable in their private lives? 
This conflict between public and private morality is sometimes called the 
"dirty hands" problem, after Sartre's play of that name (1955), or the 
"Mach i ave 11 ian prob 1 em", after the adv i ce given to those see.k i ng high 
office by Machiavelli in The Prince (Chapter XV). 
Essentially this issue is whether public morality can be considered to 
differ in some way from private morality, and although usually thought of 
as a political dilemma, .. it clearly applies with equal force to military 
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leaders, to those in business management or people in any post of 
responsiblity. The purpose of this chapter is to consider first the 
variety of situations in which the problem can arise; second, to ask if 
there is any justification in considering that public life is somehow 
different from private, then to look at some differing approaches to the 
question and finally !o ask what schools and colleges might be expected 
to do to prepare students for posts of responsibility and a life which 
will require them to face many compromises. 
6.1 The ftDirty Hands ft Problem 
The problem of the contradictions which may arise between public and 
private ethical standpoints is by no means new; it was essentially the 
Agamemnon predicament; it was faced by early Christian theologians 
considering whether it was right to bear arms in a just cause, such as 
Tertullian, Augustine and Basil the Great, and it was studied 
particularly by Machiavelli. Nevertheless, it has been given a new twist 
in recent years in the debate about the rules of war; the potential for 
mass destruction in modern nuclear warfare has challenged the very notion 
of there being any such thing as a "just war", and modern investigative 
journalism has brought into the light of public scrutiny the compromises 
occurring in modern power politics. Moreover, TV technology now means 
that the public enters more immediately into the debates surrounding 
notorious events such as the My Lai massacre or Watergate. 
One of the main political compromises faced by the early church, to take 
the first of these examples, was whether Christians could with a clear 
conscience fight in the Roman army., If so, could they kill without 
incurring guilt? The two poles of the argument, which might be named the· 
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absolutist and the expedient, presented relatively clear positions: 
either Christians ought to remain pacifist and refuse to enlist even at 
the point of death (Tertullian's position) or they were justified in 
obeying the commands of the State ("Be subject for the Lord's sake to 
every human institution" 1 Peter 2:13), in which case, however 
regrettable the consequences, no guilt was incurred. 
6.1.1 At one extreme stood Tertullian, who can be seen as an early 
Christian example of the uncompromising absolutist. He rejected the 
worldly (i.e. Roman) attitude towards war. "It is absolutely forbidden to 
repay evil with evil" (On Patience 8). "How will a Christian go to war, 
nay, how will he serve even in peace without a sword, which the Lord has 
taken away?" (On Idolatry XIX). 
Augustine adopted a compromise position; he did not consider it wrong to 
kill if the cause was just, although it was the kind of thing that might 
make a soldier melancholy and sad: 
It is the wrong doing of the opposing party which compels the wise 
man to wage just wars; and this wrongdoing even though it gave rise 
to no war, would still be a matter of grief to man because it is 
man's wrongdoing ... 
Let everyone, then, who thinks with pain on all these ~reat evils, 
so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if 
anyone either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is 
a more miserabl~ plight still, for he thinks himself happy"because 
he has lost human feeling (City of God XIX 7). 
It was right, therefore, to feel melancholy at being compromised by 
worldly standards; good men should always deprecate war.- Guilt, however, 
was not appropriate. We might parallel this argument with modern versions 
of expediency; utilitarjans find no place for feelings of guilt if the 
action is justified in terms of its outcome, although even misplaced 
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guilt may still have its benefits (see Slote 1985 pI64). In none of these 
cases do we have a dilemma as such and therefore no problem of "dirty 
hands". Good men and women can eit~er avoid war altogether and pay the 
penalty that the state exacts, or they can participate with a clear 
conscience, with regrets probably, with doubts even, but not with a 
justified sense of guilt. 
Basil the Great, however, takes a more serious view, a position midway 
between Tertullian's outright rejection and Augustine's compromise. 
Regret becomes uncleanliness, or impurity which, although it may be 
distinguished from justified guilt, is closely allied to it and may 
indicate the origin of the "dirty hands" concept. 
Homicide in war is not_ reckoned by our fathers as homicide; I 
presume from their wish to make concession to men fighting on 
behalf of chastity and true religion. Perhaps, however, it is well 
to counsel that those whose hands are not clean only abstain from 
communion for three years. (Letter CLXXXVIII, 13) 
6.1.1 In recent years, Gelder (1989) has drawn attention to two 
"dilemmas of deterrence", the credibility dilemma and the usability 
dilemma. Although Gelder saw these as two closely related questions, they 
can be better described as one, a dilemma with two horns: loss of 
c~edibility and likelihood of use. Briefly, the more extreme. our threats 
to use nuclear retaliation, and therefore the more likely to lead to all 
out nuclear war, the Jess credible it will be that rational people would 
carry them out, and deterrence fails. If, however, we moderate the 
threats in order to make them more credible, they may then become 
insufficient to counter the possibility of aggression. 
Nuclear deterrence cannot be effective unless its threats are 
credible, and yet t~e very process of making those threats credible 
increases the risk of nuclear war, directly undermining the original 
purpose. Nuclear deterrence appears to be either incredible or self-
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defeating; either way, it fails to prevent nuclear conc1ict. (p159) 
This has led to a debate (see, for example, Schonsheck 1991) in which 
different escapes from the horns of the dilemma are argued. It would be 
difficult to decide whether this is a moral or a non-moral dilemma. What 
is clear, however, is that it illustrates typically the different 
principles that come i~to play when defining a credible defence policy 
for a ~ountry and the impossibility of keeping one's hands pure. 
6.1.2 The starkest presentation of the case for compromise and 
expediency is to be found in Sartre's Dirty Hands (1955). In it, Hugo, an 
idealist, intellectual revolutionary (an absolutist) believes he ought to 
assassinate the leader of his party, Hoederer, for betraying the 
revolutionary principles for reasons of opportunism. Hoederer's reply has 
become much quoted: 
How you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid you are to soil 
your hands! All right, stay pure! What good will it do? Why did you join us? Purity is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals 
and bourgeois anarchists use it as a pretext'for doing nothing. To 
do nothing, to remain motionless, arms at your sides, wearing kid 
gloves. Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the elbows. I've , 
plunged them in filth and blood. But what do you hope? Do you think 
you can govern innocently? (1955 p224) 
Here we find neither the absolutist, rejection of compromise, as desired 
by the unworldly Hugo, nor the uncomplicated, clear conscience adoption 
of the "filth and blood", as might be argued by the act utilitarian. 
Keeping one's hands clean ~s not an option in Hoederer's eyes. His 
position is that of the leader who knows only too well that it is not 
possible to "govern innocently". His political dilemma is a real one. 
6.1.3 Machiavelli also presented a deliberate approach to compromise and 
expediency. The Prince must learn how not to be good if he will survive: 
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There is such'a difference between how men live and how they ought 
to live that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done 
learns his destruction rather than his preservation, because any man 
who under all conditions insists on making it his business to be 
good will surely be destroyed among so many who are not good. Hence 
a prince, in order to hold his position, must acquire the power to 
be not good, and understand when to use it and when ,not to use it, 
in accord with necessity. (The Prince chapter XV) 
Machiavelli was not making ,a case for placing politics in an autonomous 
realm, beyond the claims of ordinary morality. He was judging the good 
prince, "among so many who ar~ not good" by the same code which he 
himself respected. Elsewhere he appproved of the Florentines who have a 
higher regard for their "patria than for their souls". In both cases, it 
is a question of the prior claim of high office; his point is that there 
are situations in which the good leader must override his personal 
intuitions about moral obligations in the interests of the state for 
which he has accepted responsibility. 
6.1.4 Similarly, Walzer (1973) is clear that we are dealing with a 
problem within the moral code, a question of the grounds and limits of 
compromise. For him, the moral politician is a tragic hero. He (sic) does 
not shrug off the dilemma as if it were of no consequence, for he is a 
man of scruple (which is probably why we voted for him). But neither can 
he adopt the absolutist line and stay pure, for either he would have 
failed to obtain power in the first place, or he would have lost it in 
the struggle with "so many who are not good". If he couldn't sta~d the 
heat.he should have stayed out of the kitchen. What he has ~s a genuine 
dilemma, the problem of "dirty hands". 
If he is the good man I am imagining him to be, he will feel guilty, 
that is, he will believe himself to be guilty. That is what it means 
to have dirty hands .•.•... Here is the moral politician: it is by his 
dirty hands that we know him. "If he were a moral man and nothing 
else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician and 
nothing else, he ~ould pretend that they were clean. (1973 p166 ff) , 
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6.1.5 There are many other applications of this problem. Benn (1983) 
described the issues from the point of view of the liberal conscience, as 
the conflict between the 'personal' and the 'political'; in this the 
liberal has a conflict between two principles which he acknowleges. On 
the one hand, the obligation to be tolerant, a tradition born out of the 
'wars of religion and persecutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, which has taught him advantages of respecting the individual 
conscience, the "Inner Light"-and the right to individual belief. The 
integrity of the individual demands such respect; it is also a prudent 
policy, for the sake of social peace. It was on these grounds that the 
U.K. Report of the committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (the 
Wolfenden Report) declared in 1957 that "there must remain a realm of 
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not 
the law's business" (Cmd 247 para 61). 
On the other hand, liberals understand morality to be a rational process, 
open to public scrutiny and justified by appeal to the commonly accepted 
criteria of good reasoning. They therefore have difficulty in accepting 
"gut feelings" or private intuitions. Morality is not a question of 
personal taste, like baroque music or avocado pears, it is public in the 
sense that Wittgenstein claimed a language must be public: "the 
principles, the reasons for saying that you have got it right or wrong, 
must be open to anyone" (Benn 1983 p156). On similar grounds to these, 
Lord Devlin rejected the distinctions made in the Wolfende~ Report: "I do 
not think one can talk sensibly of a public and private morality" (1965 
pI6). 
The question for the li6eral, argued Benn, is whether to congratulate 
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one's leaders for making tough decisions in the jungle world of power 
politics, or to expect some signs of appreciation of the tension between 
a morality of principles and one of utilitarian expediency. His own 
conclusion seems to support the "d~rty hands" concept and the belief that 
political dilemmas genuinely exist. In answer to Hoeder~r' question, he 
does not believe that it is possible to govern innocently and that "a 
-feeling of loss, for some liberals, is inescapable" (p159). 
6.2 Is There a Distinctive Public Morality? 
Let us now look a little closer at the claim that the public sphere is so 
special that a different morality applies to it; and for the purposes of 
this study this is taken to include any post of public responsibility, 
from student president to college governor, from site manager to project 
director, petty officer to ship's captain. Several reasons can be put 
forward to justify the distinction between a public and a private 
morality. First, there is the popular view that politicians are different 
from (and worse than) private citizens. 
Walzer (1973) has drawn a distinction on three grounds between 
'politicians and "other entrepreneurs in an open society, who hustle, lie, 
intrigue, wear masks, smile and are villains" (p162). The first reason 
they are regarded as worse than ourselves, he claimed, is because the 
politician acts on ~ur behalf, he (sic) "hustles, lies, and intrigues for 
us - or so he claims". As"it happens, he cannot serve us ~ithout also 
serving himself, for success brings him the power and glory which he so 
desires, "the greatest rewards that men can win from their fellows". But 
he will argue that if he did not hustle and lie there would be many 
others prepared to. 
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Secondly, a politician is considered worse than the rest of us, he 
claimed, because he exercises power over us. "The successful politician 
becomes the visible architect of our restraint. He taxes us, licenses us, 
forbids and permits us, directs us to this or that distant goal - all for 
our greater good (pI6S). 
Thirdly, the politician uses his power against us. "The men who act for 
us and in our name are often killers, or seem to become killers too 
quickly and too easily" (pI64). For these reasons, therefore, politicians 
are arguably distinct from ordinary citizens and are commonly regarded as 
such. In which case they can be expected to follow a different code of 
behaviour. 
6.2.1 More generally, with regard to other posts of responsibility, it 
can be argued that it is no longer the·individual's moral code that is 
relevant. Each one is in office by virtue of election, appointment or 
nomination and, as such, personal morality is not particularly important; 
what counts are the multifarious codes of the constituency or the moral. 
standards of the appointing authority. You should therefore seek a 
consensus, a mandate or delegated duty. However much you wish to be "your 
own man", you are not. You are under authority and, even though this 
involves ducking and diving, wheeling and dealing, making the best of the 
situation, this is w~at you are put there to do and to imagine otherwise 
is a selfish indulgence.. 
By the same token, the moral intuitions appropriate to individuals in 
their private capacity may be quite inappropriate in their public role. 
Benn quotes with approvaJ Cecil's observation that "No one has a right to 
be unselfish with other people's interests" and that the morality which 
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requires an individual to sacrifice his or her interests to others is 
inappropriate to the action of a state (p162). 
6.2.2 When one considers the apparent public outrage in ~he USA at the 
lies told during the Watergate affair, or those that forced the 
resignations in this country over the Spycatcher issue, it is clear that 
lying to save one's own skin in government is regarded as a very 
different matter to the grand fabrications of state. As Benn stated it: 
The grim necessities of the contest for power will excuse a lie for 
the country's sake. To lie for the government's survival can be 
acceptable, if embarassing, to its supporters. To lie for personal 
advantage alone is not acceptable and not to be excused merely by an 
appeal to the Hobbesian rules of the political game. (p166) 
6.2.3 Then there is the "buck stops here" argument. All those in 
positions of authority are to some extent isolated. However hard they 
consult, seek advice, attempt to find the will of the people, this will 
elude them. They are often expected to take the very decision that no one 
else will take; it may be to sack a trouble maker, to take a stand 
against an aggressor or to threaten those who use violence. At the point 
of decision, it is quite likely that their followers or advisers will 
look to their own reputations and speak with a forked tongue. They may be 
criticised and opposed right up to the point of decision; then, if it 
appears successful, they can expect to be told that this was what they 
were expected to do a)l along; if unsuccessful, they will be expected to 
take the blame, even resign. Such things go with the job. 
6.2.4 Another distinguishing facet is the seduction of power. Those who 
obtain high office will not readily relinquish it; politicians can do no 
good unless they obtain power themselves, and this is unlikely unless 
they use the necessary. means, including making compromises, wheeling and 
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dealing. The struggle to get re elected, or re-appointed may require many 
such accommodations, face saving formulae, U-turns and the like. Popular 
acclaim is fickle and to strive ove~much for the appearance of 
consistency will be regarded by the public as a conceit of far less 
importance, in the majority of cases, than to undertake dubious backstage 
manoevres in order to retain power. 
6.2.5 Another approach is to distinguish between the different forms of 
reasoning that are employed in political and private spheres 
respectively. Lucas (1966), for instance, argued that political reasoning 
is dialectical, it balances opposing interests; the questions are never 
prejudged and the issues rarely settled or closed. This means that both 
sides in a dispute can always return to them, perhaps years afterwards, 
when new circumstances apply, when there are new actors on the stage, and 
new constraints to limit our choices. Oakeshott (1965) expressed the 
matter slightly differently; when we come to a political argument,he 
wrote, we bring a whole array of beliefs, traditions, feelings and 
prejudices. This means there is no body of norms and principles which can 
provide tidy solutions or references to guide our decisions. We can, of 
course, call on our beliefs and traditions, but not in the sense of a 
vade mecum of ready principles. We learn from these only by living them 
out in practice and in what are by definition new situations. Our 
decisions are based ~pon what is likely to provide the most acceptable 
compromise between competing goals. 
6.2.6 Many would argue that the distinction between a public and a 
private morality rests on the fact that politics is a jungle world, where 
the devil takes the hinQmost and the refinements of moral principle are a 
luxury by comparison with the survival of the fittest. Thus Benn argued 
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that those who are the agents of the state "are licensed to set aside 
moral principles for the sake of good outcomes (or more usually, to avoid 
bad ones), and that the reason for this is that they are the champions 
and trustees of the public in a jungle world" (pI67). 
6.2.7 There is, therefore, a case for seeing a difference in the role, 
and a difference in the perception by the public of that role. But it is 
very doubtful if any of these arguments establish the case that politics 
(or the military life, or management) is beyond the reach of moral 
considerations. Accountability makes for greater complexity in ethical 
issues, less predictablility and raises other constraints. All these are 
arguments for compromise and adaptation of the code, but not for the 
autonomy of public morality; still less are they for taking politics and 
other spheres of responsibility out of the moral realm altogether. 
Morality applies to all human actions; the distinctions, therefore, if 
they indeed exist, are within morality. It is clear that a more complex 
set of considerations applies to posts of public responsibility. There· 
will be a need to obtain publicly desired goals by the best means 
possible, including compromises. In such circumstances, men will argue 
about the difference between fighting dirty and fighting cl~an, between 
acceptable dealing and unscrupulous actions, between motives of self 
interest or personal ~advantage and the public interest. The politician 
will not be respected for-feathering his own nest, taking b~ck handers or 
saving his own skin at the expense of the common weal. But in the end 
Niebuhr's words seem the most applicable: 
Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience 
and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life 
will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy 
compromises. (1963 p4) 
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6.3 What is the Appropriate Response to "Dirty Hands"? 
How should one come to terms with bne's "dirty hands"? What kind of 
response is desirable from someone whose decisions of office have become 
tainted by compromise? Attitudes are likely to range from, "I've not 
given it much thought, since it was the most reasonable thing to do in 
the circumstances", through, "I regret what I did, but could do no 
other", to, "I feel very bad about it, and cannot shake off the sense of 
guilt". These inevitably reflect a variety of ethical standpoints. 
6.3.1 Some preliminary points should be made first. For example, it is 
useful to distinguish those attitudes taken before the action from those 
adopted after it. The decision itself, together with its consequences, 
can significantly alter this attitude; it was true of those involved in 
the Manhattan experiment, developing the nuclear bomb, and it is a well 
established phenomenon that those who decide that an abortion is the best 
solution to an unwanted pregnancy may sometimes subsequently regret it. 
~.3.2 Then, it is important to concentrate on the reasons given for a 
person's decisions, rather than simply on its results. For example, an 
absolutist, or qualified absolutist like Nagel, will regard some actions 
as definitively prohibited whatever the situation. Nagel (1971), 
considering war and massa~re, gave as examples the use of flamethrowers 
or napalm, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and firing on trucks 
carrying food. Accepting that warfare cannot be romanticised, his hope 
was nevertheless that "when nations conflict they might rise to the level 
of limited barbarity that typically characterizes violent conflict 
between individuals, rather than wallowing in the moral pit where they 
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appear to have settled" (1971 pI42). 
The same outcomes, however, may equally be deplored by a person with a 
very different ethical outlook. Braridt (1971) argued that the rules 
adopted by the u.s. Manual of Warfare also forbids certain actions 
(pillage, killing the enemy when they have laid down their arms, or 
putting prisoners to death because their presence retards his movements). 
The decision, therefore, where-one exists, will be found not in the 
outcome but in the reasons justifying the decision, the arguments put 
forward and the motives articulated. 
6.3.3 Another pre decisional characteristic, put forward by Nagel 
(1971), is that absolutists·are more likely to seek ways of retaining 
direct personal interaction than those relying on expediency of outcome. 
He suggested that one ought to justify to the victim what is being done to 
him, a scenario which would sometimes border on the ludicrous: 
If one abandons a person in the course of rescuing several others. 
from a fire or a sinking ship, one could say to him" You 
understand, I have to leave you to save the others". Similarly, if 
one subjects an unwilling child to a painful surgical procedure, one 
can say to him, "If you could understand, you would realize that I 
am doing this to help you." One could even say, as one bayonets an 
enemy soldier, "It's either you or me." But one cannot really say 
while torturing a prisoner, "You understand, I have to pull out your 
fingernails because it is absolutely essential that we have the 
names of your confederates"; nor can one say to the victims of 
Hiroshima, "You_understand, we have to incinerate you to provide the 
Japanese government with an incentive to surrender." (1971 p137) 
This seems pretty far fetched and more like a case of moral cowardice, a 
rationalization for doing something in an extreme case that one's 
absolutist principles actually forbid. If one does decide on torture or 
blanket bombing, one should of course have an adequate reason for it. The 
decision may still be wrong, and there may be a real dilemma; but no 
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amount of "direct interpersonal response to the people one deals with" 
(p136) will make it any more acceptable, reduce the amount of guilt, or, 
one suspects, make it any easier to _live with the decision. 
6.3.4 The Articles of the Hague and Genevan Conventions were agreed on 
,all sides; and prior to the subsequent wars it was accepted that 
aggression should be directed solely at a specific hostile target. But 
this did not survive the test of one side breaking the agreement. Thus 
the allied raids on Hamburg or Dresden were justified at the time as 
reprisals for German bombing ~g.Coventry and Amsterdam. Civilians, in 
this respect will be thought of as impermissible targets. 
Alternatively, the law of double effect, whereby indirect results are 
excusable, has often been quoted. If the undesirable outcome was 
perceived as an indirect side effect, it was not condemned. This, 
however, is too vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy. During the Vietnam 
War, the American public were not convinced by the argument that their 
troops were right to raid a village because they suspected that guerillas 
were hiding there, nor that they should be excused the killing of 
hundreds of women and children on the grounds that it was an unfortunate 
side effect, that killing innocents was not their deliberate goal. There 
was therefore a public outcry. In this way, popular morality, or common 
sense, can be a check on the casuistry of government spokesmen. 
6.4 Post Decisional Attitudes 
When we consider what attitudes are appropriate after acquiring "dirty 
hands", everything depends on the person's attitude to guilt. Clearly, if 
the utilitarian ethic -is espoused, however much there might be a 
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lingering unease or regret, or sympathy for those adversely affected, 
there will not be any sense of genuine guilt; actions were taken for the 
best. Similarly, the Machiavellian hero had no serious second thoughts 
and felt no remorse; he had learned how not to be good and had rejected 
any idea of personal goodness, in favour of the rewards of power and 
,glory. "A Machiavellian hero has no inwardness", claimed Walzer. We 
therefore do not know for certain what his feelings were. We can only 
guess that his attitude is likely to be one of basking in glory. 
Walzer found all this very unsatisfactory; "We want a record of his 
anguish", he wrote. He turned next to the approach taken by Weber in his 
essay Politics as a Vocation (1948). In this, the good man (sic) with 
dirty hands is still a hero, but a tragic hero, one who does indeed feel 
the anguish of his decision; one who is no stranger to remorse. But his 
is a godless career, for the world is an evil place and it is simply not 
possible both to do good in the world and to save one's soul. The 
politicians therefore must accept the price of their vocation; by doing 
bad in order to do good they lose their souls. This seems like an 
argument to shoot politicians who have dirty hands and then jump into a 
vat of boiling oil. 
How satisfactory is this dualist attitude to the life we lead and 
individualist accoun~ of guilt? We are asked to imagine a man who lies, 
compromises, sends people to their death, perhaps, but does. it all with a 
heavy, unrelieved heart. He has lost his soul and it cannot be regained. 
He suffers the inward penalty of individual guilt. But a~ Walzer says, 
"We don't want to be ruled by men (sic) who have lost their souls .... a 
politician with dirty hands needs a soul, and it is best for us all if he 
has some hope of personal salvation, howev~r that is conceived ... He 
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commits a determinate crime, and he must pay a determinate penalty" 
(pI78). 
6.4.1 This seems a very unconvincing presentation of the Protestant 
conscience, if that is what is intended. Some Protestants··would certainly 
see the world as an evil place in which the goodness of the Creation has 
been eradicated by the evil of the Fall. And some might believe that no 
guilt free dealings are possible within such a world. But most would 
surely not accept that the "sin" acquired by a secular life cannot be 
cleansed and was beyond forgiveness? Surely redemption is not foregone by 
the person who accepts deliberately the political vocation and as such has 
acquired dirty hands? It is never too late to obtain forgiveness. 
6.4.2 Nevertheless, it is the notion of paying a specific penalty that 
made Walzer prefer the attitude in Camus' The Just Assassins (1958). 
These men are terrorists in nineteenth century Russia; they are heroes 
who willingly consent to being criminals and to pay the price. There is, 
therefore, in Camus' eyes no reason to condemn them. They are innocent 
criminals, "just assassins", because they are willing to die· for their 
actions (p215). 
Walzer preferred Camus' approach because it indicates a punishment or 
penance that fits the crime. Sartre's hero Hoederer makes no reference to 
the moral code by which he has acquired "dirty hands". When he asks the 
question "00 you think you can govern innocently?" he clea~ly believes 
that the answer is "No"; but no further analysis is given. The attitudes 
of Machiavelli's hero, like his actions, are determined solely by 
prudential considerations, Weber's tragic and suffering hero is punished 
only to the extent that as an individual he is capable of suffering. Only 
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Camus' Just Assassins pay the penalty that society requires. "On the 
scaffold they wash their hands clean and, unlike the suffering servant, 
they die happy" (pI78). This therefore is Walzer's preferred attitude when 
in the "moral blind alley" which he describes (but see Brandt [1971] who 
disagrees). 
6.5 The Relevance to Education 
There are three areas in which-schools and colleges can consider the 
"dirty hands" problem and prepare their students for posts of 
responsibility. The first is by their internal structures; the time 
honoured practice of creating prefects is by no means the only, or even 
the best method of training for leadership. It suffers from lack of time 
for conscious reflection and the fact that prefects lead you~ger pupils 
rather than their peers. But other methods such as societies, sports 
leaders, student councils, social and community activities also provide 
opportunities for leadership and for decisions with potential costs and 
difficulty. 
Secondly, there has to be time for discussion and consideration of 
specific issues. This may be within the time allocated to sports, the 
student councilor the various societies, but more likely it will be 
within structured time such as a tutor or form period, or a general study 
course. 
Thirdly, it is vital that there are supportive materials, resources and 
guidance for tutors to consider the price of leadership and the cost and 
negative effects of particular decisions. This too is the place for a 
consideration of how best each individual can learn to handle, or live 
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with, the marginal decision, the costly policy or the action with 
regrettable consequences. 
6.5.1 In the world of public responsibility, we have hard choices to 
make, based upon our "reflectively improved version of common sense 
morality" (Gaut 1993 p33). We can either shrug off our moral compromises 
and decide that in the jungle all is fair, for it is a cold world 
separated from the human atmosphere of ethical obligations. Or, we can 
try to purge our guilt in a variety of ways. What is hard to accept is 
the notion that the world of public affairs brings a different set of 
moral obligations into play. For example, it is not convincing to argue 
that, because the business world has profit making and accountability to 
its shareholders as its main objectives, it is therefore a self indulgent 
luxury to find room for private morality. Accountability raises another 
constraint but does not define a new sphere of activity, and 
shareholders, like voters, cannot be assumed to to be swayed only by 
amoral considerations. 
Whatever moral code is chosen, it applies to all human activity, and 
variations in behaviour, if they exist, are the result of decisions taken 
within the one moral sphere. The politician will not be respected for 
closing his eyes to the private ethics of his constituents, on the 
grounds that they are from a different world. In the end it seems 
inescapable that reflective common sense in context is our only recourse. 
Education is one, major influence in the deve1pment of such a common 
sense morality. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PHENOMENOLOGY: THE EXPERIENCE OF SOME 16 - 19 YEAR OLD STUDENTS 
The third perspective consists of an enquiry into the ex~~rience of 
dilemma by some 16 to 19 year old students at one Sixth Form College. It 
forms one of two pieces of fieldwork in this research (the other being an 
enquiry amongst sixty Heads of Department in post sixteen colleges, see 
chapter 10) and adopts the general approach favoured by phenomenologists 
(see above 4.6). In analysing the interviews, this perspective employs 
some of the insights of Personal Construct Theory as part of the 
"triangulation" method used in this research. The chapter describes the 
selection and interviewing of the sample of students, giving the context, 
the assumptions behind the -semi structured pattern of questions; this is 
followed by a summary of fifteen case studies, four of which are expanded 
and analysed in greater detail. 
7.1 Arranging the Interviews 
-In preparation for the interviews, a number of guidelines on interviewing 
techniques were found useful (e.g. Nisbet and Entwistle 1970, Johnson 
1977, Cohen and Manion 1980). The aim was to test some of the theoretical 
perspectives whilst discovering what students themselves considered to be 
dilemmas and how they coped with them. 
A computerised random selection of 25 students was made from a total 
population of 400 in their first year of A levels (1991/2). This was 
repeated in the following year (1992/3). An invitation was sent to each 
student asking if they would be prepared to help with some research into 
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"the way students take difficult decisions and the way they resolve 
problems where the alternatives make the choices very hard" (Appendix 
1.1). They were invited to a short interview (about 20 minutes) in their 
lunchtime and asked if they would describe in confidence any such 
situation that might have occurred recently. They were asssured that 
their name would be kept confidential and that nothing said would be 
traced back to them. They would be asked to agree or amend the transcript 
afterwards. No other pressure was brought to bear in any way, and no 
reminders were sent.out. 
The response was much as expected; in the first year 12 responses were 
received, 3 declining to discuss their dilemmas and 9 consenting to be 
interviewed. In the second year, 15 responded, 2 declining and 13 
consenting. This gave a total of 22 students for whom interviews were 
arranged. 
7.1.1 In chapter fou~ Phenomenology was described as a movement or 
approach to research, rather than a school of thought with agreed tenets 
(see 4.6.3). "The most characteristic core is its method; wrote 
Spiegelberg (1965 p655), and he gives a number of "positive steps II which 
mark this method. Although there is much disagreement as to which are 
essential, most commentators accept: bracketing, intuiting,~analysing and 
describing and intentionality (see 4.6.3-9). These steps formed the basic 
approach to the interviewing procedure and interpretation in this part of 
the research. 
It would have been artificial to pretend that no preconceptions existed, 
or that all interests and assumptions could be "bracketed" out. There had 
been many years' interest in the problem, considerable reading and 
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research had preceded the exercise and the research questions outlined in 
chapter two had been devised prior to the interviews. 
7.1.2 More specifically, the assumptions and interests can best be 
gauged by the following 10 questions which were kept in mind during the 
interviews: 
(1) What were the student's main constructs (emergent and 
implicit)? 
(2) Were there any regrets, guilt or second thoughts? 
(3) Was it a "resolvable" or "irresolvable" dilemma, regardless of 
whether or not any decision was taken? 
(4) Were alternative choices considered? 
(5) Were stress conditions present (e.g. deadlines, social or moral 
pressures)? 
(6) Was it an isolated or shared· decision? Was advice sought? 
(7) Was the student a victim of circumstances, bad luck? 
(8) Was the immediate and articulated dilemma a cover for another 
problem? 
(9) Was the dilemma perceived as a moral issue? 
(10) Would it be possible to categorise the dilemma as one of the 
six types described above (5B.16)? 
It was essential in interpreting the answers to see the point of· view of 
the student and the same questions can be seen from two per.spectives, 
that of the observer and that of the interviewee (see 10.6.3). A semi 
structured interview plan was devised (Appendix 1.2) and··all interviews 
were taped and transcribed; fifteen of these are now summarised below as 
being particularly helpful in illuminating the dilemmas experienced by 
students. The remaining cases added nothing further of substance to the 
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observations nor contradicted any findings. 
7.1.3 The interviews supported the typology proposed in 58 16, 
reinforcing and illustrating each category of dilemma, namely those that 
were resolvable (A) and those that were irresolvable (8); each could then 
. be further divided into those with no second thoughts, though leaving a 
poignant memory (1), those with a residue of regret (2) and finally, 
those more serious dilemmas leaving behind a remainder of guilt or 
remorse (3). As follows: 
AI. Dilemmas which can be resolved without regrets or second thoughts. 
Nevertheless, the experience is still remembered as a poignant one, 
causing some personal .concern and urgency, thus distinguishing it 
from a "problem" (see interview 3). 
A2. Dilemmas which can be resolved, but only by leaving sentiments of 
post decisional regret or anguish about the rejected alternative(s), 
(see interview 5). 
A3. Dilemmas which can be resolved but only by leaving a remainder of 
justified post decisional guilt or remorse (see interview 15). 
81. Dilemmas which appear from the agent's perspective to be 
irresolvable. N~vertheless, when the choice of action has been 
decided, although there are no regrets or guilt feeli~gs, the memory 
of the experience is still a poignant one, causing some personal 
concern and urgency (see interview 8). 
82. Dilemmas which are irresolvable. Nevertheless, when the choice of 
action has been decided, the agent is left with a sense of post 
decisional regret (see interview 1). ' 
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B3. Dilemmas which are irresolvable. Nevertheless, when the choice of 
action has been decided, the agent is left with a sense of 
(unjustified) guilt (see interview 2). 
7.2 Summary of Student Interviews 
7.2.1 Move house with parents or live with Gran? 
T's parents had a small business which went into liquidation a few months 
before. They lost their jobs and their house. T felt "all his security 
had gone, like we didn't have any money and we've always been quite 
comfortable." T wanted to stay at college which would mean living on his 
own with his grandmother. The choice was between that and moving away 
with his parents. He therefore felt the double bind of loyalty to his 
parents and desire to stay with his friends and finish his A level 
education. The decision to stay was eventually taken without advice. This 
was essentially an irresolvable dilemma with some regret as a remainder. 
(Type 82). 
7.2.2 leave home or stay? 
F did not get on with her parents but thought that the blame lay partly 
with herself and felt guilty about this. She had moved out once before, 
to the YWCA, using her savings to do so; should she try again? She said 
that she had been made to feel a failure in education, h~d wasted the 
money spent on her schooling with little examination success to show for 
it. She would, however, miss her ~arents and continue to see herself as 
partly at fault. Her decision was taken without outside help but, in so 
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far as guilt and regret remained, the dilemma was irresolvable. (Type 
83). 
7.2.3 Drop Art AS or continue? 
H considered that the work involved with Art AS was little short of an 
A Level; he was also studying English AS together with Media Studies and 
COT at A level. The problem about dropping Art (and raising the English 
to A level) was that this would restrict his career choices. He did not 
consider that English and COT would open as many opportunities for him. 
Also he knew that the Art teachers would be disappointed and perhaps feel 
let down. There would also be a great deal of work involved in catching up 
the English. H resolved his dilemma by "putting crosses against Art and 
plusses against the English~" He did this with advice from parents and 
careers staff. There were no regrets. (Type Ai). 
7.2.4 Come to Sixth Form College or take a job? 
D really thought when he was at school that he would go out and get a 
job, as his friends had done, in a local labouring firm (there was also a 
job at the Airport). The immediate money was attractive. He also didn't 
get on with his teachers and particularly the Headteacher who made fun of 
him. But then other friends had been to the College, and he considered the 
longer term benefits of b~ing better qualified (even though "there are 
loads of self made millionaires which haven't got an education and 
stuffll). Eventually he chooses to come to College; it was his own 
decision, the dilemma was resolved and he has no regrets. (Type Ai). 
- 133 -
7.2.5 Enter Higher Education or take a job? 
The main difficulty A sees is what to do after his A levels, go to 
university or go straight' into a job. He had always been vague about any 
,-
career plans. There was the attraction of immediate money; he also got 
the impression everyone was "trying to push me more into university." At 
the time of interview he was still undecided. But having talked to tutors 
careers staff and his parents, he eventually chose to take a year off and 
postpone the decision. The dilemma seemed to him resolvable but only with 
regrets. (Type A2). 
7.2.6 Help friend with problems or not? 
R had recently made friend~ with another student whose parents were going 
through a divorce (his father's second). The friend kept coming to him 
every day to ask what he should do. This had begun to annoy R whose work 
was being affected. Yet he did not wish to let his friend down. He 
discussed the problem with his parents who were clear that the friend 
needed professional help, but R did not think that they appreciated the 
~fu11 details" of the problem. His dilemma was therefore the choice 
between the obligation to his friend and the obligation to himself. He 
,-
took the decision to cease seeing his friend. There was no regret, the 
relief more than compensated him for the obligation he had refused. (Type 
Ai). 
7.2.7 Remain at College or return to former school? 
When E came to college it took her a long time to make-new friends. She 
had returned to her old school for a Speech Day and doubts about her 
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decision to leave began to trouble her. "I knew everyone I was speaking 
to and I really missed it and I thought Oh gosh, what have I done?" She 
thought she might go back but her parents persuaded her to wait a while. 
Meanwhile, she also paid another visit to the school and found things 
" 
were not so good there as she had previously thought. So she waited, made 
more friends at college and became settled. The resolution therefore came 
more by procrastination than decision. She had clearly been strongly 
influenced by her parents. Now she had no regrets or second thoughts~ 
(Type A1). 
7.2.8 Stay inside tent or make a run for it? 
This student recalled a camping incident when she was 13. She was in the 
tent with a girl friend th~ same age; it was about 11.0 pm when they 
became aware of someone outside who began pouring the embers from their 
fire over the canvas. Both were very scared and clung to one another. 
Should they make a run for it or not? They imagined the tent going up in 
flames ~ut also worried about what sort of person might be waiting for 
them outside. The person eventually left, the threat was over and the 
situation was resolved by inaction rather than deliberate decision. In 
retrospect, she thought it might have been wiser to rush out of the tent, 
but she had no serious regrets or second thoughts about their response. 
The dilemma as such had been irresolvable but the outcome had left them 
with no second thoughts. (Type 81). 
7.2.9 Take holiday in Florida or go with family? 
Z habitually went on holiday with ~er parents each year. This year 
however she had an offer to go to Florida with a friend and her family. 
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She was keen to go but if the two dates did not clash (unlikely) this 
would mean she would have to go on both holidays as her parents would be 
unwilling to leave her at home on her own. On the other hand if the dates 
overlapped (probable) she would have to choose between her friend and her 
own family. There were other considerations: her sister would feel let 
down if left on her own with th~ parents. Z also did not really know how 
well she would get on with her friend in Florida. It turned out that the 
dates coincided and although her parents put her under some pressure she 
had decided on Florida. She received no real help in her decision to go, 
but had no serious second thoughts about it. An irresolvable dilemma with 
some elements of guilt as a remainder. (Type 83). 
7.2.10 Keep Mum's secret or tell younger sister? 
HC was the oldest daughter of seven (3 brothers and 3 sisters). She 
discovers from a chance remark by her Aunt that her mother was again 
pregnant. Although sworn to silence on the grounds that it was not her 
business, she took a different view; her mother had a history of having 
deep postnatal depressions, followed by increasing rejection of the child 
·as it ceased to be a baby. HC remembered this very well from previous 
births, the most recent of which had affected her considerably during her 
GCSE year. This had caused some resentment. She therefore ihought it was 
indeed her business, and wanted to talk to her sister about the 
situation. She considered-that her mother should have discussed the 
matter, even asked her children, first. The dilemma was essentially one 
of opposing and incomparable duties: to herself and to her Aunt (beyond 
which was a duty to her Mother). She decided to tell her sister, a 
decision taken on her own. The dilemma was irresolvable, but she was not 
left with any regrets or guilt. In fact she described it as "quits in a 
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way." She would only have felt guilty "if she was an only child and had 
told a friend" (i.e. outside the family). (Type 81). 
7.2.11 Make choice between college and school 
8 was faced with a standard student choice: his parents were in financial 
difficulties and he had to decide whether to stay at his private school, 
where, it seems, he was popular, well taught and participating fully in 
sport, or come to college, where he felt there would be more choice of 
subjects, greater freedom and a chance to mature. The choice was very 
evenly balanced but he had decided upon college and had no regrets. The 
decision was his own, reached without help, though he felt it would 
probably have been forced upon him anyway in time because of his parent's 
financial situation. This Was therefore resolvable with no post 
decisional regrets. (Type Al). 
7.2.12 Live with Mum or Dad after their divorce? 
N used to get depressed when his parents first began arguing; that was 
four years ago, when he was eleven or twelve. He started to hate both of 
them, knowing they would eventually get divorced. He'd been asked by the 
-Judge with whom he preferred to stay, but was reluctant to'say, even 
though closer at the time to his mother, for fear of hurting hi~ father. 
Either way, he felt that one of them was bound to be hurt. The real 
," 
difficulty was facing his parents after making the choice. He had a 
sister, four years older, who had also elected to stay w~th her mother. 
There had been strong presssure from his Dad, causing him feelings of 
guilt. In fact, whenever he saw his father afterwards he felt sad about 
it. The only help cam~ from grandparents, on his father's side, who gave 
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moral support, but left it to him to make the final decision. This 
dilemma was irresolvable, two opposing, single principle obligations, 
with considerable post decisional guilt. (Type 83). 
7.2.13 Cover up for sister or tell the truth? 
K had a younger sister who had lost her bus pass for the third time in as 
many days. Each time she had to go to her father for the money. On the 
last occasion she wanted to say it had expired and asked her sister to 
support her. K in fact fudged the issue when talking to her mother, 
admitting it was lost but not that their father had paid for it. In fact 
she could have lent the money herself, but chose not to. There were no 
real second thoughts, except that had she realized her mother would find 
out anyway, she would probably have told the truth. The dile~ma was one 
of opposing and incomparable obligations, loyalty to her sister, and· 
telling the truth. It was res01vable by compromise and with no regrets or 
guilt. (Type Ai). 
7.2.14 Study in Australia or in England? 
M had to decide a year ago whether or not to move from Australia to 
England for her "sixth" form education. Her parents were p~~pared to 
uproot the family "from our whole way of life, all of our friends, our 
whole established routine-to go somewhere new where we didn't know 
anyone." She was at first undecided then thought it would be good to 
'broaden her horizons; her parents were keen to move but would have waited 
if she had preferred. She had to leave a "long time boyfriend." It was 
upsetting. She had cried a lot but in the end decided to come to England. 
There was no sense of guilt afterwards but plenty of regrets. Every 
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couple of days she realized what "a very different society" it was, but 
"the friends that I keep are my real friends, so I mean, as life goes on 
that was going to happen anyway." There were many people to whom she could 
turn for reassurance but she had decided this on her own. It was a 
resolvable dilemma but with regrets as a remainder. (Type A2). 
·7.2.15 Keep up with old friends or not? 
AM is losing contact with the "really good friends" he had made at 
boarding school. His dilemma was whether or not to "leave them be." He 
rarely spoke to them now, they lived in different parts of England; in 
all he mentioned about 50 acquaintances, including 20 good friends, of 
whom he would like to keep~up with about 5. Now he found his college 
friends occupying more and more of his time. "It seems like now that I 
don't need them. I am sort of casting them aside." He had decided (on his 
own) to mix his engagements and to divide his time. The dilemma was thus 
resolved by compromise but leaving a remainder of guilt. (Type A3). 
7.3 Construct Analysis of Interviews 
A more thorough analysis was then made of each interview, using the 
concept of bipolarity and other insights of PCT. This cast more light on 
the nature of dilemma and helped to understand the student better, so 
assisting the process of.,counselling. In the four examples -which follow, 
the constructs are therefore divided into "emergent" and "implicit". The 
interpretations presented are directly derived from the ~ords of the 
students which can be found in the transcripts (Appendix 2), and from 
indications given during the interview, such as manner, gestures, 
expression and other things said. 
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7.3.1 Interview 2. R922 (F). leave home or stay? 
F spoke in an agitated manner, volubly, quickly and very willingly. Her 
main concerns were the practical issues of getting away from home where 
she was unfairly blamed for performing poorly at school and college and 
undervalued: 
Emergent Constructs 
(1) Not getting on with parents (1.15, 31, 43, 
I. 133, 144) 
(2) Made to feel failure (1.32, 129. 134)) 
(3) Feels misunderstood (!.93, 138) 
(4) Need for independence (1.77, 110) 
(5) Work not good enough (1.87, 130) 
(6) Feels guilty (1.55, 69) 
(7) Need for security (1.41, 64, 90, 116, 142) 
(8) Hopes family wi~l get back together (1.41) 
Implicit Constructs 
Mutual love and respect, fairness 
Being encouraged, valued, 
justifying expense on 
education 
Having similar values, 
about class and type of 
school 
Being tied to parental 
expectations, not being free to develop own 
ideas 
Other valid views of 
success 
Achievements not in fact poor 
No sense of involvement 
Ability to live alone, 
without affection of 
parents 
Ability to accept break 
(9) Is concerned for family, others (1.66, 92) Being self centred 
-7.3.2 Although F disclosed her main constructs as concerning practical 
issues, conflict at home, lack of money to escape, beneath these emerged 
other tensions. F needs~independerice, but she also still wants a sense of 
security; she is concerned for her parents and her siblings, but she is 
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also determined to care for herself. 
She feels undervalued at home, yet is sure in hers~lf that she is not 
doing so badly in her work. The constructs may therefore be grouped in 
such a way as to reveal that her dilemmas were experienced on several 
levels and between several opposing poles at the same time. 
(a) Desire for freedom 
Need to make her own decfsions 
Accepting the family break up 
(b) Sense of unfairness, not her fault 
(c) Made to feel a failure 
(d) Is seen as a poor investment 
(e) Concerned for others 
Need for security 
Need to be advised 
Hopes for family to get 
back again 
Feeling of dependence, 
involvement, guilt 
Is not in fact 
performing badly 
Justifying parental 
sacrifices and expense 
Concerned for herself alone 
The interdependence of these constructs is such that the kaleidosope may 
be jogged to form a new pattern. What is clear is that the major 
practical dilemma is by no means the only issue for F to resolve. Money, 
an alternative place to live, would not in themselves resolve the issues 
of growing maturity, freedom, leaving the security of home.~Taking a 
decision to leave home may therefore be virtually irrelevant to resolving 
the real dilemma where this is the deeper personal conflict. 
7.3.3 Interview 6. R931 (R). Help friend with problems or not? 
R sat calmly throughout the interview and gave a factual, apparently 
uninvolved account. He talked readily, without pauses and without any 
signs of strain. His manner was cool and detached ("nothing really upsets 
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me much ... ! just let it happen" 1.123). 
The main concerns which R revea1ed'were the conflict between his duty to 
stand by his friend and his duty to himself. On the one hand his friend, 
isolated, friendless and neglected needed him and, despite 
irritation at being pestered about this problem, he had a sensitivity 
towards the general obligations of friendship. On the other hand, there 
was also a strong sense that -he owed it to himself to give more to his A 
level work; it also came across clearly that he wanted the freedom "to 
mingle" and escape the claustrophobia and constraints of having a "best 
friend," an idea which he did not believe in. He several times repeated 
that he just wanted to get his friend "off his back." The emergent 
constructs are listed below with the implicit constructs, based as before 
upon other comments made and indications such as facial expressions and 
gestures. The references are to lines in the transcript: 
Emergent Constructs 
(I) Sympathy with friend in trouble, neglected 
by parents, friendless, upset, future 
college in doubt (1.25, 27, 30, 35, 
40,46, 53, 59) 
(2) General obligations of friendship 
(1.32, 54, 117) 
(3) Unwillingness to hurt his friend 
(1.73,57, 115) 
Implicit Constructs 
"Get him off his 
back," freedom from need to show 
concern, 
irritation 
Duty to himself 
"I'm alright Jack." 
. Continuing to show 
concern 
\ 
\ 
(4) Not keen on close friendships (1. 69, 159) Unable to mingle, get on with own life 
7.3.4 As in other interviews, there were different levels of dilemma, 
deeper concerns not fuJ1y admitted and a complex web of overlapping 
pressures. There was· the pull of friendship and a sense of duty towards 
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his friend and unwillingness to hurt him by admitting that he was not in 
fact his "best friend." But there was also irritation at being bothered 
daily with this problem when he wanted to get on w~th his life, mingle, 
get on well with many people; his parents were not much help ("they 
didn't seem to really understand the full details"). 
He agreed that his friend needed professional help and that he was not 
the person to do it, but knew~hat this was not enough, what his 
friend actually wanted was friendship, someone to turn to when 
everyone else was neglecting him. In fact, he was on the point of leaving 
college. There was little altruism about R's decision, which was mostly 
based upon self interest; he expressed some uneasiness but no sense of 
guilt, when he said, "I am always thinking 'I'm alright Jack' and, 
although it is not really right, I just think it is the best way - the 
only way you can get on." He had some fear of possible reprisal ("I was a 
bit scared because he was the sort of person who could get a bit crazy"), 
and a desire to be friendly with as many people as possible; there was 
also pressure of time and of A level work. In the end it seemed he was 
concerned basically for himself, being blamed for causing his friend's 
education to be affected, for which he had no regrets or guilt. R finally 
revealed that one thing he had learned was how to spot a problem of this 
kind, to back off and not get involved. 
7.3.5 Interview 10. R.935 (He). Keep Mum's secret or tell.younger 
sister? 
He showed considerable emotion when recounting her story. Her words were 
vehemently expressed. She was eager to give her account, lent forward, 
did not welcome interruption, showed pent.up feeling. 
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This was a dilemma which was ostensible solved without regret, leaving 
only some sharp personal memories, resentment really. He even spoke of it 
as "sort of quits in a way" in sharing the secret of her mother's 
pregnancy with her younger sister. She had no doubts as to who was really 
to blame; it was her mother, who had "picked the most difficult time, it 
was a planned pregnancy as well and she didn't ask us what we thought 
about it." As before, the references are to lines in the transcript which 
provide evidence for the interpretations suggested: 
Emergent Constructs 
(1) Bound by her promise of secrecy 
(1.20, 40,80.) 
(2) Feeling impact on her life, her A levels 
time and trouble (1.23, 36, 100) 
(3) Anger and resentment at her mother's 
deliberate pregnancy (1.79,,92, 173) 
(4) Need to talk about things, and to release 
anger, share frustration 
(1. 29. 91. 203) 
(5) Worry and anxiety 
(1. 109, 135, 198) 
Implicit Constructs 
Free to speak at least 
to her sister 
Freedom from family 
concerns, keeping up 
her social life 
Keeping friends with 
mother, sharing family 
concerns 
Bottling things up, facing problem on own 
Living own life, 
without cares 
7.3.6 The prima facie dilemma was whether or not to share the knowledge 
" 
of her mother's pregnancy with her sister (she had no doubt that going 
outside the family, for example had she been an only child, wouJd have 
been wrong ("I would have felt very guilty about it"). But beneath this, 
were other conflicts troubling her: the contrasting roles and obligations 
of mother, (eldest) daughter, sister, a "neutral person~ outside the 
family, the father. There were ideas about what was fair and what the 
limits of family loyalty were in such an instance. How far did mutual 
, . 
dependency require t~~t plans and "secrets" shouid be shared? An 
- 144 -
external, "neutral" confidant(e) was necessary only when the family trust 
had been perceived as broken. 
There were her own needs of growing maturity to be taken into 
consideration, the resentment that her mother had not "really trusted 
her," kept her in the dark. For example, it is not entirely clear what it 
was that caused her to feel so strongly that she should have been 
consulted first? Was it close~ess to her mother and a feeling of 
betrayal? Or was it rather a desire to be treated now as an adult, given 
a say in the family planning? Or was it simply the reason given, the 
knowledge that she and her sister would, as before, bear the brunt of the 
work in bringing up the new child, and therefore deserved more 
consideration? Or, perhaps it was all three? 
There were several things she claimed to have learned from the 
experience, for example the discovery that her anger needed release, 
preferably to "someone neutral who is not involved in any way, so that it 
will not get back to the person involved." 
7.3.7 Interview 12. R937 (N). live with Mum or Dad after divorce? 
N spoke quietly, slowly and thoughtfully; he showed no rancour and seemed 
to have come to terms with the memory of what had happened. His 'parents 
had divorced four years previously when he was ten. At the.time the 
dilemma had been how to answer the question put to him, for example ,by 
the judge in the case, which of his parents to live with: At the time he 
was clear that he preferred to live with his mother because he had a more 
personal relationship with her. But he was very aware of the distress 
this would cause his father. He was also sensitive to the way he was 
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being subtly manipulated by other members of the family, saying that it 
was only his own interests they had at heart. What was remarkable was the 
degree of sensitivity, at aged 10, even allowing for retrospective 
enhancement four years later, towards both his parents and their 
different needs. He had a considerable degree of self knowledge. He also 
knew that the questioD "Who do you want to live with?" required an 
answer, even though it was "not his decision really," and would be a 
factor in the judgment. The decision itself was clear enough and he would 
take the same again, but the problem had no obvious resolution; he 
particularly felt bad about having to look the affected parent in the 
face afterwards. He was left with a sense of (misplaced) guilt at causing 
hurt, at the loss of a proper father son relationship as a result. As 
before, the references are to lines in the transcript: 
Emergent Constructs Implicit Constructs 
(1) Memory of upset, depression, even hate Remaining a family unit 
at parents divorce (1.28, 31) no upheaval, staying 
with sister 
(2) Reluctance to hurt either side, regret Keeping a relationship (1.16, 47, 113) without hurt or guilt 
(3) Awareness he was being manipulated Being valued for his 
(1.62, 68; 134) own sake 
(4) Knowledge of a different relationship No need to distinguish 
with each parent (1.44, 80, 85) Doing same things with 
each 
(5) Loss of a "father and son relationship" Just like any. two adult 
(1.177) - friends 
7.3.8 Beneath the straighforward dilemma of choice between parents to 
live with, lay other issues. Predominantly there was the strong sense of 
not wanting to hurt one side or the other. N even defines a dilemma in 
these terms ("a decision that is going to hurt someone in a way"). He 
.. 
also remembered wanting the best for both- parents on the one hand but 
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also for himself ori the other; he did not wish to leave his sister, lose 
the presents and fun he had with his father, the close personal bond 
with his mother. Then he was acutely aware of being the cause of his 
father's depression, wished to be able to cheer him up. The feeling 
of responsibility weighed heavily on him, even though he knew it was "not 
really his choice." He-certainly had regrets, second thoughts and even 
(unjustified) guilt. lilt was always in my subconscious that if I lived 
with my Dad it would be more fun" (this in spite of him being more 
strict). 
Reflecting on the experience and what it might have taught him, he 
considered that he had learned how to be more "on the ball" with his 
decisions, more "precise," knowing he would need to be aware of all the 
the "pros and cons" before taking any quick decision. 
7.4 Conclusions 
(1) It was not surprising that the students, being self selected on the 
basis that they had a dilemma they were willing to describe, did not deny 
the existence of dilemmas. Nevertheless, it was interesting to see the 
readiness with which they described what they meant to them. Some 
stressed the serious, as opposed to trivial, aspect of the quandary: 
Something that will make a big impact on your school life or 
. further life (interview 6). 
Something obviously for which there are two sides to decide from 
and something which has a major effect on either yourself or your 
future - at my age anyway (interview 11). -
Several saw a dilemma as a choice between alternatives which might have a 
harmful effect on oth~r people: 
- 147 -
A decision before the actual event that was going to hurt someone 
in a way. (interview 12) 
It is when you are worried about feeling guilty about making the 
wrong decision. How it will affect other people. (Interview 15) 
Some thought of them as essentially moral questions: 
You have to sort of spend a long time to try and decide whether you 
are making the right decision. Whether it is moral whether it agrees 
with your beliefs and, you know, morals generally. (Interview 13) 
When you have to make a choice between something that you want to 
do and something that youdon't wantto do and you have to decide 
which is the right way to go. (Interview 10) 
However, they also recognized that there are dilemmas which do not raise 
moral questions at all, although providing experiences of stress, worry, 
personal concern or urgency. These students experienced dilemmas at 
various levels and appreciated the distinction between "dilemma" and 
"problem", seeing only the former as involving them at a personal level. 
(2) Most students wished to try and resolve the dilemmas on their own. 
There was a tendency to regard them as the responsibility for each 
person; others could support, listen, counsel, but could not'effectively 
decide. Students took advice, they often sought out friends, tutors, 
relatives to share the problem with. But there were no examples in which 
the burden, individual responsibility to reach a conclusion was not 
found. It was as if there was a need to "own" the resolution, c~rtainly 
not to pass the responsibility on to anyone else. 
(3) Enough evidence emerged from these interviews to reinforce the 
definition of dilemma that was developing during these studies, that each 
experience had a quality that cou~d not be reproduced; these interviews, 
relatively few though,. they were, showed how each situation defied 
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categorisation; each was in its own way unique, unrepeatable, distinct as 
an experience. They thus supported the contention that there is an 
irreducible plurality of moral "oughts" and duties which students 
perceive, constituting a way of life that they aim at and an order of 
"" 
priority amongst obligations which they try to follow. This supports 
those arguments that refuse to classify the application of principles. 
(4) Many showed awareness of the possibility of a post decisional 
remainder in the form of regret, or guilt: 
It is one where you don't know which way to go, you don't want it 
to turn out wrong in the end, but you just think am I going to 
regret this? But I don't know how to explain it. (Interview 7) 
(5) Often there were other pressures which added to the decision and the 
stress experienced; for example, lack of money, isolation, physical 
danger, examination work. These also have to be taken into account by 
counsellors, tutors or friends. The circumstances are often not of the 
students own making, some (as in a classical tragedy) being caught in a 
web beyond their control. The context is always a vital component of the 
dilemma and needs to be understood if help is to be provided. 
(6) In most instances a positive view of the experience was taken by the 
student; something had been learned that was beneficial, even though 
there was a clear awareness that the experience would not and could not 
be precisely repeated. They would be more careful in future to consider 
all the circumstances o~ the case (interview 8), or take more time about 
the decision (12), or avoid getting into certain predic~ments in the 
first place (6). 
(7) There was a need to be observant and to note every gesture, 
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expression or indication when trying to uncover the deeper issues that 
nearly always exist beneath the stated dilemma. The very strength of the 
pull in the two directions is a measure of the involvement in something 
personal which may only emerge by careful observation, tactful 
.-
questioning, sensitivity and listening to the silent signals. Counsellors 
would always find it worthwhile looking below the surface to the hidden 
issues, which mayor may not be acknowledged, before drawing conclusions 
or categorising students' problems. 
(8) To conclude from the data derived from these interviews, clearly no 
valid generalization could be made concerning the behaviour of all 16 -
19 year old A level students, let alone of all students in this age 
group. However, the aim of this fieldwork was a limited one, namely, to 
illustrate, as part of the-triangulation process adopted in the research, 
what dilemmas some fairly typical A level students experienced and to 
discover, in so far as they were prepared to discuss it, how they viewed 
that experience in retrospect. With this objective in mind, a great deal 
of value was learned. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PSYCHOLOGY: DECISION MAKING AND POST FORMAL THINKING 
Unlike the philosophical persective, which is concerned mainly with 
meaning, consistency and rationale, or the sociological perspective, 
which looks at the social preconditions, psychology sheds light on 
dilemma by focusing more on the processes of thought, of decision making 
and of cognitive development;- it is more interested in the personal 
perception of dilemma and the moral awareness that this presupposes, than 
in the social context or environmental circumstances. It is, therefore, 
from this perspective particularly that we can consider the question of 
rec~gnition, how students come to accept dilemma, to acknowledge valid 
alternatives, rather than -simply to be aware of them. 
The scope of the psychological perspective on dilemma, however, is 
potentially vast and could well constitute a thesis on its own. It was 
therefore essential to be selective in this chapter about the issues 
considered and to choose only those psychological studies of most 
_ relevance to the study of dilemma. This was particularly the case as no 
claim was being made to any specialist knowledge of psychology, the aim 
being to assist tutors and counsellors in their work. 
The students considered in this research are in late adolescence, a 
period with its own distinctive character (see 10.6) and close to that 
point of maturity in cognitive development that is characterised by 
Piaget's description of the stage of formal operations. This was, 
therefore, the natural starting point in understanding the processes of 
~ 
thought required to recognize or resolve dilemmas. The questions asked 
were: is post formal operational thought'to be seen as the final stage of 
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cognitive developmerit or is there another "stage", or further development 
in adult reasoning? Do we know how students make moral judgments? 
In chapter 58 it was indicated that there are certain assumptions behind 
the recognition of dilemma which relate to the concepts of reality and 
knowledge. It is assumed that when alternative solutions are recognized, 
it is not a matter of choosing between black and white, right and wrong 
but rather that several altern~tives may have validity. This in turn 
implies that ethical conclusions are not absolutes to be discovered by 
correct thinking, and that therefore knowledge is not a fixed, unchanging 
entity, but rather it consists of certain pertinent elements which alter 
with changing circumstance. It is likely that this is an ability which 
will be developed by practical living, i.e. it is an aspect of mature 
thinking. It also has significant implications for moral education, where 
many would regard relativism and subjectivity as ideas which threaten 
traditional teaching and the need for absolute standards in behaviour. It 
was necessary therefore, to consider both these aspects., adult reasoning 
and the development of moral judgment. 
This chapter also attempts to illuminate the concept of dilemma by 
considering some related, psychological studies. For example, since 
deciding between alternatives is often a painful process, it was 
important to look at-some theories which deal with different kinds of 
conflict: decision making, avoidance strategies, post decisional 
reactions such as cognitive dissonance, and guilt about the outcome or 
the rejected alternative. 
Finally, it was necessary to consider whether or not the recognition and 
resolution of dilemma represented a special type of thinking. A brief and 
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selective consideration is therefore given of such "types" as: problem 
solving, lateral, creative and critical thinking, which it has been 
useful to consult in this research.-
It is quite common to see the terms "thinkingll, "problem solving" and 
"cognitionll used interchangeably, based on the definition that IIthinking 
is what happens when a person solves a problem" (Mayer 1977 p6). There 
are of course radically different theoretical approaches to the 
psychological understanding of "thinking". Two such opposing views are to 
define thinking either as an external, behavioural manifestation, subject 
to empirical observation, or as an internal cognitive process. 
Behaviourists do not find it helpful to consider thinking as an internal 
process without relating i~ to visible evidence. Cognitive theorists on 
the other hand, understand thinking to be an internal mechanism 
underlying behaviour but separable from it. Gilhooly (1982) used the term 
to refer to "a set of processes whereby people assemble, use and revise 
internal symbolic models ll (pI). Others, like Mayer, adopt a compromise 
position, in which thinking is a cognitive activity inferred from 
observable behaviour, but nevertheless an internal process to be studied 
in terms of the cognitive system, its purpose being directed towards 
finding solutions or solving problems. 
To anticipate somewhat, the conclusion drawn from these selected studies 
was' that there are a number of indications that the recognition of 
dilemma (i.e. the acknowledgment of valid alternatives) has much in 
common with certain aspects of adult reasoning: the acceptance of 
genuinely conflicting obligations, the tolerance of ambiguity, openness 
to relativism, the influence of the specific situation and context. These 
are arguably the characteristics of matur-e thinking and the later phases 
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in cognitive and ethical development. 
8.1 Formal Operational Thought 
First, in order to consider whether or not dilemma acceptance is a 
characteristic of adult reasoning, it is necessary to digress briefly and 
consider Piaget's description of the stage of formal operations. This is 
the final stage in the sequen~e of cognitive development and must 
therefore represent his view of the nature of mature thinking. 
Piaget's theory of cognitive development involved a clinical, detailed 
questioning of children in a number of problem situations. From his 
experiments he produced a descriptive analysis of the development of 
basic physical, logical, mathematical and moral concepts from birth to 
adolescence. His theory has been summarised by Child (1986 p145) as 
genetic (the higher processes evolve from biolological mechanisms), 
maturational (in that they formed an invariant sequence through several 
clearly definable and related stages) and hierarchical (in that each· 
stage must be experienced and passed through in a prescribed order before 
any subsequent stages of development are possible). 
Each stage could be described in terms of the way the individual 
interacted with the-environment (the knower and the known) so that both 
were mutually transformed. The final stage of formal operations, 
purported to develop during the years 11 to 16, revealed certain clear 
characteristics. Formal thinkers are capable of hypothetico-deductive 
thought, that is to say they can reason like scientists. They construct 
theories that can be tested by e~perimentation. Furthermore, formal 
thinkers are capable"of reflecting on their own processes of thought 
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introspectively (thinking about thinking). That is to say they can 
theorize about mental operations (Inhelder and Piaget 1958). 
8.2 Stages in Moral Development 
In Chapters 5 and 6 the place of moral dilemmas in ethical philosophy was 
considered. The psychologist, however, is concerned with the development 
of moral judgment and Piaget'~ study, The Moral Judgment of the Child 
(1932), has been the stimulus for most subsequent research in this field. 
Kohlberg, a prolific and influential writer (also a pupil of Piaget's) 
extended this theory and method (1966)~ He argued that young people 
progress sequentially through six stages of moral judgment. Kohlberg 
claimed that adult morality is characterized by the reasoned adoption of 
absolute principles. 
Piaget believed that intellectual development consisted of a sequence of 
changes in cognitive structures, as a result of both internal and 
external pressures, these structures being set by the structure of the' 
brain. He traced the development from heteronomous reasoning, in which 
the authority was the adult, to autonomous reasoning, in which the 
standards and rules were set and determined by the individuals 
themselves. 
Kohlberg similarly believed that moral development occurred through an 
invariable sequence of stages; he described six steps (compared with 
Piaget's two basic stages), each with a separate type of moral reasoning, 
becoming more sophisticated with age. Each stage was quite different but, 
while Piaget believed moral maturity (autonomous reasoning) was achieved 
around the age of 12 'for most people, KohJberg's capacity for reasoning 
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in principles might' be reached by some (though most would fail to do so) 
in the late teens. Unlike Piaget, Kohlberg believed that the stages 
normally spanned the whole of a person's life. 
Kohlberg uses one method to establish his theory, the Moral Judgment 
Scale, a structured test consisting of nine hypothetical dilemmas. The 
interviewer presents each subject with one of the dilemmas and the person 
makes a judgment about it and ~hen puts forward a justification for his 
or her choice. The kind of reasoning used is the basis on which one would 
know which stage of moral development the person had reached. 
Although Kohlberg's theory of moral growth received much acclaim at the 
time, there were many critics (as there had been for Piaget's theory, and 
on similar grounds). Kurtines and Greif (1974), for example,'pointed out 
that his research methods were flawed.' It was rare, they said, that all 
nine dilemmas were presented, through shortage of time, so the tests and 
the scale were neither standardised, nor consistently applied. The number 
and content of the dilemmas varied across the research and as a 
consequence the results did not allow easily for generalizability. The 
effect of this was that each study employed a unique scale. "In the 
absence of evidence demonstrating that each dilemma taps the same 
cognitive dimension there is no basis for making comparisons among 
studies using the Moral Judgment Scale" (Kurtines and Greif 1974 p468). 
Probably the most longlasting criticisms will prove to be those against 
the idea of there being structural "stages" in either mo~al or cognitive 
development, which are maturational and hierarchical. Common sense would 
seem to indicate that individuals 'operate at various levels at various 
times and in various domains, and that fixed age related stages do not 
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accurately reflect the years of human development. 
8.2.1 Limitations in the various theories of formal operations have led 
a number of writers to consider adult reasoning and moral. judgment as a 
further development. These characteristics are consistent with the 
ability to recognize dilemmas and as such are worth considering. For 
instance, Kramer (1983) summarised postformal thinkers as possessing 
first, an understanding of the relative non-absolute nature of knowledge. 
Knowledge and reality are viewed as temporarily true (or real) rather 
than universally fixed. Second, postformal thinkers accept contradiction 
as a basic aspect of reality (e.g. an individual might realize that a 
relationship with another person cannot be described in terms of love or 
hate alone, but by the simultaneous existence of these apparently 
contrasting emotions). Third, "postformal thinkers possess ari ability to 
synthesize contradictory thoughts, emotions, and experiences into more 
coherent, all-encompassing wholes" (Rybash 1986 p38). 
At present these studies are rather diverse and separate, identifying' 
various styles of mature thinking, without as yet producing an 
overarching, integrating theory. It is necessary to be selective and the 
following critics of formal operational thought are representative of 
those who find a place for dilemma thinking. 
8.2.2 Most writers on adult thinking acknowledge their indebtedness to 
Perry (1968) who studied the growth of epistemological thought during 
college years. He was one of the first to consider the place of 
relativism in mature thinking, describing his research as follows: 
We trace a path .from adolescence into adulthood. We map this journey 
from the accounts of college students ... Could it be that in a 
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changing, pluralistic culture in which man's very knowledge and 
values are seen to be relative, the sequential challenges of this journey are essential steps in a person's maturation? We think so. 
(p.ix) 
Perry described the evolution in students' interpretation of their lives 
as a progression through various "forms" which characteriie the 
"structures which the students explicitly or implicitly impute to the 
world" (pI). He devised a measure (A Checklist of Educational Views) 
which was administered to a random sample of 313 freshmen in 1954. This 
was followed up by 98 taped interviews including 17 complete four-year 
records. The questions were open ended in the form, "Would you like to 
say what has stood out for you during the year?" Then, "Do any particular 
instances come to mind?" The development he observed is described in 
/ 
terms of nine positions through which the students are seen to pass. 
These he summarised as follows: 
Position 1: The student sees the world in polar terms of we-right-
good vs. other-wrong-bad. Right answers for everything exist in the 
Absolute, known to Authority ... Position 2: The student perceives 
diversity of opinion and uncertainty, and accounts for them as 
unwarranted confusion ... Position 3: The student acepts diversity 
and uncertainty as legitimate but still temporary .. Position 4: the 
Student perceives all knowledge and values (including authority's) 
as contextual and relativistic ... Position 6: The student apprehends 
the necessity of orienting himself in a relativistic world through 
some form of personal Commitment .. Position 7 : The student makes an 
initial commitment in some area .. Position 8: The student 
experiences the implications of Commitment .. Position 9: The student 
experiences the affirmation of identity among multiple 
responsibilities and realizes Commitment as an ongoing, unfolding 
activity through which he expresses his life style. (p9f) 
As far as the study of dilemma is concerned, Positions 1 and 2 clearly 
represent an inability to "recognize" dilemma whilst the remaining 
Positions show an evolving accommodation to dilemma in a relativistic 
world. This interesting study in many ways paved the way for research 
into adult thinking. 
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8.2.3 Another study of adolescent moral judgment, supporting the 
hypothesis of postformal development and relevant to our understanding 
the ability to perceive dilemma is found in Kitchener and King (1981). 
They put forward a seven stage model of post adolescent reasoning. High 
school and college students were administered the Reflective Judgment 
Interview which consists of a set of four dilemmas in the sphere of 
current events (science, religion and history) and were assessed 
according to their understanding of reality and the way they justified 
their beliefs. The model outlihes a sequence of increasingly complex 
methods whereby they might do this. As they see it, changes occur over 
age and over educational levels. The most advanced is called "Reflective 
Judgment." These changes can be seen in the way authority and evidence 
are used and the increasingly thoughtful examination and evaluation which 
people give to their experience. 
8.3 Beyond Formal Operations 
Another powerful critique of Piagetian developmental theory, which is 
directly applicable to the study of the recognition of dilemma, is 
contained in a collection of essays entitled Beyond Formal Operations by 
Commons, Richards and Armon (1984). This is a symposium of studies on 
cognitive development beyond Piaget's formal stage. The contributors 
question the idea that there is a fixed developmental endpoint of 
cognitive ability, reached in adolescence, a kind of plateau of ability 
after which there can only be a gradual decline. In contrast they argue 
that adult thinking has a sophistication which indicates a further 
development: 
The model of formal operatiorts is too limited to capture the 
richness of adolescent and adult thought. Kinds of thinking exist 
that do not show"the logical structure of formal operations or of 
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lower stages. These kinds of thinking might develop parallel to 
formal operations and supplement them, being used in areas not 
amenable to the logic of propositions ... There is a gre~t deal of 
developmental potential beyond formal operations. More sophisticated 
thinking can be found and described in models collectively labelled 
"postformal". These models aim.at extending conceptions of cognitive 
development into adulthood. (1984 p xv) 
8.3.1 Within this symposium, a number of concepts is developed to 
characterise adult reasoning, of which four are selected here. First, 
Koplowitz (1984) claimed that there are two postformal stages, a general 
system stage and a later unitary stage. He illustrated this by comparing 
two concepts of causality, arguing that the formal-operational concept of 
causality is a linear one. An event is conceived of as being the result 
of a previous event: 
The linearity of the formal-operational concept of causality is .. 
revealed in questions commonly asked about events. "Who started it? 
"Whose fault is it?" "How did it begin?" These questions imply a 
causal chain that has a beginning. (p273) . 
The general system concept of causality is cyclical. Its difference 
from the linear formal-operational concept may best be illustrated 
by means of an example; a formal operational man may feel that he 
drinks too much and the cause of his drinking is his wife's yelling 
at him; he may feel her yelling is caused by trouble in the family 
such as the cutting off of the electricity because the bill was not 
paid, or the family's being without transportation because he got· 
into an automobile accident ... the wife may feel that she yells at 
the husband because she is distressed by trouble in the family 
caused by his drinking ... Both husband and wife have linear concepts 
of causality and both have an answer to the question, "How does the 
problem start?" A family therapist, using general system concepts, 
will not see the problems as having a starting point, but will see 
the husband's and wife's problems as being mutually causative in a 
cyclical manner. (p278f) 
8.3.2 Second, Benack (1984) used Perry's studies (1968) as the basis of 
an empirical investigation. She agreed with him that the turning point in 
cognitive growth occurs when students become aware of the existence of a 
diversity of opinions on any given topic. 
Truth externally g';ven is replaced by "truths" each relative to its 
context of evaluation ... a dualistic world view ceases to exist, 
except perhaps as a special case of ~ particular perspective within 
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a relativistic.world. (p341) 
The dualist sees peoples' experience as generally reflecting the 
nature of the external world. He or she typically perceives the 
experience to be identical with reality; not as "how I see things" 
but as "the way things are. 1I ••.• With the rise of relativism comes 
the ability to recognize multiple subjective perspectives on common 
situations. The relativist is able to differentiate not only "my 
experience ll from "your experience, II but .. ·"my perspect ive" from "your 
perspective." ... He or she sees no contradiction in multiple views 
of a situation, each having "validity" or "truth". (p34S) 
Benack then applied these ideas to empathy and the ability to be aware of 
the differences between people_without being unduly troubled by them. 
Benack's hypothesis was that relativistic thought would be associated 
with higher levels of empathetic functioning. She used a counselling 
setting to test subjects with a semi structured interview, inviting them 
to make concrete moral jUdgments. Her tests indicated that relativists 
showed superiority in all dimensions of empathetic functioning. 
8.3.3 Third, Sinnott (1984) also described adult thinking as 
relativistic. "Adults must use relativistic operations to organize their 
complete understanding of interpersonal and everyday reality adaptively" 
(p300). She considered intelligence to be a question of assimilating 
reality in order to survive. Two skills are needed: an understanding of 
interpersonal and social reality and a knowledge of how to apply abstract 
formal operations selectively. This requires what she called a "necessary 
subjectivity". Maturity, she argued, brings acceptance of the necessary 
subjectivity inherent in relativistic operations carried out on reality. 
This acceptance can be seen in "tolerance of others' beliefs and ways of 
life." Adolescents and young adults struggle to cope with the 
inconsistencies in the world by trying to force them intri a "correct" 
formal system. The certainty of formal operations, if they are 
supplemented by the necessary subjectivity of relativistic operations, 
can "maximise use of ~onflicting information and minimize social 
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conflict" (p321). 
Sinnott acknowledged that relativist·ic uncertainty is often distressing 
and individuals may respond with various coping strategies to minimize 
personal anxiety, probably at the cost of being able to adapt. "A middle 
aged adult with a family, a career, civic responsibilities, and a social 
life ... is faced with endless demands to "fit" the data of this social 
world by choosing a viable for~al-operational system for interacting with 
each individual at an appropriate level" (p321). Sinnott suggested that, 
while relativistic operations may not be perfectly consistent with 
reality, they will provide the best possible match. However, they use 
mental energy and are stressful. Therefore, individuals resort to various 
strategies to cope. For example, they can develop a rigid social 
identity; they can retreat completely and interpret all the behaviours of 
other people in a simplistic way. Instead of dealing with a certain 
person as an individual, one may decide to treat that person as a member 
of a racial group to simplify the choices and judgments that have to be 
made. On the other hand, "Adults with postformal relativistic operations 
can act intelligently in complex, everyday situations that require 
several mutually contradictory systematic logical interpretations" 
(p304). 
8.3.4 Fourth, Arlin-(1975) is another who supported the theory 'that there 
is a·further development beyond Piaget's formal operations.and she speaks 
of a fifth stage with two steps: problem solving followed by problem 
finding. She regarded formal thinkers as primarily involved in the task 
of problem solving and postformal thinking as primarily geared to the 
task of problem finding~ In 1984 she studied this in a group of young 
adult artists. All were given several/measures of formal thinking and in' 
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addition a problem finding task. She found that while all scored equally 
well in the formal thinking measures, those who were judged as producers 
of highly creative and original works of art scored significantly better 
on the measures of problem finding. She also found thaL less creative 
artists viewed their work as fixed, unalterable and complete. The more 
creative artists, however, saw their work as changeable and unfinished. 
8.4 Adult Cognition and Agetng 
Another group of writers, Rybash, Hoyer and Roodin (1986), considered a 
number of criticisms of Piaget's theory which, whilst supporting their 
case for "adult cognition and aging", are directly relevant to the 
recognition of dilemma. 
First, formal operational thought emphasizes the power of logic in 
problem solving ... logical, rational analysis to provide the one 
correct solution to a problem, regardless of the domain within which 
the problem is embedded .... 
Second, formal operational thinking places an overemphasis on 
possibility and abstraction, along with a corresponding 
underemphasis on the pragmatics of everyday life .. , the formal 
reasoner may mistakenly assume that the goal of mature thought is to 
construct a set of purified, absolute principles that apply to 
problems-in-living. In late adolescence or adulthood, individuals 
become'aware of this overemphasis on abstraction, absolutism, and 
logic. (p31-33) 
Rybash et al considered that formal thinking was more suited to "closed 
system" problems irr which a number of finite and knowable vari~bles 
produce a specific and 'reliable outcome. Real life problems on the other 
hand were "open" in the sense that there were no clear boundaries between 
them and the context within which they occurred. If this is the case, 
'formal thinkers might be expected to approach ethical and dilemmatic 
problems in an empirical and rational manner. They would tend to seek 
clear solutions and 'shrink from having to accept conflicting obligations. 
- 163 -
They would prefer t6 solve problems rather than to find them (Arlin 1984) 
and would be ill equipped to understand the relativistic nature of 
reality and knowledge (Perry 1968, Sinnott 1984). All this would cause 
them to transform unsolvable dilemmas (or at least those with remainders) 
into solvable problems. 
8.4.1 Rybash et al (1986) then put forward an Encapsulation Model which 
analysed age related changes i~ cognition. They described cognition as 
consisting of three interrelated dimensions, processing, knowing and 
thinking. These dimensions had previously been examined in relative 
isolation from each other by other psychologists interested in the study 
of adult cognitive development, and this was an attempt to draw them 
together into an integrated theory on adult reasoning. 
Our Encapsulation Model integrates and extends the three dominant 
strands of adult cognition; processing, knowing, and thinking. 
Processing refers to the manner by which various mental abilities 
and psychological resources are used to process (ie intake) 
environmental information. Knowing refers to the manner by which 
information is represented, stored, accessed and used. Thinking 
refers to the manner by which individuals develop an understanding 
or a perspective on their knowledge. Specifically, we suggest that 
information control processes and fluid mental abilities become 
increasingly dedicated to and encapsulated within particular 
representations of knowledge (ie domains) throughout adult 
development. As general processes and abilities become encapsulated 
within the parameters of domain-ordered knowledge systems, extant 
. knowledge becomes more differentiated, accessible usable and 
"expert" in nature. (p16) 
This study would support the evidence found in the fieldwork with 
students (chapter 7), which suggests that the ability to recognize 
dilemma (RD), where it exists at all, is specific. In one subject area, 
students may be found to be observant, sensitive to the ~ariety of 
possibilities and the circumstances present and ready to accept the 
validity of alternativeNstandpoints. In another, however, they may be 
inclined to dualistic~ absolutist and simplistic solutions. 
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8.5 Decision Making 
It is common for writers to distinguish between pre-decisional stress and 
post-decisional conflict, or "dissonance (Festinger 1957). The questions 
usually of most interest to psychologists are, "What types of search, 
deliberation and selection procedure do they typically use?" (Janis and 
Mann 1977 p21). The question uppermost in the interviews with students 
was, "How do they make their decision when faced with apparently 
irreconcilable obligations?" Decision making has a considerable 
literature devoted to it from the behavioural sciences and it will not be 
appropriate to pursue it in gre~t detail here but to outline the ideas 
most relevant to an understanding of the process of resolving a dilemma. 
How do people choose among alternative courses of action? One of the most 
influential hypotheses was formulated by Simon (1976). Decision makers 
typically "satisfice" (rather than maximise) themselves, that is to say 
they look for a course of action that is good enough. People have a 
limited capability and tend to resort to simplification when dealing with 
complex decision problems. This applies "whenever the consumer, the 
president, or anyone else is looking only for a choice that-offers some· 
degree of improvement over the present state of affairs" (Janis and Mann 
1977 p26). 
8.5.1 Sometimes, a modification of this strategy is employed, using a 
simple moral precept as the sole rule; this is referred to as Quasi-
satisficing; alternatively a multiple rule may be used, Elimination by 
Aspects, combining several simple decision rules. Then there can be 
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Incrementalism, or muddling through. Many people may consider they will 
be better off moving in small steps towards their chosen goal rather than 
in "giant strides ... putting out fires, rather than selecting the 
superior course of action" (Janis and Mann 1977 p33). Etzioni (1967) puts 
forward a strategy which he calls Mixed Scanning (p294), which occupies a 
halfway position between the perfectionism of optimizing and the 
casualness of muddling through. 
8.5.2 Janis and Mann considered the pre-decisional situation when people 
are faced with an oncoming disaster (such as a flood, earthquake or 
crash) and review the symptoms and sources of conflict. Conflict is 
likely to be intense where a person has to make an important decision at 
"the risk of suffering serious losses from whatever course of action he 
selects" (ie a dilemma). The most prominent signs will be "hesitation, 
vacillation, feelings of uncertainty, and signs of acute emotional stress 
whenever the decision comes within the focus of attention." This leads to 
such symptoms of stress as "feelings of apprehensiveness, a desire to 
escape from the distressing choice dilemma, and self-blame for having 
allowed oneself to get into a predicament where one is forced to choose 
between unsatisfactory alternatives ("Why did I let myself get into this 
box? Now I'm damned if I do and damned if I don't" p47). The stress is 
noticeably most acute at the initial stage of decison making. The example 
they give is of parachutists ratings of avoidance feelings, occ~rs well 
before they leave the ground, at the time of their initial decision to 
participate in the airplane jump ... while on the flight, feelings of 
avoidance decrease, even though objectively the parachut~sts are closer 
to the danger situation." (p47). Other avoidance strategies can be used, 
from simple procrastina~ion to mo~e disguised types of "displacement 
activity" (see Lorenz .. 1966). 
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8.5.3 Having analysed the causes of pre-decisional stress, Janis and 
Mann put forward a conflict theory model of stress avoidance. The 
strategies adopted include: passing the buck ("defensive avoidance"), 
making snap judgment about the best thing to do ("hypervigilance" or 
simple panic) and, when there is sufficient time and the individual still 
"-hopes to be able to escape unharmed, a high quality decison is possible 
("vigilance") typified by the way trained pilots will respond to an 
emergency. During what they referred to as the "hot cognitive processes" 
of decision making, there are five stages: (1) Appraising the Challenge 
(Are the risks serious if I don't change?), (2) Surveying Alternatives 
(Is this [salient] alternative an acceptable means for dealing with the 
challenge? Have I sufficiently surveyed the available alternatives?), (3) 
Weighing Alternatives (Which alternative is best?). (4) Deliberating 
about Commitment (Shall I implement the best alternative and allow others 
to know?) and (5) Adhering despite Negative Feedback (Are the risks 
serious if I don't change? Are the risks serious if I do change?) 
(pI72) • 
Earlier (2.11, 58 11) it was suggested that dilemmas could be resolved by 
a reasonable decision but nevertheless leave some kind of remainder in 
the form of regret for the rejected alternative, remorse or guilt 
feelings for the outcome. These post decisional attitudes, painf~l and 
undesirable as they are, hold interest for the psychologist. Can they be 
avoided? One theory which attempts to account for the apparently 
universal desire to eliminate the conflict between decision and 
afterthought and to return to a state of harmony is that of "cognitive 
dissonance". 
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8.6 Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive Dissonance was first elaborated by Festinger (1957 and revised 
1964) to describe the situation where two elements, which exist in a 
person's cognition and which are "relevant to one another but do not for 
one reason or another fit together". They may be inconsistent or 
contradictory. Festinger gave the example of a person who is already in 
debt but nevertheless purchases a new car, or another who is afraid 
although knowing that only friends were in the vicinity. The presence of 
dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce or eliminate the dissonance. 
"The strength of the pressure to reduce the dissonance is a function of 
the magnitude of the dissonance" (pI8). And "It follows from this that 
the greater the conflict before the decision, the greater the dissonance 
afterward" (Festinger 1964 ·p5). Other examples are given of those 
prepared to continue smoking despite ~eing aware of the consequences, or 
someone who buys car A despite knowing the superior advantages of car B. 
According to Brehm and Cohen, who stress the importance of commitment in 
the theory, the amount of dissonance will depend on the weight given to 
each element and the degree of commitment to the decision. Brehm and 
Cohen are concerned with the strategies adopted post decision to reduce 
the amount of dissonance, to live with the consequences as well as in the 
applications of the theory to social problems (1962 p267f). 
8.6.1 By no means all theorists agree with the cognitive dissonance 
hypothesis and an alternative approach employing a conflict model was 
proposed by Janis and Mann (1977 and see 8.5.3). In {his the interest 
focusses on "hot cognitive processes associated with feelings of regret, 
which come into play when post decisional conflict is so severe that 
stage 5 (Adherence) s~ves way to stage 1 (Challenge)" (p309). These 
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symptoms of conflict range from occasional second thoughts to regret, 
guilt, remorse or anguish; it will be clear that each of these is-
relevant to dilemma as defined in this study. The essential difference 
between the conflict theory proposed by Janis and Mann and Festinger's 
Cognitive Dissonance or Brehm's commitment lies in the importance given 
to the precise situation in which the decision was taken or the 
commitment given. The factors which determine whether or not there is an 
invariable and spontaneous regret following a decision will be 
situational, as they explain: -
Our conflict model leads us to expect that the arousal of post-
decisional regret and its duration depend upon the conditions under 
which a decision is made and the conditions that prevail after it is 
made ... we .. predict that spontaneous regret after a binding 
commitment will predominantly occur under a rather unusual set of 
circumstances - namely, when the person believes himself to be fully 
committed but, because of a premature deadline, continues to 
vacillate because he is still in a hypervigilant state ... Our model, 
by rejecting the assumption that postdecisiona1 regret is always 
present but too subtle or too fleeting to be detected, emphasizes the 
necessity of searching for situational variables that may determine 
the intensity and persistence of regret. (p335) 
In the student interviews (chapter 7) it was pointed out that most made 
their decision on their own; they mayor may not have received some 
support, but rarely was the decision taken away from them. It has also 
been argued that dilemmas can be resolvable or irresolvable regardless of 
whether the decision is in fact taken, that is to say taking a decision 
may be the result of practical pressures, or out of despair, but the fact 
that it has been taken sheds little light on the nature of dilemma as 
such, although it has relevance to a study of the experience. Counsellors 
and tutors, however, would clearly benefit from being conversant with 
conflict theory in their work with students. Of even greater interest, 
however, is the nature of guilt (see also 5A 5, 58 13, 6.4). 
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8.7 A Personal Construct Theory of Guilt 
The usual definitions of guilt are likely to be either religious or 
legal; the first is based on the idea that certain actions alienate a 
., 
person from his or her God, fall short of the requirements of the Church, 
or fail to come up to the standards and rules of one's religious group 
(be that a Buddhist monastery, a Catholic order, a Quaker cell or a 
Moslem group). This distancing from the core of one's belief creates 
responses we tend to call guilt. These cover misdemeanours or sinful 
acts. But there is also a more complex idea in Christianity, that of 
Original Sin, whereby "all have sinned and come short of the glory of 
God" (Romans 3.23) and are guilty not because of any sins they have 
specifically committed but simply by virtue of being a member of the 
human race (see 58 13). Legal guilt is more directly derived.from the 
notion of punishment. Actions which are against the law will in many, 
perhaps in a majority, of cases (given a reasonable government and a law 
abiding populace) engender a feeling of guilt. 
8.7.1 Kelly (1970), however, sought to develop a "truly psychological 
definition of guilt" (p26). He appeared critical of religious notions of 
guilt basing them (wrongly in this researcher's view) on the notion of 
.' 
punishment. For him "even the term 'repentance' which might better be 
taken to mean rethinking or reconstructing, as its etymology suggests, 
has come to stand for undertaking something irrelevantly unpleasant or 
punitive in compensation for disobedience, rather than doing something 
which will throw light on past mistakes." This, no doub~ referring to 
abuses in the Catholic practice of confession, led Kelly to the 
conclusion: 
A person who chr6nically resorts to this kind of penitence to bring 
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his guilt feelings back into comfortable equilibrium, or to write 
off his wrong~doing, ends up as a well-balanced sanctimonious 
psychopath. His only possible virtue is obedience ... (p27) 
He then goes on the draw up a PCT definition of guilt "the sense of 
having lost one's core role structure. A core structure is anyone that 
is maintained as a basic referent of life itself" (except, presumably the 
sort that Kelly disapproves of as likely to produce "well balanced 
psychopaths"). A person has only to feel dislodged from such a role to 
suffer the inner torment most of us know so well. 
To feel guilty is to sense that one has lost his grasp on the 
outlook of his fellow man, or has unwittingly played his part in a 
manner irrelevant to that outlook by following invalid guidelines ... 
with this goes a feeling of alienation from God, or man, or from 
both. (p27f) 
This, apart from his side swipe at a much abused but nevertheless 
frequently practised habit of confession, brings Kelly back to the point 
where his theory can include religious (though less comfortably legal) 
concepts of guilt. Other writers, especially theologians and 
sociologists, also recognize the central importance of the sense of guilt 
in a person's well being and equilibrium. Here is one example from the 
PCT tradition: 
Guilt can be very damaging to an individual and if the precipitating 
event is serious enough can become quite debilitating 
psychologically. For any individual, what is serious may be vastly 
different, and even an apparently trivial issue to one person may be 
of such core role import to another as to produce a huge guilt 
reaction. Where the dislodgment is major the person may end up 
"consumed by guilt",·still hanging on to their original perception 
of themselves, but.unable to deal with the evidence that that is not 
how they actually behaved. A soldier fit and strong, going into 
battle, who then avoids a situation in which he might have been 
killed but has resulted in a mate being killed or injured, might be 
in such a position. He has always seen himself as One who would rush 
in regardless of personal safety, but when the crunch came, he 
discovered he did not with terrible consequences. (Dalton and Dunnett 
1992 p59f) 
8.7.2 Guilt can sometimes be implanted, ~perhaps by the persuasive words 
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of an evangelist, or it can be the result of an over scrupulous 
conscience, or simply an inap~ropriate reaction. Nevertheless, no tutor 
or counsellor, however much they might disagree with a particular 
instance of guilt faced by a student, should underestimate the 
debilitating effect of a highly developed sense of guilt. Our churches 
-
would be even emptier were it possible for guilt to be removed lightly. 
The ability to act, to make decisions between alternatives, to resolve 
certain types of problem, is clearly wider than cognitive ability. The 
resolution of dilemma, the motivation to act decisively, opens up the 
possibility of a skill more akin to creativity; to be able to hold 
different alternatives in one's mind means being able to empathise with 
other points of view, to perceive relative truths. It will be useful now 
to look now at some ideas on problem solving and different types of 
thinking. 
8.8 Problem Solving 
.Most definitions of "problem" are derived from the Gestalt psychologist 
Duncker (194S) for whom a problem arises when a person has a goal but 
does not know how this goal is to be reached. As Mayer (1977) stated it, 
there are three characteristics: the given state, the goals or desired 
terminal state, and the o,bstacles. 
Such definitions are not particularly helpful in studying the experience 
-
of dilemma, being necessarily wide enough to cover problems ranging from 
geometry to chess and riddles (Mayer pS). What does appear to be agreed 
by most psychologists is that a task set by an experimenter is not 
necessarily a problem for a given individual. It may also vanish or be . 
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dissolved if the person changes his or her goals (as would dilemma). 
8.8.1 Studies of the influence on each individual of his or her past 
experience (e.g. of conflicting obligations) appear inconclusive because 
it may have either a negative or a positive effect. Whilst the 
"reapplication of very- specific, rigid, past habits can hinder productive 
problem solving, there is of course, complementary evidence that in some 
cases specific past experience may aid problem solving" (Mayer 1977 p81). 
The interviews with students similarly indicated that they were very 
unsure that they would be any better at resolving the next dilemma, even 
if it were similar, as a result of the experience they had just 
described. This might be either because the common elements in the two 
situations were not recognised (people do not invariably learn from 
experience) or because no two situations can ever be identic·al; there 
will always be variables which the subject might consider to be critical. 
8.8.2 In this study, however, it has been stressed that "dilemma" is not 
to be confused with "problem". Two main distinctions have been drawn: . 
first there is greater personal involvement in a dilemma than in a 
problem. This means that whereas the essential element of a problem, as 
with a puzzle or brainteaser, remains the same, relatively .minor changes 
in a dilemmatic situation (e.g in age, time, terms of a promise, etc.) 
could transform the ~ubjective experience itself. 
Second, a problem which has been solved does not linger, there is no 
aftermath (except perhaps pride, relief or exhaustion at completing the 
task). Dilemmas on the other hand, when they are recalled, even when 
there are no second thoughts, no remainders of regret or guilt about the 
rejected alternative(~), conjure up the memory of personal involvement, 
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the commitment, the sense of fear perhaps, or stress, personal tension or 
urgency. 
It would be interesting, therefore, to see more studies of dilemma based 
upon the individual's own description of their experience. Despite the 
insights to be derived- from.psychological studies of problem solving (or 
thinking) it has to be said that, in general, studies based upon prior 
learning (often with animal s~bjects), information processing or the 
nature of thinking, do not get us very far in our understanding of the 
recognition of dilemma. 
8.9 Specific Cognitive Abilities and Types of Thinking 
In the early days of this research it was thought that perhips it might 
be possible to identify dilemma as a discrete form of thinking, a 
distinctive type of reasoning. Although this proved to be a cul de sac, a 
potentially fruitful line of enquiry, which it has not been possible to 
follow up in'detail here, seemed to lie in a comparison between dilemma 
and different types of thinking, such as lateral, creative, critical 
thinking and so on. 
Following Spearman's use of factor analysis (1904) there have been many 
attempts to isolate·the various components of human abilities. For 
example, Guilford (1950,-1956) produced a model of the intellect with as 
many as 120 mental factors, of which he claimed to have identified about 
80, including convergent and divergent thinking. The convergent thinker 
is recognised by an ability to handle problems requiring one correct 
solution obtainable from the data"available. The divergent thinker, on 
the other hand is capable of addressing problems requiring the generation 
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of several equally' acceptable solutions. Guilford attempted to 
distinguish between the styles of problem solving strategy adopted in 
closed and open ended problems, a skill clearly related to that which has 
been referred to here as recognising dilemma. 
8.9.1 Other researchers (e.g.Getzels and Jackson, 1962) have subsequently 
attempted to confirm the independence of convergent and divergent 
intellectual operations. They argued, therefore, that intelligence is a 
broader ability than it was conventionally thought of by those who 
devised the early IQ tests and that a more systematic map of human 
abilities might be devised (this point is taken up later in chapter 10). 
Yet other work has been done on brainstorming (Parnes 1977), suggesting 
that if the mind is allowed to run free in attempting to solve a probl~m, 
especially in a group producing as many hypotheses as possible without 
bothering to evaluate them (think now evaluate later), far more good 
ideas, and hence possible resolutions, will be generated than by 
conventional, individual problem-solving techniques. Eysenck, on the 
other hand, preferred to see creativity as a personality trait and not a 
cognitive ability at all; as such, he would argue, it is of no relevance 
to a study of intelligence. A very different approach has been taken by 
de Bono (1970) who wrote: 
Lateral thinking is closely related to insight, creativity and 
humour. All four processes have the same basis. But whereas insight, 
creativity and humour can only be prayed for, lateral thinking is a 
more deliberate process. It is as definite a way of ysing the mind 
as logical thinking - but a very different way. (p9) 
Lateral thinking is often perverse, preferring the unexpected, illogical; 
it is provocative "in order to bring about repatterning", it welcomes the 
chance intrusions (p44f).The person who is prepared to acknowledge the 
validity of alternative viewpoints would,very probably demonstrate some 
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of these characteristic ways of thinking as well. 
8.9.2 It can be seen that little or no agreement has been reached by 
psychologists on the nature of creative thinking or how to measure it. 
One problem is the confusing variety of terms used synonymously: 
"originality", "intuition", "inventiveness", "imagination", "divergent 
thinking", "creativity", "giftedness" are just some the terms used by 
psychologists and it is by no means clear how, if at all, they differ in 
meaning. As Dennis Child (1986) put it: 
The reasons for this difficulty of definition are not hard to 
find. Consider, for example, the question of aesthetic 
enterprises in art, music, sculpture or writing. What objective 
criterion can we use to evaluate the "amount" of creativity 
which has taken place in a work of art? Many would rightly say 
that it is a pointless question anyway because it depends too 
much upon value--judgements within a cultural context. There is 
no sense in which we can arrive at a widely accepted judgement 
of creativeness since, in art, music or writing, one man's meat 
is another man's poison. For this reason, attention tends to 
have been directed to scientific discovery rather than to 
artistic creation in the study of creative thinking. There may 
well be a common thread running through the fabric of our 
artistic and scientific creativity, but at present we have no 
idea what it might be .... In the present state of research the 
safest conclusion is that divergent thinking is partially 
dependent on intelligence and partially a function of other 
personality characteristic. (p230) 
8.9.3 Alternatively, the study of critical thinking might be thought to 
be more promising in our search for light on the ability to recognise 
dilemma. But, again, there are many interpretations of this ability 
(Bruner 1964, Feuerstein ·1980 and Sternberg 1985). Three traditions in 
particular have been concerned to identify what is meant" by the term: 
the philosophical, the educational and the psychological. Sternberg 
(1986) following the latter defined it as "the mental processes, 
strategies, and representations people use to solve problems, make 
decisions, and learn new concepts" (pI). This hardly takes us beyond the 
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study of thinking itself. 
On the assumption that critical thinking is an analytic skill and 
therefore at the highest level according to Bloom's taxonomy of 
educational objectives (1956), many programmes have been"planned in the 
United States to help identify and advance the education of the gifted 
and talented (see chapter 10). Sternberg (1986) admitted some of the 
weaknesses: 
We have some good ideas both about how to test it and how to train 
it. At the same time, we need to recognize some of the limitations 
on our present understanding. First, we have a much better 
understanding of analytical (critical) thinking than we do of 
synthetic creative thinking .... creative thinking seems to be much 
more resistant to analysis. Yet, the most important contributions of 
thinking to the world and its cultures are probably in the synthetic 
domain rather than in the analytic one. (p27) 
8.9.4 To conclude this digression on cognitive abilities and types and 
styles of thinking, it should be emphasized that no case is being made in 
this study for dilemma thinking being thought of as a distinct type. 
However many similarities that may emerge between different responses to 
dilemma, they are covered by the studies on adult thinking already 
described. There may indeed be similarities but these are insufficient to 
establish RD as a separate category or type of thinking. More important, 
we would need to allow for those who do not acknowledge the existence of 
valid alternatives, those who cannot or will not tolerate ambiguity or 
accept the genuine~conflict between obligations. These are, as' argued in 
chapter SA above, established standpoints although they ~re not positions 
taken in this research. Clearly, the student who deliberately rejects the 
existence of dilemma, or who takes the view that "there is no 
.' 
alternative", would not exemplify the similarities ~nd would provide an 
exception which would~require further theoretical explanation. 
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8.9.5 It must also be said that the definitions of types of thinking 
lack the degree of clarity required to make fair comparisons. It is more 
satisfactory to speak of the Recognition of Dilemma as a style of 
thinking, as Rybash,. Hoyer and Roodin (1986) concluded a~out Adult 
reasoning. Having discussed studies that showed that adulthood is 
characterized by the growth of several components of postformal 
reasoning: relativistic thinking, metasystematic reasoning, problem 
finding, and dialectic thinking. They stated: 
We concluded that adults think in a manner that is largely 
consistent with postformal accounts of cognitive development. 
However, we have come to the regard postformal cognitive development 
as characterized by the emergence of a set of styles of thinking, 
not as a genuine structural stage of thought. (pS6) 
8.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it should be asked whether anything of value has been 
added to our original definition of dilemma. It is probably more useful 
to think of RD as a style which is characteristic of maturity, of post 
formal operational thought (and probably of creative or lateral thinking 
as well). It has not been argued that the recognition of dilemma is a 
stage, structure of the mind, faculty or category; dilemma thinking is 
very probably not a discrete cognitive ability and the evidence so far 
observed does not support this hypothesis. The students interviewed in 
this study were mo~ing from one milestone in development to another and 
the waypoints may not be plotted with any accuracy. Ther~ are cases of 
inconsistency especially between one domain, in which dilemma recognition 
may be observed, and another, in which there is dualist and absolute 
certainty of conclusion. There are cases of reversion as well as the 
deliberate adoption of an absolutist position. 
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As with mature thinking, the boundaries are not clear-cut, and the 
definition, especially in transition from adolescence to maturity, is 
necessarily imprecise. We must allow for: 
(1) An occasional reversion to a previous style of "thinking; people 
are rarely consistent in their level of thinking or "stage" of 
developme~t across areas of activity. 
(2) The deliberate choice of an absolutist position or the 
considered adoption of a "there is no alternative" standpoint. 
(3) The possibility that some people might deliberately distance 
themselves from any commitment, preferring to stand aloof from any 
ethical conclusions. 
(4) The possibility that some individuals might be retarded or 
immature in their development and might not reach the later stages 
of mature reasoning. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: COMMON SENSE CONFLICTS AND THE THINKING SOCIETY 
The purpose behind considering this perspective is to see what light can 
be shed on the experience of dilemma by anchoring it in its social and 
ideological context.~First, therefore, there will be a survey of some of 
the main approaches of sociologists and social psychologists towards 
dilemma and ideological con[lict and then a critique will be offered. It 
will be suggested that most of these theories inadequately explain the 
existence of real dilemmas in practical living in that they tend to 
undervalue either the place of history or the thinking and argumentation 
of individuals. Rather than presenting dilemma as a genuine struggle for 
the individual or as playing a substantive and necessary part in the 
development of an individual's capacity to think or in creating a society 
in which argumentation flourishes, most theories apparently seek to 
explain or avoid it. 
The approach taken here will be a "return" to common sense one, as 
advocated in previous perspectives (see 5.0 and e.g. Nussbaum, 1990, Gaut 
1990). It will suggest that dilemmas are not only a natural part of 
society but a necessary precondition of the development of common sense, 
for liberal thought and much we take for granted in Western democracies. 
Focusing finally 6n the views of Billig (1988) and the Loughborough 
Discourse and Rhetoric Group, it will be argued that common sense grows 
only in a certain soil and that ideological dilemma should be regarded as 
essential for developing the ability to argue, to make comparisons and 
for the very existence of a thinking society. 
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9.1 Conflict and Contradiction in Sociological theory 
If we are seeking a justification of dilemma as a genuine struggle for 
the individual to choose between at least two valid alternatives, it will 
not be easy to find it in sociological theory. On the face of it, 
sociological analysis~ under the influence of Hegelo-Marxist ontology, 
has much to say about contradiction and conflict in society. In 
the main, these concepts mean an opposition between classes, world views 
and social forces; for Marx, at least, the means by which 
contradiction was eliminated was revolution. Sociological theory has 
especially recognized the place for ideological conflict. But the 
tendency has been to present this as between ideologies rather than to 
find a place for dilemma within them. 
Sociologists are not especially concerned with the meaning or rational 
consistency of dilemma, rather they focus upon the circumstances and 
preconditions of its occurrence in society. Nor are they particularly 
interested in the agonies of choice, the decision making process, the 
moral development of the individual or the extent of a person's 
·predisposition to recognize valid alternatives. Sociologists in general, 
and social psychologists in particular are more concerned to devise 
theories which explain the existence of conflict and contradiction within 
society, between ideologies, cultures and interest groups on the one 
hand, or within individuals on the other. 
9.2 Avoidance Strategies 
There are many ways in which the existence of genuine dilemma can be 
explained away. The main theoretical avoidance is the use (or rather, as 
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argued here, the misuse) of scientific reasoning. This accords with 
the rationalist stance considered earlier (chapter 5A) and the demand for 
logical clarity. Ryle (1953) considered that "dilemmas derive from wrongly 
imprinted parities of reasoning" (p67) and Flew (1975) wrote: 
If contradiction is tolerated, then, in a very literal sense, 
anything goes. This situation must itself be totally intolerable to 
anyone who has any concern at all to know what is in fact true. 
(pI7) 
It is possible to study dilemma as a disembodied concept with its own 
rationality (or lack of it), disregarding the human involvement, the 
perplexities and distress surrounding the process of decision making. By 
saying "it is time to bring in reason", Hare (1981 p31) demonstrated the 
view that to display a concern for human perplexity is an intrusion which 
clouds the main issue, which is whether or not dilemmas can properly be 
said to exist at all. This standpoint fails to distinguish between 
logical confusion and a conflict of values. It also overlooks the fact 
that science itself is not immune to controversy both in its theory and 
its method. 
9.2.1 By contrast, the phenomenological approach welcomes attention to 
the details of dilemmatic situations; it compels us to anchor the study 
of personal dilemma, whether this be the concept or the process, in the 
empirical experience itself. Disembodied ethical theories have no place 
in this approach. As Macintyre (1985) has said: 
We have to learn from history and anthropology of tne variety of 
moral practices, beliefs and conceptual schemes. The notion that the 
moral philosopher can study the concepts of morality merely by 
reflecting, Oxford armchair style, on what he or she and those 
around him or her say and do is barren. (pix) 
! 
Observing closely the.experience" itself (being faithful to the data, 
listening to the evidence) leads inevit~bly to a respect for what 
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Nussbaum (1985) called "the every day facts of lived practical reason" 
(p5). It seems truer to the spirit of scientific discovery to ground 
one's reasoning upon the observed ~vidence, even if this involves the 
inconvenience and untidiness of a humanistic study. 
9.2.2 Other sociological theories can be destructive of the substance of 
dilemma. Dialectical philosophy finds a positive place for contradiction 
within the historical process. Hegel (1975a) wrote, "Life involves the 
germ of death, and .... the infinite, being radically self contradictory, 
involves its own se1f-suppression" (pI17). If, however, his views on the 
role of tragedy in finding a resolution of conflict are representative of 
his thought on social conflict, Hegel (1975b) held that "eterna1 justice 
is exercised on individuals and their aims in the sense that it restores 
the substance and unity of ethical life with the downfall of the 
individual who has disturbed its peace." 
The truly substantial thing which has to be actualized, however, is 
not the battle between particular aims or characters, although this 
too has its essential ground in the nature of the real world and 
human action, but the reconciliation in which the specific 
individuals and their aims work together harmoniously without 
opposition and without infringing on one another. (pI197) 
Engels (1957) developed a theory of historical inevitability and his 
arguments that thesis is followed by antithesis and then synthesis 
similarly devalued any belief in genuine dilemma. Contradiction is seen 
-
as part of life's mystery but does not describe real disagreement between 
individuals; dialectical conflict is part of the inevitable flux of 
history, the pattern determining social change, just as it determines 
individual values. 
~ 
9.2.3 Marxist theory, inheriting a philosophy of dialectic, taught that 
... 
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a person's consciousness was determined by his or her social, especially 
economic, being. There is as a result a genuine place for ideological 
conflict between economic groups or classes, and the concept of 
revolution was intended in part as"a theory of conflict elimination. 
Althusser (1979) developed the Marxist concept of ideology and proposed 
that socialism might reveal as strong a tendency towards contradiction as 
~ 
modern capitalism. In the main, however, this tradition is more intent 
upon the removal of conflict than on tolerating it. In any case, ideology 
was seen as a coherent, internally consistent social structure, within 
the broader whole and this fails to give due weight to the contradictory 
nature within each ideology or culture. 
9.2.4 Non Marxists are often equally reluctant to accept dilemma. For 
Weber, perhaps the closest parallel is to be found in his idea of 
"disenchantment" in Science as a Vocation (1970), the sense of loss in 
the face of modernity, in which not even death has a meaning. Such is the 
traumatic influence upon the individual of the profit motive and the 
materialistic ethic underlying modern capitalism that the resulting 
disorientation has much in common with the notion of living in a 
permanent dilemma. There is such a strong sense of nostalgia for good 
things now ruined that one can only call it despair. The resulting 
attitude can be seen in his essay on Politics as a Vocation (1970 and see 
6.4), in which he reveals his reaction to a pietistic upbringing, yet 
reluctance to accept a Marxist interpretation of the world: 
The devil is old; grow old to understand him! ... Age is not 
decisive, what is decisive is the trained relentlessness in viewing 
the realities of life, and the ability to face such realities and to 
measure up to them inwardly. (p12S) 
Recent feminist writets (e.g. Adams and Cowie 1990), although too 
heterogeneous a group to classify with any confidence, seem to reveal an 
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acceptance of, and even a respect for, the idea of dilemma in society. 
Perhaps it is most clearly articulated in their descriptions of the 
distance and opposition between theory and political action. 
9.2.5 Mannheim (1991) wrote that he was "concerned with how men (sic) 
actually think" (pI)-and to understand this one must taken into account 
the social implications. For him, ideologies are figments of the mind 
which disguise the true nat~re of any given society. They arise 
unconsciously. Utopias on the other hand are "wishdreams" that inspire 
opposing groups to act collectively with the aim of revolutionising an 
entire society. "A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with 
the state of mentality within which it occu~s" (pI73), and in this way 
conflicts can emerge bet~een utopian beliefs. 
The world is known through many different orientations because there 
are many simultaneous and mutually contradictory trends of thought 
(by no means of equal value) struggling against one another with 
their different interpretations of "common" experience. (p24I) 
Throughout this work, an important aim for Mannheim was to have a view of 
the whole, which, he claimed, was not possible in modern philosophy or in 
empirical science. To him, ideologies were whole constructs and utopias 
were subtypes. The weakness of this ideal-type approach to resolving 
dilemmas is seen when applied to individual cases. Mannheim's analysis of 
the debate between Marx and the anarchist Bakunin (p2I9f) reveals that 
his interest was not in the argument itself, but rather in the way the 
dominant ideology eventually eliminated the utopian subtype. The 
conflict thus was resolved without the need to pay attention to the 
personal dilemma. Indeed, as he put it, the individual case is of less 
significance than the whole process: "No single individual represents a 
... . 
pure embodiment ot anyone of the historical-social types" (pI89). 
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It can be seen that Mannheim had an appreciation of the social and 
historical influences on the way we think but underplayed the place of 
dilemma in individual patterns of. thought or in the development of common 
sense. 
9.2.6 Berger and Lu~kmann (1971) likewise took as their starting point 
the root proposition which they based on Marx, namely that man's 
consciousness is determined by his social being (pI6). They therefore 
demonstrated a concern for social processes, which they distinguished 
sharply from the philosopher's concern for truth and validity. They were 
interested in whatever "passes for moral". This permitted them to accept 
the relativism which is the precondition of much cultural dilemma. They 
quoted with approval Pascal's maxim that what is truth one side of the 
Pyrenees is error on the other. ("Verite au deca des Pyrenees, erreur au 
dela", Pensees v 294). 
Their aim was to explain the ways in which symbolic systems in modern 
societies are socially constructed and to offer an explanation of ho~ 
contradictions are either eliminated or ironed out. This they did by 
considering four types of "machineries": mythology, theology, philosophy 
and science. The first two contained inconsistencies which were explained 
on the grounds of their simplicity. Neither myth nor theology (only' 
slightly less naive), contained conflicts which could be considered 
substantial. Philosophy and science remove dilemma by means of two more 
mechanisms, therapy and nihilation. Successful therapy: 
Establishes a symmetry between the conceptual machinery and its 
subjective appropriation in the individual's consciousness; it re-
socializes the deviant into the objective reality of the symbolic 
universe of the society .~. Nihilation, in its turn, uses a similar 
machinery to ljquidate conceptually everything outside the same 
universe. (p132) 
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In each case, dominant perspectives are secured by the rejection of 
alternatives and the dilemma is effectively removed. 
9.2.7 By contrast, other theories place too great an emphasis upon the 
individual in society. If we can extend the concept of dilemma to include 
that of "double purp6se", Freud (1901) found a central place for it in 
his analysis of the unconconscious sources of motivation; psychotherapy 
has as one of its tasks in hjs tradition, the accommodation of each 
individual to the inner forces of conflict. Little attention is paid here 
to the part played by society; dilemma, would therefore seem to be 
accepted as a normal part of one's psyche, not automatically eliminated. 
It was seen in chapter 8 ~ow Festinger considered the main motivation of 
each person is to achieve balance and harmony. If there is any 
inconsistency, therefore, between the choice and the afterthought, the 
person will find this too uncomfortable and be led to seek a 
reconciliation. The dilemma remainder therefore disappears. It is as if, 
as Billig (1988) put it: 
There is for each individual a blood red silicon chip which 
organizes thoughts and actions. This chip is the psychologist's 
Rosetta Stone: if only it could be discovered and then decoded, the 
hidden plan of the mind would be revealed. (pI9) 
This approach also~ effectively denies the substantive existence of 
dilemma for the individual because heorshe is internally motivated to 
see that it disappears and harmony returns. 
9.2.8 Other individualist interpretations stress the cognitive 
processes and the wa~decisions.are taken (e.g Hamilton 1981). Each 
individual requires"rules and procedures in order to process the incoming 
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data. This is essential in order to select the information, direct 
thought and action. Dilemmas are explained as mere occasions in this 
process of organizing information. Data would be selected in order to 
confirm prejudices. Racists, right wing and left wing theorists would all 
discover evidence to support their views. Such schematic processing will 
tend to avoid any inc~nsistency, double standards or clash of values. In 
this way cognitive social psychologists also evade the reality of dilemma 
for an individual. 
Explanations of dilemma which stress only the individual, isolated from 
his situation and background, do not square with the insights of 
classical tragedy. As Nussbaum (1986) argued, Greek tragedians 
appreciated that we are not untouched by our environment; fate plays a 
hand. Conditioning, in modern parlance, is a central factor for us all. 
We therefore need to appreciate not only the inner struggle of dilemma as 
a substantive, real event but also at the same time see each person as 
sharing in the "common sense" of society. We grow in the soil of our 
environment and upbringing: 
I am an agent but also a plant and much that I did not make goes 
towards making me whatever I shall be praised or blamed for being; 
that I must constantly choose between competing and apparently 
incommensurable goods and that circumstances may force me to a 
position in which I cannot help being false to something or doing 
some wrong; that an event that simply happens to me may, without my 
consent, alter my life; that it is equally problematic to entrust 
one's good to friends, lovers or country and to try to have a good 
life without them - all these I take to be not just the material of 
tragedy but everyday facts of lived practical reason. (p5) 
9.3 Dilemma and Rhetoric 
Billig (1988) studied dilemma from the point of view of a social 
psychologist {he and~is co-authors formed the Loughborough Discourse and 
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Rhetoric Group). They criticised both those writers who undervalue the 
place of history and the influence of ideology in our culture and those 
who ignore the importance of the individual making concrete and real 
choices. The authors' definition of dilemma is close to that adopted in 
this research. Dilemmas are a real and tough choice between two 
alternatives; as such they are a natural and common part of our lives. 
But they went much further than this: 
What is involved is clearly not a straightforward issue of choice, 
of alternative courses Qf action, nor on the other hand a matter of 
intellectual puzzles or paradoxes .. The characteristic of a dilemma 
which makes it significant for social analysis is that it is more 
complex than a simple choice or even a straightforward technical 
problem ... (dilemmas are) social situations in which people are 
pushed and pulled in opposing directions ... They are also seen to 
impose an assessment of conflicting values. (p163) 
Dilemmas, it is claimed, are built into our culture and contradictory 
elements can be found within both ideology and common sense. They are 
necessary for us to develop as thinking human beings. The authors, 
therefore, intend: 
To oppose the implications of both cognitive and ideological theory, 
which ignore the social nature of thinking. In contrast to the 
cognitive psychologists, we stress the ideological nature of 
thought; in contrast to theorists of ideology, we stress the 
thoughtful nature of ideology. (p8) 
They distinguished between a lived ideology, II which refers to ideology as 
a society's way of life", and an intellectual ideology, "which is a 
system of political, religious or philosophical thinking and, as such, is 
very much the product of intellectuals or professional thinkers" (p27). 
They believed that: 
The study of dilemmas should not be confined to actual choice-making 
behaviour. There is a need to recognize the dilemmatic aspects of 
thought, which are preconditions for any dilemmatic choice and which 
continue to exist in common sense, even in the absence of actual 
situations which necessitate the taking of difficult choices. (p24) 
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9.3.1 Their argument was founded upon four main points: first, "thinking 
is necessary for a society and .. a society without thought is either an 
impossibility or a totalitarian nightmare" (pI49). 
They believed that dilemmas will always be with us and that they fulfill 
a vital function. We should not dream of "a silent society, in which all 
dilemmas have been resolved and whose members, in consequence, have 
nothing to deliberate about" (pI49). This, however, does not mean that 
the issues will be the same in every society, let alone that every 
society should think in the same way as do people in late-twentieth 
century Britain. 
In their view, most social psychologists, when they study dilemmas, have 
seen them in terms of making difficult decisions. This "pr~vented (them) 
from appreciating the dilemmatic quality of much everyday thinking, which 
can be revealed whether or not individuals are actually faced with 
decisions to be made" (p9). By contrast their concern was to examine the 
social preconditions for dilemmas, in order to show how ordinary life is 
shaped by dilemmatic qualities. Ordinary people who may not experience 
the Scylla and Charybdis of dramatic choice, nevertheless are well aware 
of those conflicting points of view "which surface so vividly in the 
dilemmatic situation per se II (p9). 
9.3.2 Second, they believed that thinking, arguing and ideology were 
closely interdependent. Billig, (1991) wrote that lithe holding of 
opinions is an essentially rhetorical and argumentative matter. Moreover, 
it is also deeply ideo10gical" (pvii).In each individual, thinking takes 
the form of an "interna1 dia10gue" or debate, a skill akin to the 
~ . 
rhetoric which was"so prized and developed in Greek and Roman education 
- 190 -
(for example by Quintilian, Aristotle, Socrates). They held that there 
was much to be learned from the insights of these classical writers who 
so influenced European education. 
However, the revived interest in rhetoric has a new emphasis. Traditional 
rhetoric concentrated on the speaker, on training those who wished to be 
an orator, to communicate. Modern rhetoric shifts the focus to the 
listener, or reader (for all discourse now falls within the rhetorician's 
interest). Under the influen~e of modern philosophy, the duality of 
knowledge and opinion, persuasion and conviction, reason and emotion is 
challeged. Phenomenologists and existentialists would claim that a 
person's basic method of judgment is argumentation, whether in dialogue 
with others or with a text; the results, in either case, are necessarily 
relative and temporal. N~t only the processes of the speaker's mind are 
of interest, but also the response of the audience. The elements of 
speech, metaphor, allegory, antithesis, parallelism, and so forth, are 
all a crucial means of studying the transactional nature of discourse. 
Potter and Wetherell (1987) argued that people were not necessarily. 
consistent in their attitudes, they did not hold a single opinion but 
rather used complicated and sometimes contradictory ideas and patterns of 
speaking. It is as if a living dialogue is taking place within each 
person. It is also crucial to consider the context in which the speaker 
may be operating.-One example of how this may raise dilemmas- is described 
by Edwards and Potter-(1992). They particularly highlig~t what they refer 
to as the "dilemma of stake": 
The dilemma of presenting factual reports while being treated as 
having a stake in some specific version of events or some practical 
outcome. The recipients of such reports may well, in turn, respond 
to them accordfngly, as designed to manage that dilemma. So, by 
offering a report rather than, say, directly making an accusation, 
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speakers do not ensure a certain interactional outcome, but seek to 
garner the accountability of 'just telling it how it is' " (p7ff). 
Billig went further and argued that conflict and dilemma were therefore 
essential prerequisites of a thinking person: 
By stressing the dilemmatic and rhetorical nature cif thinking, we 
see thinking as inherently social. In fact, thinking is frequently a 
form of dialogue within the individual (p6) ... Thus, the paradox of 
the term "the t~inking society" describes the reality that our 
dilemmas of ideology are social dilemmas and that our ideology 
cannot but produce dilemmas to think about. (p7) 
9.3.3 Third, Billig saw dilemmas as genuine conflicts for the 
individual. He is sceptical of social theorists and theorists of 
ideology, who tend to give weight to the processes of history and how 
they create the culture and beliefs of particular societies but tend also 
to "ignore the thinking of individuals, for individuals are often seen as 
the blinded bearers of a 'received ideological tradition" (p2). On the 
contrary, Billig claimed, whereas people may not have invented the common 
sense which they use, they are not "dupes" and each individual is a 
thinking person, not "his master's voice". 
Conflicts are of interest ... not to find how they might·be . 
institutionally resolved or functional for the social system, but to 
show how they give rise to both problems and opportunities for 
reflection, doubt, thought, invention, argument, counter-argument. 
Hence our conception suggests that in everyday thought the 
individual is a lay philosopher, not a marionette dancing to the 
desires of a great design. (p163) 
9.3.4 Fourth, their interest did not lie in the motivation or 
information processing'of individuals but in the fact that knowledge is 
socially shared and that common sense includes conflict~ng and 
contradictory notions. The authors quoted a number of classical sayings 
and proverbs to illustrate how normal and natural a part of life dilemma 
is. In particular, ~hey refer ~o Francis Bacon who, in his Of the Dignity 
and Advancement of Learning (1605), collected a number of antithetical 
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proverbs (see Whately 1963, appendix A), which by their seeming 
contradiction reveal how dilemma is woven into the heart of our practical 
wisdom. Today, in our upbringing, we are still receiving contrasting 
messages from our traditional proverbs: "Absence-makes the heart grow 
~ 
fonder" on the one hand, and "out of sight, out of mind" on the other; 
"nothing ventured nothing gained" but "look before you leap"; "many hands 
make light work" but then "too many cooks spoil the broth"; "charity 
begins at home" yet "love thy neighbour". Similarly, we have come to 
accept as normal Hamlet's predicament that it is sometimes necessary "to 
be cruel, only to be kind" (Act 3, Sc.4). 
Billig argued that such dilemmatic contrasts are necessary if we are to 
learn how to think at all and that fireside wisdom, even though 
-
frequently contradictory, assists in the very development of our thinking 
and arguing processes. 
The contrary themes of common sense represent the materials through 
which people can argue and think about their lives, for people need 
to possess contrary themes if they are to think and argue. (p8) 
9.3.5 Billig then undertook some "initial investigations", "key 
illustrations" of real and concrete dilemmas which confront individuals 
in specific situations: education, medical care, race and gender. The 
authors identified common ideological themes which recurred in these 
discourses. They' drew out the tensions between authority and equality, 
freedom and determinism, the individual and the state. The same conflicts 
occur frequently whatever the dilemma being considered. They concluded: 
In this way the characteristics of dilemmas are revealed as 
fundamentally born out of a culture which produces more than one 
possible ideal world, more than one hierarchical arrangement of 
power, value ~nd intere~t. In this sense social beings are 
confronted by and deal with dilemmatic situations as a condition of 
their humanity. (p163) 
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9.4 Conclusions 
This analysis has been found particularly relevant to the present 
research and elaborates the original definition and understanding of 
dilemma. It accords closely with what Hampshire wrote (1980 and see 
2.12). It gives due weight both to the individual and to the constraining 
influence of his or her cultural environment. As Gaut (1993) pointed out 
when she argued that "a reflectively improved version of common-
sense morality is the best morality": 
We ~lready possess a raft of moral convictions, which has been 
passed on to us by our parents and fellows from our culture, altered 
and refined by the common understanding of previous ages, and which 
we, in turn, will pass on to our descendants after we have made our 
own reflective contributions. Ethical convictions and deliberations 
are always historically located and conditioned. These inherited 
convictions are those of common-sense morality. (p33f) 
The perspective we have been considering likewise stresses the place of 
"common sense" and the importance of developing the capacity to debate 
different sides of a question. It perceives the ideological basis to many 
recurring dilemmas (e.g. between individuality and collectivity, equality 
and authority, freedom and necessity). It sees dilemma as a constant in 
society and does not aim to remove it (or discover a method of 
resolution); it does not look forward to the end of dilemma, "towards a 
pure consistency of thinking, for that would be to look'forward to the 
end of thought" (p148). 
This approach leaves the experience of dilemma centre stage and of 
permanent significance in the life and thinking of any individual, indeed 
of society itself. For these, and other, reasons it is justifiable to 
claim a more important pla~e in our educational programmes for the 
consideration of~. and reflection upon dilemmatic situations. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
EDUCATION: SUBJECT SPECIFIC DILEMMA 
The intention in this chapter is to provide a justification for the 
inclusion of dilemma in the teaching programmes, the counselling and the 
general entitlement for all 16-19 year old students. It will also offer 
some guidance on ways in w~ich this might be done. It, therefore, 
provides in part a new perspective, that of the educationist, and in part 
an application of the insights from the other perspectives to the role of 
a tutor or counsellor. 
There are four sources upon which this chapter draws: first, there is a 
fresh analysis of the informal discussions which took place over two 
years with a group of ten subject tutors on the recognition and 
resolution of dilemma (abbreviated to RD); these culminated in the 
attempt to devise hypotheses and to test these amongst groups of randomly 
selected students. The data is revisited in the light of the changed 
objectives and methodology. Second, a study visit to the USA to look at a 
variety of programmes for the "Gifted and Talented" pupils, on critical 
thinking and problem solving, in a range of schools; these included 
acceleration, enrichment and "pullout" programmes. Third, a letter and 
questionnaire which was sent to sixty Heads of Departments in ten 
different post-sixteen institutions across the country, requesting 
examples and comments. on subject specific dilemmas. Fourth,·some 
background literature on the philosophy and ethics of education and 
counselling. Drawing on this data and background, some conclusions and 
recommendations for tutors and counsellors in post 16 colleges are 
tentatively put forward. 
- 195 -
It should, however, be made clear that it was no part of this study to 
evaluate the theories on the identification or treatment of "Gifted and 
Talented" children, nor on counselling theory, nor comparative education. 
10.1 The Dilemma Research Group 
Are dilemmas considered as part of the course in different subject 
disciplines and, if so, to what extent are they distinct? What kinds of 
opportunity occur in post 16 courses to develop the ability to recognize 
and resolve dilemma? What do different disciplines understand by dilemma? 
These were some of the questions considered by a group of Sixth Form 
College teachers meeting over two years (1988/89). A four month 
secondment had been granted to me by the LEA, the terms of which required 
any findings to be applied to programmes for the "gifted and talented". 
It was therefore necessary to consider first the differing theories on 
the identification and selection of able students; then, to compare the 
various strategies for teaching them. The following subject disciplines 
were represented: Chemistry, Government and Politics, Geography, Design 
and Technology, French, Psychology, Physical Education, Classics, Physics 
and Religious Studies. Meetings took place three or four times a term, 
after college. There were two weekend study sessions and two pieces of 
fieldwork amongst students. It was recently followed up by an enquiry 
amongst 60 Heads of Departments in post sixteen instititutions during 
1994. 
The details of the earlier, informal study need not concern us. Briefly, 
however, the aim was to discover whether "able" students, as defined, had 
any advantages over "average" students when faced by dilemmas (see 1.6, 
3.2.1, 4.1). Would-they be better at recognizing dilemas, accepting the 
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validity of alternatives (ie a form of relativism) and resolving or 
taking appropriate action in response to them. In order to research these 
questions, a number of problems had to be overcome; in the first place, 
what was meant by "able" and how ~ould they be selected ? In the event a 
multi criteria method was chosen, such as is widely accepted in the 
literature, for example Postlethwaite and Denton (1984) or Renzulli's 
Revolving Door Model-(1977), which includes observations of intelligence, 
creativity and task commitment, or as described by Sternberg and Davidson 
(1986). In practice students were identified as "gifted" on any of the 
following grounds: if they had 6 or more grade A's at GCSE; if they had 
been previously screened by an Educational Psychologist and identified as 
"gifted"; if they were nominated by subject staff as being "exceptional" 
in their subject, or had indicated an outstanding performance in some 
socially useful activity, possibly outside college. 
Secondly, what was meant by "average" students? Should the term include a 
random cross section of the college and thus include a proportion of able 
students? This was accepted as the statistically valid method. But common 
sense seemed to suggest otherwise. It was finally agreed that you do not 
compare the distinctive characteristics of blonde over brunette students 
by including blondes in your control group, so the "able students" were 
omitted. 
The team of staf.f who had volunteered began by setting themselves the 
. 
task of clarifying and refining the meaning of dilemma and the definition 
in respect of their own subjects. There was no disagreement about a 
working definition of dilemma, which was accepted a~ a situation or issue 
which invited "various approaches, interpretations, strategies or 
techniques" and therefore had "alternative legitimate solutions". It was 
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also agreed that dilemmas would usually (but not necessarily) have a 
remainder in the form of a cost such as regret or guilt over the rejected 
alternative. It was accepted as a working assumption that the recognition 
of dilemma might vary from one subject to another and therefore the group 
should draw its membership from across the curriculum. It was agreed to 
begin by looking in a fairly general way at the kind of problems students 
came across in their A level courses which were open ended and admitted 
several valid solutions. Each member of the group presented a paper in 
turn from the perspective -of her/his own subject specialism. 
10.1.1 The physicist began by denying that there were any real dilemmas 
in his subject until a student had progressed far into the subect (to 
degree level at least). In his view, genuine dilemmas did not arise as 
such, in A level courses; there was only ignorance or lack of insight. 
Even when faced with a difficult choice, for example between methods of 
measurement, there was always a preferred solution, clear to any student 
with enough knowledge or understanding. When pressed on this, he allowed 
that it might be a useful pedagogic technique for the teacher to let the 
student work under the illusion that a dilemma existed and to refrain 
from providing the missing ingredients of knowledge or insight. 
10.1.2 In Design and Technology, the opposite standpoint was taken. 
Students, it was claimed, were faced with dilemmas from the outset of 
their course and at every stage; The example was given of a student who 
was dismayed at the right-handedness of everyday life and the implements 
available and who wished to design tools for the left handed. There were 
always different and equally valid options open. Other members of the 
group challenged this on the ground that the examples given were problems 
~ 
not true dilemmas; it was also questioned whether there was any sense of 
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cost in making the choice; was it not a question of good, basic thinking 
as applied to problems of design and technology? 
10.1.3 An interesting slant on the discussion was provided by the 
Physical Education teacher. The example he gave was that of instant 
decision-making of the kind, "Do I pass or kick at goal?" "Do I playa 
lob or make a passing shot?" These were decisions usually made at high 
speed in response to an immediate situation. This in turn led to a 
discussion on whether or not that decision was more of an instinctive, 
reflex action than a considered reflection. In fact, it was suggested 
that the exercise of RD in a physical situation was probably a case of 
hesitation or fatal dither. Most members, however, considered that there 
had to be some cognitive element in such cases, however physical the 
skill and however instantaneous the decision. It would therefore qualify 
as a dilemma. 
10.1.4 In Politics and Government the e~ample was given of a discussion 
on Proportional Representation (PR). It was held that to devise a system 
of PR would simply constitute a problem, because there was an accepted 
definition of PR and the task was defined and limited. On the other hand, 
to consider whether or not one ought to have PR would be a dilemma. The 
main challenge to this opinion was on the grounds that there was no sense 
of loss in the rejected alternative. This raised the question whether the 
existence of a remainder was a sufficient but not a necessary 
characteristic of dilemma. On this point the group was divided, but most 
members believed a sense of cost was an essential part of the definition. 
10.1.5 In Classics, the question was considered, "What life style was 
enjoyed by Plautus?" This required the student to enter into the life of 
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slaves, and also to express a personal judgment. Able students, it was 
suggested, might avoid giving any opinion, preferring the safer option of 
learning, then describing. This was likened to a swimmer who refused to 
let go of the side and launch out for fear of making a mistake. This 
teacher considered "letting go of the side" the most important ability in 
the recognition of dilemma and to develop the confidence to risk error, 
even to do badly on~occasion. 
10.1.6 When Religious Studies was considered, a number of dilemmatic 
questions emerged of the type, "Can there be a Just War in a nuclear 
age?" This led to such questions as what value should be placed upon 
idealism by comparison with practicality? Is religion world affirming or 
world denying, assuming a pessimistic or an optimistic view of human 
nature? A more distinctive dilemma was the question of the place of RS in 
the curriculum; was it an essential part of the culture (as Buddhism 
might be in Sri Lanka, Catholicism in Spain or Islam in Iran)? If so, who 
was qualified to teach it, a convinced believer only, or any qualified 
teacher? The answer clearly would depend upon whether the objectives of 
RS included, or specifically excluded proselytism. This in turn raised 
dilemmas for educators and students alike, as both would need to ask to 
what extent it was permissible (or essential perhaps) to let one's 
personal standpoints influence the direction of the course. 
10.1.7 In Modern Languages, it was suggested that the quintessential 
dilemma was the search for an appropriate translation and the 
appreciation of meaning. It was also argued that "dilemma for 16-19 year 
old linguists is the recognition of the need to th~nk in the language and 
to understand what that actually means; for example the first positive 
sign is often dreaming in the language. Not knowing what is coming next 
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is part of this, in that you are not planning the sentence ahead before 
deciding to speak." 
10.1.8 One major outcome of these discussions over the two years was the 
quality of the contributions, which it was unanimously agreed had a 
beneficial influence on day to day teaching strategies~ The vigorous 
debates which took place not only refined the definition but also 
increased their understanding of dilemma in each subject specialism and 
how it might be included in the college curriculum. After the individual 
presentations, hypotheses were drawn up to compare the ability to 
recognize and resolve dilemmas (RD) between "able" students and other 
students. An assessment procedure and marking scheme was devised and 
interviews and essays were arranged. 
-
It remained an unresolved question whether or not dilemma was subject 
specific or whether, rather, there were subject based perspectives on 
each dilemma (see 10.3) The outcomes as regards the chosen hypotheses 
were (predictably) inconclusive, but as far as the study of dilemma 
thinking was concerned, they were very encouraging. Dilemmas~ as defined, 
certainly existed in A level courses, as well as general education 
(complementary study) programmes; it was considered by all, with one 
exception, to be an important component of good teaching; it was subject 
specific not in the sense of being a distinct form of knowledge (see 
10.4) but in tbe sense that students might be able at recognizing 
dilemmas in one subj~ct but not in another, or alternatively in college 
courses but not in their personal lives (and vice versa); it was agreed 
that RD could be taught and included in the curriculum, preferably 
within existing courses rather than by arranging a special place for it 
on the timetable~ This earljer study, although informal, not only kept 
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the researcher's interest alive but also provided data which it has been 
possible now to rework and apply to the new objectives of illumination 
and providing assistance to tutors and counsellors. 
10.2 A Study Visit to the USA - October 1988 
A study visit, unde~ the auspices of the English Speaking Union, was 
arranged in the Autumn of 1988 to the U.S.A.; the purpose was to look at 
both selective and normal schools and seek educational programmes which 
-
might relate to dilemma thinking. The itinerary covered six stays: in New 
York, where visits were arranged to schools in Harlem, Manhattan and Long 
Island; then to Princeton, where in addition to the High School and 
University, there was an opportunity to learn at first hand from the 
staff at the Education Testing Service about the thinking behind the 
Standard Achievement Tests (SAT's) and the Advanced Placement (AP) 
courses and to what extent dilemmas were included or valued in these. The 
next visit was to Baltimore to see especially the School for the Arts; 
then to Washington to visit the Thomas Jefferson School for Technology in 
Virginia; then to Houston University and the centre for Gifted and 
Talented Education at the School of Education. The final visit wai to San 
Francisco and to the Lowell High School and GT programmes in the Fremont 
Unified District. 
10.2.1 In the~S there has been in recent years a strong tradition of 
teaching critical thinking and in selective schools, such as Dalton High 
or Stuyvesant, in New York, both of which had fought ·hard against 
prevailing educational policy to remain selective, a high premium was 
placed on problem solving and fast thinking. In one such school, which 
included two Nobe) prizewinDers amongst the recent alumni, the head 
, 
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believed that, "provided you have the genetic basis, what you need to 
motivate a pupil is economic striving"; he put success down to diversity, 
challenging teaching, questioning, and out of class activities such as 
publications, plays and concerts.- It was hard to find any acknowledgment 
that dilemmas existed, at least in academic situations. Problems had 
solutions and reaching conclusions at speed was rewarded, together with 
confident and articulate argument and competitive activity. The preferred 
and most successful approach towards their most able students was to 
accelerate them in specifi~ subjects. 
10.2.2 At Levittown on Long Island there was a special centre for Gifted 
Programmes, starting at the third grade. The state had provide some 
funding for salaries, materials, software and a coordinator. Parents, 
too, were very support~ye. Each Middle School had a teacher serviCing 
three classes and on a rota basis the pupils selected (according to a 
multi criteria definition) were "pulled out" and bussed to the centre in 
order to receive enrichment sessions for three hours a week. 
The activities were varied, clearly enjoyed by the eight and nine year 
olds, and noisy, with plenty of visual material. Written on the board was 
a quotation purported to be from Einstein, "The soul never thinks without 
an image" .. The theoret i ca 1 backbone was Bloom's taxonomy (even to the 
children they spoke of "meta cognition", "synthesis" and "problem 
solving") and the staff consciously aimed at the higher order thinking. 
Fast responses were encouraged but there was not the same stress on 
"correct" answers as at the selective schools previously visited. One 
activity was called "Alike it or not", in which the teacher presented the 
pupils with a set of four words, numbers or pictures and asked them to 
put their thumbs up or down·to indicate whether they saw a likeness; it 
was suggested that one would be the odd one out (for example, dime, rope, 
glass, slide; foot, hand, knee, cheek; 127 52 108 99). The aim was to 
loosen up the rigid mind and to create confidence in their own thinking. 
As long as they could justify the similarity, there was no search for a 
"correct solution". 
10.2.3 Also releva~t to the understanding of dilemma thinking were the 
programmes undertaken at The Thomas Jefferson School for Technology. Here 
85% of the pupils were already identified as Gifted and Talented. 
Admission was competitive and althought they tried to meet some ethnic 
and gender quotas, the tests were strict; 20% screening was provided by a 
maths, verbal, spatial and abstract reasoning test. This was followed by 
an essay to discover motivation. In the classes, the participation was 
impressive. A conscious effort was made to promote divergent thinking, 
discussion and argument. 
The preferred strategy for the most gifted was acceleration, although not 
to the exclusion of enrichment, because most staff considered their 
teaching was already "enriched". Three students were already 'attending 
Princeton University for mathematics lectures, whilst still on the school 
roll. In this way they retained their pastoral and social links with 
their known age group. Within the school there was considerable 
counselling before pupils were accelerated to a senior class. 
10.2.4 At the Center for GT Education at Houston University, there were 
40 teachers doing an MA on GT education (fifteen other similar set-ups 
existed in other universities in the USA at that time). Much work was 
being done on how to teach problem solving and critical thinking, but it 
was not possible~to find an~thing that encouraged the recognition or 
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resolution of dilemma (or anything like it). 
10.2.5 In the Fremont School District outside San Francisco, Lowell High 
School had recently been identified as one of the "top ten" schools in 
the USA and was the the only school in San Francisco to be selective 
(indeed only one other state funded selective school existed throughout 
California). Scores for SAT' would be in the top 15% and there were many 
considered gifted; these were placed on an accelerated track in a 
specific subject after counselling. The Principal strongly denied it was 
an elitist school. "True elitism occurs only when there is an economic or 
social advantage obtained, not when it occurs by merit", he said. He 
preferred breadth to accelerated advance and personally encouraged 
creative and divergent thinking in the school. 
10.2.6 Most administrators met on this visit were eclectic in their 
approach to the identification and teaching of the "Gifted and Talented", 
using both enrichment and acceleration strategies for their most able 
pupils. Segregation in the form of "Pullout" programmes and special 
schools was a more controversial policy and in many districts was ruled 
out on political or social grounds. In the best examples witnessed, as 
at Levittown, students were encouraged to think divergently, creatively 
and to allow for alternative approaches. They were also encouraged to be 
confident of their own ideas and to practiSe articulating them. Such 
concepts were directly relevant to the issues raised by this research 
into dilemma. Specially funded programmes, however, with specific 
objectives along such lines were confined to those pupils identified as 
gifted and talented. A strong impression was gained, throughout the 
visit, that most G and T pupils on special programmes were taught that 
problems have correct solutions and that there is a right answer to be 
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sought by the brightest minds in the shortest possible time. 
10.3 A Survey of Heads of Department 1994 
The earlier small scale study referred to above (10.1) had given 
considerable encouragement to expect that many teachers would think that 
dilemmatic issues were an important part of their specific subjects. To 
follow this up a letter was sent to 60 Heads of Department (appendix 3.1) 
in ten different post sixteen institutions. Dilemma was defined as "a 
situation in which a choice has to be made between at least two pressing 
alternatives, where there is no obvious solution" and examples were given 
of both moral and non-moral issues. It was explained that the research 
interest was to discover "the extent to which there are opportunities to 
"practise" this common predicament in college based examination courses 
(i.e. not simply in general courses or tutor periods)". A questionnaire 
was enclosed (appendix 3.2). 
10.3.1 The first surprise was the response, which was remarkable and 
very encouraging; 43 (72%) replied which was a considerably higher 
percentage than was expected. Many were positive, even enthusiastic about 
the matter, enclosing photocopies of parts of the syllabus they taught, 
adding a page of explanatory notes, in order to elaborate on their ideas. 
In one case, five pages of closely argued analysis of texts, ranging from 
the Book of Job to Hamlet, illustrated dilemmas of the intellect and of 
the soul, the mental process from confusion to enlightenment, via various 
levels of realisation, agony and "eureka" type discovery to occasional 
resolution. One said the questionnaire had jogged him into the 
realisation of the importance of the subject and several wished to be 
kept informed of any findings or outcome. In all, 19 different subjects 
.. . 
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were represented by the respondents. All, with one exception, 
acknowledged the existence of dilemmas in their subjects. One wrote that 
"they should be avoided if possible by careful planning." Another thought 
it unprofitable for students to consider the question, because it could 
only lead to confusion in a student's mind. 
10.3.2 Amongst the respondents, 38% said they covered the issue weekly 
. -
and only 2 (3%) said that they never considered the matter. One was a 
biologist (while four other biologists gave several examples from their 
teaching and said it was "very worthwhile"); the other was a 
mathematician (which did not agree with the view of another mathematician 
who claimed to deal with dilemmas regularly). 
10.3.3 When asked what value they would personally place on the 
consideration of "dilemma" type problems in a student's general 
education, all except one thought it "worthwhile" (33% said "very 
worthwhile"). A similar figure thought such problems in vocational 
education to be worthwhile (15%), very worthwhile (33%). Despite the high 
proportion who thought it worthwhile or very worthwhile and who 
considered dilemmas frequently, nearly half of the respondents could not 
recall having had any teacher training or preparation in the recognition 
of resolution of dilemma; even so, there was a substantial number who 
considered dilemmas frequently in their main course; .38% said this was 
weekly, 7% monthly, 18% occasionally and only two respondents who said 
that they never considered the question at all. 
10.3.4 All were asked to give examples of the type of dilemma which 
students considered as part of the course. It was suggested that this 
might perhaps be "a set assignment, an essay topic, part of the 
.. 
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coursework, a practical or experiment". The replies covered a wide range 
of topics and problems, providing evidence that moral issues occur in 
every discipline, particularly in its application. 
There was manifestly no shortage~of examples of the type: 
Which type of energy production should a developing country spend 
its scarce resources on developing? (Geography) 
Siting a chemical plant (Chemistry) 
Funding the Health Service, how to allocate scarce resources 
(Sociology) 
Government economic policy - the need to raise revenue while 
preserving an image as the party of low taxation (Government and 
Politics) 
The morality of feeding grain to cattle in the rich world whilst 
approx one billion starve (Geography) 
Some illustrated a general concern for the study skills and stressful 
choices which students could sometimes face: 
Do I miss lessons to make deadlines or not? 
Students preparing a group demonstration are faced with maintaining 
their individuality (by stressing their own ideas) or accepting 
the dominance of others, so benefitting the group's progress. 
(Theatre Studies) 
A key stage is when a piece of work is nearly finished when it is 
frequently possible for the artist to do something that will 
either brilliantly resolve a piece or ruin it (Art and Design) 
Dealing with young children who exhibit behaviour difficult to 
handle (Health Education) 
It was sometimes difficult to see just how subject specific some dilemmas 
were. For example: 
Revolutionaries in nineteenth century Tsarist Russia - what methods 
to use to effect change, propaganda or assassination? (History) 
The dilemma of GDR citizens in 1989, go west for jobs but leave 
family; friends and home behind. (German) 
Whether to seek full employment or to reduce inflation. (Economics) 
Students are presented data about the candidate drugs and they are 
asked to recommend one of the drugs for further development. 
(Chemistry) 
The impact of science on military decisions. (Physics) 
How much German is required to deal with the GDR emigrant's problem and 
how much Chemistry is required to locate a chemical plant, or Physics to 
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assess the impact of science on military strategy? Arguably very little, 
and the subject knowledge is therefore separable from the dilemma. What 
this reveals is that there are no English dilemmas or Chemistry dilemmas 
as such, but rather issues which can be diagnosed and perceived from a 
particular discipline but not confined within it. On the other hand, a 
decision as to which chemical to develop cannot be taken without 
scientific knowledge; some understanding of Economics is needed to 
allocate scarce resources and knowledge of History is desirable before 
discussing the choices confronting Tsarist revolutionaries. 
10.3.5 This point was considered by the staff discussion group (10.1). 
The question, "Are there any dilemmas in your subject?" is not the same 
as, "Are there any distinctively Physics type dilemmas?" The former can 
legitimately include applied moral issues, of the type "ls it right to 
build a nuclear reactor on that site?" In the same way, students studying 
German might properly be asked to look at current historical or cultural 
issues and thereby face a question about GDR emigrants. But, however 
valid these situations might be as dilemmas, none of them substantiates 
the proposition that there are subject specific dilemmas. This is very 
possibly why one of the scientists claimed that there are no scientific 
dilemmas as such, only dilemmas of application. 
A parallel and well known problem is where to locate Moral Education, 
given that Moral Education is not a distinct discipline (as opposed to 
Moral Philosophy). Should it be taught within other disciplines or as a 
separate subject? Similarly, "Can study skills be a"cquired apart from 
particular studies?" The answer given by most teachers is of a "both-and" 
nature rather than "either-or". As in moral education, there are formal 
characteristic~or skills .of argument and organisation, theory and 
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concept where all the possible exemplars will come from other disciplines 
and cannot effectively be studied apart from them. 
10.4 The Search for a Philosophical Rationale 
Can a philosophical rationale for including dilemma in the curriculum be 
found? This is a deceptively simple question. It suggests that it is 
somehow the business of philosophers to prescribe the content or method 
in education and, moreover, that if and when this is done, there is a 
con~ensus which may be treated as a vade mecum for the guidance of 
educators. 
There are, however, problems with both these suggestions. On 
the question of an agreed consensus, this has never existed in practice. 
Aristotle (1962) expressed his uncertainty like this: 
We must not leave out of sight the nature of education and the 
proper means of imparting it. For at present there is a practical 
dissension on this point; people do not agree on the subjects which 
the young should learn, whether they take virtue in the abstract or 
the best life as the end to be sought, and it is uncertain whether 
education should be properly directed rather to the cultivation of 
the intellect or the moral discipline. The question is complicated, 
too, if we look at the actual education of our own day; nobody knows 
whether the young should be trained at such studies as are merely 
useful as means of livelihood or in such as tend to the promotion of 
virtue or in the higher studies, all of which have received a 
certain number of suffrages. Nor again, if virtue be accepted as the 
end, is there any agreement as to the means of attaining it. 
(7. 2. 13337a33) 
10.4.1 We have seen grounds for thinking that a majority of teachers 
believe that there is indeed a place for including dilemmas in the post 
sixteen curriculum. Many would no doubt call these "philosophical" 
grounds, perhaps linking them with the tradition 'of "liberal education" 
in this Western Europe. But the picture is no clearer when we look at 
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modern liberal democracies. The idea that educators might discover some 
agreed guide, theoretical basis or common practice on which to base their 
policies is fruitless. As Jeffreys (1950) remarked with more than a touch 
of romantic nostalgia: 
The most serious weakness in modern education is the uncertainty 
about its aims. A glance over history reminds that the most vital 
and effective systems of education'have envisaged their objectives 
quite definitely, in terms of personal qualities and social 
situations. Spartan, Feudal, Jesuit, Nazi, Communist educations have 
had this in common, they knew what they wanted to do and believed in 
it. By contrast, education in the liberal democracies is 
distressingly nebulous in its aims. (p61) 
10.4.2 O'Hear (1981) had no doubt that philosophy could provide a 
supportive rationale: 
One's philosophy of education .. will be distinct from a sociology 
of education; reflecting one's values and concept of what men (sic) 
ought to be, as opposed to what they might be in any particular 
society. It also ... reflects one's ideals for society as a whole. 
In saying that a philosophy of education reflects one's concept of 
what men ought to be, it can be distinguished from a psychology of 
education. Human nature is not something that is just given. It is 
something we can make something of, in the light of how we conceive 
ourselves and others ... So a philosophy of education will attempt to 
specify a set of educational aims, justifying them in the light of 
our general ethical values. (pI) 
On the other hand, Peters (1973) doubted if was sensible to ask about the 
aims of education. He found it an odd philosophical question. In'his 
view, at best it served as a "salutary request for teachers to survey 
what they are doing, get their priorities straight, concentrate their 
attention on them, and discard irrelevancies" (p14). 'He would have us 
concentrate on worthwhile activities, implied by the meaning of the word 
"education" itself and leave aside thoughts of distant goals: 
To be educated is not to have arrived at a destination; it is to 
travel with a different view. What is required is not feverish 
preparation for something that lies ahead, but to work with 
precision, passion, and taste at worth-while things that lie to 
hand. (1965 plIO) 
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Thus Peters undercut the search for a philosophical rationale by denying 
what he called the "layman's view that the task of the philosopher is to 
provide some kind of synoptic directive for living" (1964 p8). 
Approaching the question of educational aims from the analytic tradition, 
Peters argued that the word 'educatJon' like 'reform' had a norm built 
into it, which "functions as a very distant target for such activities ... 
'Education', like_'reform' picks out a family of processes culminating in 
a person being better II ( 1973 pIS). 
Whilst this view has been strongly challenged (e.g. Woods and Dray 1973), 
it can safely be concluded that unless one can find a prior argument for 
saying that recognizing and resolving dilemmas is a "worthwhile" activity 
in itself, being adept at which is to be a better person, philosophy will 
not provide one. Perhaps, as Vernon (1942) said of the place of 
psychology in education, philosophy has a more lowly role to play: 
Educational psychology is in many respects an advanced and highly 
technical form of applied science. Owing to the nature of the 
material with which it deals, it is more comparable to medicine 
than, say, to physical engineering; it cannot by itself give 
answers to definite questions about the art of teaching~ Still less 
can it affirm the soundness of educational policies or ideals; 
perhaps it is more often useful in a negative way, that is in 
indicating what principles are unsound. (p99) 
10.4.4 A different line of argument can be developed based on the idea 
of a liberal education. The consideration of moral values (and dilemmas 
amongst them) together with the ideas of generality and breadth are often 
attributed to thi~ tradition, which is central to the educational 
practices and institutions of most western countries, at least until 
recently. O'Hear (1981) describes a liberal education as consisting in: 
Initiating students into disciplines such as those of mathematics, 
science, history literature and the arts .... students are to be 
taught by teachers who have some claim to authority in what they 
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teach ..• All involved .. are to be guided by the standards of 
excellence inherent in the disciplines concerned, wherever these 
standards might lead, even into conflict with church or state .. it 
is not primarily vocational or practical. (p4) 
Recognising that a liberal education is a process concerned directly with 
the pursuit of knowledge, Hirst, (1973) defines education in terms of 
"man's knowledge of what is the case." As knowledge is itself a 
. 
distinctive human virtue, "liberal education has a value for the person 
as the fulfilment·of the mind, a value which has nothing to do with 
utilitarian or vocational considerations" (p88). This inevitably involves 
a consideration of values, the source of which, Hirst argued, cannot be 
found in religious, political or utilitarian theories; these are always 
open to debate and doubt. He sought a more "ultimate basis for the values 
that should determine education, some more objective ground". This, Hirst 
claimed, is discovered if one ensures that knowledge corresponds to 
objective reality. "A liberal education in the pursuit of knowledge is, 
therefore, seeking the development of the mind according to what is quite 
external to it, the structure and pattern of reality" (p90). From this 
position Hirst developed his argument for there being discrete forms of 
knowledge, which he summarised as follows: 
(I) Distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge (subdivisible: 
mathematics, physical sciences, humans sciences, history, religion, 
literature and the fine arts, philosophy. 
(II) Fields of knowledge: theoretical, practical (these mayor may 
not include elements of moral knowledge). 
It is the distinct disciplines that basically constitute the range 
of unique ways we have of understanding experience if to these is 
added moral knowledge (pl0S). 
The subsequent debate led many practitioners to identify Hirst's "forms 
of knowledge" with a list of subject disciplines (something he was 
reluctant to do) and thereby to derive a school' curriculum. The 
conclusion of this argument is that the consideration of dilemma would 
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find a place within the "moral knowledge", which is rather untidily 
"added" to the other forms of knowledge. 
10.4.5 Since Hirst's attempt to categorise objective knowledge, in order 
,. 
to find a sound basis for a liberal education,. there have been many other 
attempts to subdivide the elements required in a satisfactory curriculum. 
Phenix (1964), who proposed six "Realms of Meaning" which were 
characteristically "human" argued that: 
The highest good to be served by education is the fullest possible 
realization of the aistinctively human capacities and that these 
capacities consist in the life of meaning. Hence the course of study 
should be such as to maximize meanings. (p267) 
Amongst other attempts may be mentioned the H.M.I. Report (1977) which 
argued pragmatically for eight "Areas of Experience" (p30). Since then 
there have been increasingly utilitarian attempts to hijack the 
curriculum in order to serve technological or industrial or social 
purposes. What, for the purposes of this study, is significant is that 
there is in practice no difficulty in locating the consideration of 
dilemmas within the curriculum, although it would be hard to~justify it 
as a distinct "Form of Knowledge", "Realm of Meaning" or "Area of 
Experience". 
10.4.6 In this century a number of objections to a "liberal education" 
have been voiced. O'Hear (1981) identifies five: first, it is sometimes 
said to be unnatural. The liberal intellectual becomes cut off from his 
natural roots. His education is contrasted sharply and critically with a 
natural peasant life, one of simplicity, self-sufficiency, manual work, 
closeness to nature, fraternity, honour and hospitality. The intellectual 
may be clever but he is not wise. This idealistic picture of an education 
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which corrupts innocent children is associated with the writings of 
Tolstoy and Rousseau. 
Second, liberal education can be described as irreligious, in so far as it 
gives priority to wordly and secular distractions which can conflict with 
religious dogma. A fundamentalist approach to education (O'Hear quotes 
examples from Protestant groups such as the Amish i~ North America, some 
Moslems and some~Catholics) will not approve of education taking place in 
an irreligious (or even neutral) setting and would certainly wish to 
censor certain topics (such as biological evolution or sexual ethics) 
from being considered at all. 
Third, a liberal education can be thought of as undemocratic; the 
teacher, by being regarded as the expert in pursuit of excellence, can 
easily impose both content and method of learning upon pupils, whose 
voice and cooperation are essential in a democratic community. Fourth, a 
number of left wing sociologists have advocated radical reforms in 
education, even the abandonment of schooling altogether. Fifth, it can be 
seen as irrelevant to the experience of most participants and should be 
reformed to be based on the objects and concepts familiar to pupils. 
10.4.7 None of these alternative "philosophies" of education affects the 
need to face up to dilemmas. It will be apparent, however, that 
totalitarian or fundamentalist doctrines are unsympathetic to any 
position which allows, even extols, the notion of doubt. It has been said 
that "the sane man doubts often, the drunkard seldom and the madman 
never", but this, whilst welcome in a liberal education born in the 
religious disputes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and 
favouring tolerance, would be considered morally feeble and 
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intellectually indecisive in opposing traditions. 
O'Hear declares roundly that "what we want to do in schooling is to 
prepare pupils for adult life", a view which would be endorsed by most 
practitioners although it begs the questions that most would want to 
debate (about precise content or method). In so far as the case has been 
established that the experience of dilemmas is a common feature of adult, 
and indeed adolescent, life, they have a place within the curriculum. 
10.4.8 When we consider where to locate the study of dilemmas, the same 
arguments that can be brought against teaching moral education as a 
separate subject apply equally to the consideration of dilemmas. Whilst 
moral philosophy, in so far as it has a place in the post sixteen 
curriculum (and I would want to say that it does), would need to be 
treated separately, there is a strong case for considering dilemmas, like 
moral education itself, not in terms of a specific subject but rather as 
pervading the whole college in all its activities. The moral dimension 
and dilemma with it, would be considered in each discipline and in every 
activity, not given a special label and confined to a particular room or 
spot on the timetable. 
10.4.9 Teachers can frequently find themselves in dilemmatic situations. 
The practical activity of teaching will often reflect the principles 
demanded by opposing theoretical positions. One such situation, the 
conflict between a transmission oriented education and a progressive, 
child centred one was described and analysed by Billig (1988). The 
problem is "how to 'bring out' of children what" is not there to begin 
with, how to ensure that they 'discover' what they are meant to" (p54). 
Using the dialogue in the Meno (Plato 1956), Billig argues that the role 
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of Socrates is similar to that of the classroom teacher: 
He remains in control of the talk, governing the taking of turns at 
speaking, closing the boy's options even to an extent that we have 
not witnessed in schools, by merely inviting affirmations of ready-
made propositions- the familiar 'leading questions' of the 
courtroom. The assumption implicit in Socrates's account of the 
process, that he will 'simply ask him questions without teaching 
him', is that questions do not carry information, that they may not 
inform and persuade, command and convince. O( course this is a 
demonstrably false assumption. (p60) 
Although Plato's theory of anamnesis can be distinguished from the use of 
"leading questions", Billig is concerned to make the point that the 
teachers he interviewed tried to find a place for both the progressive 
and the transmission oriented traditions and thus resolve their dilemma 
by practical compromise in any given situation. 
10.4.10 Winter (1982) was concerned by a problem which frequently arose 
in action research, namely the difficulty of summarising and analysing a 
mass of interview data from teaching practice. Finding widely used 
methods inadequate (analysis by content, themes or social science theory) 
he devised a method which he terms "Dilemma Analysis". His aim was to be 
"faithful to the views of students, classroom teachers, and pupils, as 
well as those of fellow supervisors", to their different aim~, priorities 
and philosophical positions (pI67). He wished to "evoke the main areas of 
tension in the situation without generating immediate controversy by 
seeming partisan", which would lead to the point of view being rejected. 
The formal theory underpinning this method, which he called "loosely" the 
sociological concept of contradiction, was: 
That social organizations at all levels (from the classroom to the 
State) are constellations of (actual or potential) conflicts of 
interest; that personality structures are split and convoluted; that 
the individual's conceptualization is systematically ambivalent or 
dislocated; that motives are mixed, purposes are contradictory and 
relationships are ambiguous; and that the formulations of practical 
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action is unendingly beset by dilemmas. (pI68) 
He analyzed each group of statements into a number of expressions of 
dilemma, tension, or contradiction, which he categorised as Ambiguities 
(tensions and awareness of complexities which do not require action), 
Judgments (courses of action·which are complex, but not seen in negative 
terms - they are merely interesting) and Problems ("courses of action 
where the tensions and ambiguities seem to undermine the validity of the 
-
action, the rationality of the action required"). By means of this 
framework, he condensed the material into four "perspective documents", 
each one summarizing the responses of teachers, students, supervisors and 
pupils respectively. He concluded: 
My argument has been that this method produces an analysis which is 
fully responsive to the concerns and definitions of interviewees. It 
retains something of the structural complexity of the original 
statments, and produces a thematic ordering whose coherence does 
not depend on academics' theories of practitioners' behaviour, not 
simply on researchers' hunches and prior commitments. (pI73) 
10.4.11 Experiencing dilemmas and being able to reflect upon them can be 
a time of learning and growth and one of the most powerful justifications 
of the consideration of dilemma in a person's education is to be found in 
Nussbaum (1985). She bases her argument on the practical conflicts in 
Greek tragedy, especially the slaughter of Iphigenia by Agamemnon: 
I must now add, with the Agamemnon Chorus, that the experience of 
conflict can also be a time of learning and development .•• hard 
cases like these, if one allows oneself really to see and to 
experience them, may bring progress along with their sorrow, a 
progress that comes from an increase in self-knowledge and knowledge 
of ~he world. An honest effort to do justice to all aspects of a 
hard cas~, seeing and feeling it in all its conflicting many-
sidedness,. could enrich future deliberative efforts. Through the 
experience of choice, Eteocles might have discovered cares to which justice had not previously been done; Agamemnon might have come to a 
new understanding of piety and of the love he owes his family. 
(p260) 
It is a regrettable fact of experience that it often takes the shock of 
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suffering to help one to learn many of the values of human 
relationships, to discover self-knowledge and to make us examine our 
lives afresh. It would be inconceivable to plan this as part of the 
curriculum. We must, therefore, take seriously 111ich's observations 
(1973) that "most learning happens casually" (p20), that "we have all 
learned most of what we know outside school .. everyone learns how to live 
outside school. We learn to speak, to think, to love, to feel, to play, 
to curse, to politick and to work without interference from a teacher" 
(p35). This undervalues the part of reflection and the opportunities to 
reflect, to reason and to be guided in forming a balanced judgment occur 
predominantly within schools and colleges. Taken with Nussbaum's remarks, 
this is the fundamental justification for considering both the 
recognition and resolution of dilemmas during adolescent educational 
experience. 
10.5 The Role of the Counsellor 
Student counselling has developed greatly in the last thirty years. Prior 
to that the counse1Jing was undertaken by chaplains, and by the one to 
one relationship offered by tutors. The pastoral side of a tutor's role, 
giving individual advice and assistance, has long been a distinct feature 
in European education. Today, there are numerous training schemes and 
courses and, although the first American course in counsellor education 
was offered by Harvard University in the summer of 1911, the impact of the 
-
new discipline of counselling and guidance did not make a significant 
impact upon further and Higher education in this country until the 
1960's. By 1973 the Association for Student Counselling had almost 200 
members, by 1992 membership had risen to 552. Today by far the majority 
of Universities and Further Education colleges have the services at least 
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of a part-time counsellor. 
10.5.1 Counsellors deal with the given. They are trained not to let 
their preconceptions intrude into the needs of their clients. It is one 
thing to hold an opinion on .the existence of dilemmas; it is quite 
another to counsel students who perceive themselves in the middle of one. 
In theory, their choices of attitude might be: either dilemmas do not 
really exist and there is no need to accommodate them for they are merely 
problems awaiting a solution. Or dilemmas do exist, but they are mistaken 
perceptions and there is a need to re-educate the student to see things 
correctly. Or they do exist and there is a need to counsel the regret and 
remorse or guilt. Or they do exist and are to be welcomed. Thus, it ought 
to be of little consequence whether or not individual counsellors 
personally believe in the existence of genuine dilemmas. The counsellor 
might wish to persuade students to cut through the problem, to clarify it, 
to reach a reasonable solution. 
10.6 late Adolescence a Distinctive Period 
As tutors and counsellors would attest, late adolescence is a 
particularly interesting period of development. Several modern studies 
(e.g. Marcia 1980, Erikson 1968) reveal 16-19 year olds to be a distinct 
group, on the threshold of adulthood. Louizos (1994) in a study of sixth 
form college students "confirmed late adolescence as a distinct phase in 
the life cycle, qualitatively different to the earlier·teenage years ... 
Lessons have been learned from it and incorporated into new structures 
and strategies for dealing with life" (p54). 
Writers have described this period variously as a time of "turmoil" 
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(Offer, 1969), the "doldrums" (Winnicott, 1968), a ~normative crisis" 
(Erikson, 1968). Noonan (1983) specifically likens this whole period to 
living in a permanent dilemma: 
The active and emotionally energetic process of mourning provides a 
model for the adolescence transition, since both are attempts to 
achieve a sense of personal continuity out of the confusion of 
drastic disruption ... It is easiest to see and describe the mourning 
process when the loss is stark, when someone actually dies and 
cannot be retrieved in any physical way. The survivor is faced with 
a dilemma: of letting the dead person go while still giving him 
space in life as a living if not palpable being .... (p3) 
We can sometimes feel that our childhood has been irretrievably 
lost. For instance we can return to our family, home and childhood 
haunts and relationships, but they will never be as they were when 
we left them, because we and they have done things in the meantime 
.•• Personal maturation requires some things to be yielded to make 
way for new ones; it requires us to convert childhood into a memory 
which is alive, if not palpable, inside us, and this means we have 
to mourn aspects of our child-self so they may be internalized. 
(p.5) 
As late adolescents, students are acquiring independence from parents, 
from society, from each other, in an effort to gain "identity status" 
which according to Erikson "(1968) means "the accrued confidence that 
one's ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity (one's ego in the 
psychological sense) is matched by the sameness and continuity of one's 
meaning for others" (p159). 
Marcia (1966) developed Erikson's concept of "identity" and provided a 
specific model of "ego identity", offering a precise analysis. Bi1sker 
(1992) adapted these ideas through the eyes of an existentialist and 
stressed the freedom of individual choice which each adolescent has in 
"' . 
breaking away from previous constraints. Certainly, the interviews with 
students (7.0) revealed a sense of freedom, rather than a sense of being 
imprisoned and determined. 
- 221 -
10.6.1 Students have difficulties peculiar to their age group. There are 
several lists of such problems. Lago and Shipton (1994) provide a summary 
which includes: relationship difficulties, with parents and other family 
members, "learning how to get into intimate relationships, but just as 
importantly, how to leave them is a major concern"; academic 
difficulties, impaired performance (study skills, writing or 
presentation), exam problems, loss of motivation (apathy) and failure 
with its aftermath; there are emotional and psychological problems, a 
wide category which "covers all kinds of anxiety, depression, eating 
disorders, adjustment to loss and bereavement, self image; self-defeating 
patterns of behaviour, obsessional thinking; and also fears and stresses 
caused by illhealth or disability" (p27-34). They also list problems 
linked to transitions, homesickness and new academic demands. 
Louizos (1994) found that students rarely admitted to having problems. 
"Most students claimed to have few problems and even fewer serious ones" 
(p44). There was a general reluctance to disclose, based on the fear of 
not being understood and of getting too close to others. The need to feel 
"really understood" governed the choice of confidant(e), whether friend, 
parent or counsellor. The most common coping strategy was found to be 
self-reliance "as only oneself can truly understand". The importance of 
privacy and resistance to intrusion was confirmed by the evidence. 
10.6.2 The danger of using category lists of problems is that this 
"predetermines the options in how a problem might be defined" (Lago and 
Shipton 1994 p27). Nor do they help our investigation beyond alerting 
counsellors-and tutors to the kinds of issue which might form the raw 
material of a dilemma. Whatever school or training (and it is not part of 
this study to evaluate counselling theory) the counsellor will be working 
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with tutors and supporting them. Their role is also changing. Tutors in 
post 16 colleges today occupy not only an adult role model but also 
operate as friend, a peculiarly difficult half-way position in which to 
operate; they are the professional expert and facilitator but also they 
are seen to be just the other side of the fully adult threshold. 
10.6.3 One approach to the analysis of interviews with students about 
their dilemmas is to distinguish between two"standpoints, that of the 
observer and that of the interviewee. There are two sets of questions 
which then become apparent: 
THE OBSERVER 
(1) Is this a "genuine" dilemma? 
(2) Has it been resolved? 
(3) What alternatives are there? 
(4) Is there a deadline or pressure 
to reach a decision? 
(5) Is there a moral decision to 
be made? 
(6) How isolated is the subject? 
THE INTERVIEWEE 
Does the subject acknowledge 
any sense of loss, regret or 
guilt? 
Did the subject resolve the 
issue? 
Has the subject considered any 
alternatives? 
Does the subject experience 
stress or pressure? 
I s there ev i denc'e of 
awareness or concern for the 
moral issues? 
How isolated does the 
subject feel? 
(7) Is the subject a victim of determining Does the subject feel 
factors, necessity, luck? trapped, under constraint? 
(8) Is the expressed dilemma a cover 
for other concerns? 
Is the subject aware of 
other concerns? 
10.6.4 ~Perhaps the most important lesson of this study, as far as the 
counsellor :is concerned, is that students do ~xperience dilemmas, as well 
as problems and that they are capable of distinguishing between the two; 
that, nevertheless, they are reluctant to admit to either; that they wish 
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to be self reliant and to resolve them if possible without help, and so 
avoid relapsing into a form of dependency from which they are, as young 
adults, just emerging; above all, that they need to be able to face the 
uncertainties and ambiguities implied by dilemma, the post decisional 
conflicts, the doubts, regrets and occasionally the guilt which they 
carry with them afterwards. Reflective common sense is likely to be their 
only aid. Standing by to listen when invited, responding without "giving 
the answers" or removing from the students their ownership of the 
decision; is probably the most valuable role which the counsellor and 
tutor can fulfill. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An intellectual interest in the concept of dilemma and an abiding 
professional concern to improve the educational experience of young 
adults combined to provide the focus of this research. In the first 
place, the researcher has, over many years, _peen fascinated with the 
concept of dilemma and with such questions as whether moral perplexity in 
principle could be soluble, as Brennan (1977 p135) thought, despite its 
complexity and even when rooted in differences of belief. 
Together with this, there has been a longstanding interest in the way 
different people respond to the strong attraction of two choices, the 
cast of mind that can accept valid alternatives, tolerate ambiguity, yet 
can, without mental paralysis, make a reasoned decision on the basis of 
reflection and common sense. As Rockeach (1960) thought, there seems to 
be, at one end of a continuum, a closed way of-thinking, an authoritarian 
outlook, an intolerance towards those with opposing beliefs ~nd, at the 
other end, an open mind. With this researcher, as with Rockeach, there 
has been an engrosstng interest, "in the structure rather than the 
content of beliefs" (p6) and the possibility that one might "predict how 
a person will go about solving problems that have nothing to do with his 
(sic) ideology" (p7). 
Secondly, there has been a determined concern to ensure that, however 
goal orientated or utilitarian the education of adolescents became, space 
in the curriculum would be protected in orde~ that they might develop 
their own academic interests, practise making their own judgments and 
consider matters of moral application. This has meant resisting the 
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allure of a "general studies" programme consisting of hobbies, light 
relief and games, which is what many consider the content to be and which 
clog the timetable, giving the idea of non-examination courses a poor 
reputation. These were the two interests which have been at the root of 
this research. 
At the-outset, the working definition of "dilemma" was "a particular ~ype 
of predicament, which is experienced by everyone at some time or another 
(which) occurs when the pressing alternatives available to us, or serious 
obligations we face, seem so evenly balanced that it is hard, and 
sometimes impossible, to make a choice" (1.1). 
Gradually, other insights and emphases were added. In particular, there 
was the notion of regret,· opportunity cost and sometimes guilt which can 
adhere to a decision. This can be stated in anecdotal form, as Socrates 
is reported to have said, "Whatever you do you will regret it" (Laertius 
1972 p163). Alternatively, in logic, dilemma can be defined as "a form of 
argument, the purpose of which is to prove that from either of two 
alternatives an unwelcome conclusion follows" (Stebbings 1965 p5I). Or, 
it may be put more neutrally: "A situation in which an agent S morally 
ought to do A and morally ought to do B but cannot do both" (Gowans 1987 
p3). Most illumination on definitions, however, came from the individual 
perplexities which were considered, for example, Norah in Ibsen's A 
Doll's House, deciding to leave her family and home, or the student 
deciding to give up former friends in preference to forming new ones 
(interview 15). 
The research objectives for this study were set out in chapter 3. They 
were, first, "to provide insights into our· understanding of the 
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experience of dilemma"; second, "to establish the case for including 
examples of dilemma more methodically in educational programmes" and 
third, "to assist counsellors, tutors and others whose work puts them in 
dai 1 ycontact with young adul ts. " 
A fair claim can be made that these objectives have been met and that the 
outcomes provide a useful contribution to w~at we know both about the 
concept and about the experience of dilemma (with special reference to 
16-19 year olds) in an educational framework. An attempt will now be made 
to draw together the main threads of argument from the six different 
perspectives wh~ch have been considered. First, however, there are some 
methodological difficulties and criticisms which need to be considered. 
11.1 Some Advantages and Disadvantages in using Triangulation 
There are problems as well as advantages in using a multi perspective 
method. Studies of dilemma are relatively rare and, where they exist, are 
usually written from one perspective - the philosophical, as ~ikely as 
not, (see Gowans 1987, though a notable exception is Billig 1987). 
Bringing together examples from a wide range of standpoints and different 
points of view enriches our understanding of this subject and provides a 
cross-check on our conclusions but at the same time raises certain 
difficulties. As Parlett and Dearden (1981) wrote: "The extensive use of 
open-ended techniques, progressive focusing, and qualitative data in 
illuminative evaluation still raises the possibility of gross partiality 
on the part of the investigator" (p21). 
They offer a number of "precautionary tactics", such as using other 
researchers to question one's interpretations, playing devil's advocate 
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and, above all, making the assumptions explicit and more open to 
challenge. Their main defence against this line of criticism is, however, 
that it is fundamentally flawed; in their view (and in the opinion of 
this researcher), it is false to assume that there can be forms of 
research which are "immune to prejudice, experimenter bias and human 
error" (p21). 
In this study, assumptions have been made explicit to the reader and 
potential bias has been explored by consideration being given to 
alternative explanations. This has been achieved by pitting the various 
viewpoints against each other, each perspective interrogating the others, 
and by presenting the various arguments for discussion to fellow 
researchers, to colleague teachers and to teacher participants in the 
study. 
11.1.1 Other difficulties should be acknowledged. It is an inevitable 
disadvantage of the triangulation technique that it should leave itself 
open to the charge of achieving breadth of illumination only at the 
expense of depth of study. No claim has been made to any specialist 
knowledge (nor would it have been feasible to acquire it) when discussing 
the six perspectives. One recommendation, therefore, w~uld be for 
specific studies, in the light of this multi faceted analysis of the 
concept and experience of dilemma, to take this research further. For 
example, it would be interesting to see an empirical study of students' 
post decisional responses. Also, a strong recommendation would be that, 
given more time and resources, a more thorough analysis of the responses 
by the Heads of Department on teaching dilemma should be undertaken. 
These should, however, be designed deliberately to complement one another 
and to take into account the broader overview, if only to challenge it. 
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11.1.2 A conscious preference was made for a multi perspective study in 
this research. Nevertheless, a method which attempts to reunite 
fragmented knowledge in order to provide a modern, renaissance overview, 
might give the impression of being something of a pastiche. A harsh 
critic might consider,that this study has tried to combine too many 
ideas" that against a background of philosophical wrangles and 
psychological conjectures, there is assembled a sprig of classical 
rhetoric-, a small pinch of quasi Marxist conflict theory, a dash of 
dilemmatic syllogism, a touch from the "dirty hands" political debate, 
topped off by current bio ethical issues, TV discussions of personal 
dilemmas and sundry examples from literature ancient and modern. The 
result might be thought somewhat dilettante. 
It is vital, therefore, to underline that the illuminative approach was 
deliberately chosen on the grounds that the advantages were judged to 
outweigh those of a specialist analysis, which in isolation might not 
reflect the breadth and diversity of the human experience of dilemma 
situations. Without acknowledgment of other perspectives, such a 
specialist study is likely to be unbalanced. To achieve both breadth and 
depth, therefore, individual studies must be designed to complement each 
other as suggested in 11.1.1. 
11.1.3 The third pitfall in using various disciplines is the possibility 
of semantic confusions. Different studies, each employing their own 
specialist language, can sometimes use different, terms to describe 
similar ideas. In chapters 2 and 5, considerable attention was paid to 
the definition of dilemma. Some of the differences that were encountered 
were more verbal than substantial. For example, it is fairly clear that 
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the concept of "dilemma" that Billig acknowledges, indeed welcomes (see 
9.3.4), is not at all the same as that which Conee denies and deplores 
(SA 2.1). On the other hand it does seem that we have a head to head 
disagreement between the "conflict of duties" said by Kant to be 
"inconceivable" (2.8) and the "moral conflict" which Williams allows (58 
11). We, therefore, have to be equally aware of agreements, or 
disagreements, which may be more apparent than real, or which may be more 
tenable or conceivable in theory than they are in practice. 
In another case, there is little to distinguish the expression "post 
decisional regret" or "dissonance," as used by psychologists (8.0), from 
"remainder", as employed by Williams (58) or simply "second thoughts" as. 
described by students. Similarly, Sinnott's "relativistic uncertainty" 
(8.3.3) occupies the same philosophical ground as Fletcher's "situation 
ethics" (58.9). The word "guilt" as used in Personal Construct Theory by 
Kelly (8.7) means something very different from the same word used by 
Fraassen (58 13). Further, where Greenspan, like Statman (58 12), 
justified "guilt", in certain cases, there is a genuine difference of 
view from that of Conee. It is important, therefore, in comparing 
different perspectives to be aware of these dangers in the use of 
specialised language. In this study, the meaning embod~ed by the words 
has been sought in order to avoid being misled by the words themselves. 
11.2 Common Sense Evidence for the Existence of Genuine Dilemmas 
Turnjng directly to the conclusions and recommendations of this study, 
the first to be stressed, and a consistent theme throughout is that both 
a contingent basis and a theoretical justification can be found for the 
claim that genuine dilemmas are experienced. The evidence for this 
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conclusion has been derived from a number of sources: the interviews with 
students, which left one in no doubt that the experience was well known; 
the response by the Heads of department, whose surprising level of 
interest supported the concept; the examples from literature, which, in 
so far as the latter derive from real situations and reflect human life 
accurately, cannot be dismissed lightly as mistaken. 
11.2.1 The students interviewed had little doubt what they meant by the 
term "d·ilemma". In 7.0 it is shown how some stressed the serious nature 
of a genuine dilemma, others the idea that someone would be hurt 
whichever alternative was chosen, and others that it was the regret or 
guilt that they wished to emphasise: 
A decision where the consequences of your taking action in either 
way may be beneficial or not as the case may be and you find it hard 
to decide what to do. (Interview 8) 
I guess something that doesn't have obvious reasons for and 
against, or has equal reasons. (Interview 9) 
Something you really have to wrestle with yourself to decide what 
to do. (Interview 14) 
The Heads of Department survey also revealed a near unanimous conviction 
that dilemmas existed and were worth studying as part of both examination 
and non examination courses. To deny that they genuinely existed would 
mean overriding the considered views of experienced and intelligent 
practitioners. 
Finally, the variety of reported dilemma strengthens one's confidence in 
the ~oncept. This study has considered political issues, examples from 
the public domain, such as medical ethics, dilemmas of deterrence, 
ideological dilemmas, the "dirty hands" debate, subject specific 
dilemmas, everyday quandaries and perplexities of a personal nature, as 
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well as evidence from students' lives. The conclusion which was reached 
reinforced the common sense assumption that genuine dilemmas are of great 
variety. It is recommended that a future study might explain further the 
procedural processes used in recognizing and resolving dilemmas in other 
fields such as, military decisions, scientific research, business ethics 
and international relations. 
11.2.2 As a consequence, therefore, strong disagreement was expressed 
with the theoretical standpoint that the moral and other contradictions 
which are experienced in practice and described by thinking people are 
merely cases of confusion that can best be resolved by clarity of 
thought. This study would claim that, .to argue as does Hare (1981) that 
moral conflict which is "intuitively" perceived can be eliminated by the 
use of "critical" thought, is to demean all experience as "prima facie" 
and potentially mistaken. 
Such philosophical arguments against dilemmas simply do not stand up 
against the phenomenological evidence. Although some apparent dilemmas 
might turn out to be merely practical problems (e.g. the case of which of 
two children to save from a fire, or which operation will have the 
greatest chance of success), others are genuine in the ,sense that it 
would be artificial and patronising to deny them from one's armchair and 
to see them simply as cases of confusion. The prioritist, monist and 
single principle arguments against the genuine existence of conflicting 
obligations were, therefore, rejected in this research (SA and 58) where· 
the ~onclusion was that we would need to set out with an a priori 
definition that excluded dilemmas, which could only be done at the 
. expense of understanding the lived experience. 
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11.2.3 The preferred standpoint in this study has been that form of 
pluralism which was described by Gaut as a "reflectively improved version 
of common sense morality" (see also Hampshire, Williams amongst others S8 
4). Pluralism, it is argued in this research, conforms best with the 
common sense observation that there are conflicting moral duties, not 
only between different cultures, religious standpoints and ethical 
positions, but even within the same tradition. Relativism and Situation 
Ethics allows for the same principle to be applied differently in 
different circumstances. In Bonhoeffer's example (S8 9), the obligation 
to tell the truth does not have the same force when applied to the parent 
as it does to_the child. Hampshire's view that "the capacity to think 
scatters a range of differences and conflicts before us" (S8 4) neatly 
supports Billig's argument that common sense in our Western culture 
contains contradictions which are an essential prerequisite of the 
ability to think or debate (9.3), as does Gaut's reference to an 
inherited :raft of moral convictions, which has been passed on to us by 
our parents and fellows from our culture, altered and refined by the 
common understanding of previous ages" (9.4). 
11.2.4 Other philosophical arguments against the existence of genuine 
dilemmas were considered but rejected. The rules of d~ontic logic, as 
Gowans argued (see S8 IS) are not the same as a1ethic logic; they do not 
rule out conflicting a11-things-considered duties .. Whi1st they would make 
it incoherent to have two opposing "must" prescriptions, the fundamental 
challenge of a dilemma is that the subject has not yet reached the point of 
saying "I must". Agents are is still at the stage of trying to decide between 
(at least) two "oughts", which it is not. incoherent to compare. Often, in 
fact, it is the consideration of "all things" that itself gives rise to the 
dilemma. 
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One aspect of this, which was touched on in ·2.2 and 58 8 and which it 
would have been useful to explore further, given time, is Brennan's 
argument that the moral perspective can always be distinguished from the 
pragmatic. "A moral judgment ..• is not the intonation of 'right' or 
'wrong' over an array of neutral facts. It is the answer to a question 
which is raised only within a situation which has been structured by a 
moral concept" (19977 p35). He gives as an illustration the Bernini 
colonnade in St Peter's Square: 
If one takes up the proper point of view - namely, one of the two 
foci of the ellipse - what is from any other vantage point an 
undifferentiated conglomeration of columns sorts itself into neat, 
rank-and-file order so that only the front rank is visible ..•. The 
moral of this is that one can classify things the same way from 
only one point of view. (p54) 
In this study, it has not been accepted that "moral" can always be 
distinguished from "non-moral" (see 2.2) because the practical situation 
is usually too complex to be susceptible to such a cognitive taxonomy. It 
is recommended, however, that a philosophical study examining this 
contention is undertaken. 
11.2.5 Regarding the argument from remainders, it must be admitted that 
feelings of regret do not of themselves prove that anything is 
regrettable (Foot 1983 p382), nor that anyone is culpable. The existence 
of remainders does not on its own establish the existence of dilemma. 
However, if we allow that in some cases guilt is appropriate, we indicate 
our belief that a genuine dilemma has been experienced. It may well be 
the case ·that guilt is sometimes irrational, that it is occasionally 
implanted by a persuasive speaker, or that it may be the result of an 
over scrupulous conscience. This is not the point at issue. The person 
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who experiences the regret, guilt or remorse is convinced that his or her 
feeling is appropriate and, however much the rationalist may like to 
dismiss the assertion as subjective or misplaced, this can only be done 
by applying an external, and therefore different, standard, to prove the 
case. It may be that this standard is also subjective or misplaced but, 
while we dispute the issue, the person's guilt needs to be faced and 
perhaps counselled. 
11.2.6 Having considered dilemma from the perspective of moral 
philosophy, the study concludes, inter alia: (a) that a rational basis, 
as well as contingent evidence, has been established for speaking of 
"dilemmas"; (b-) that dilemmas may be irresolvable, because morality is 
multi principled; (c) they may be resolvable, but leave a remainder of 
reasonable regret; (d) dilemmas may be in the public or private domain. 
11.3 The BDirty Hands· Argument 
In 6.0 it was suggested that the "dirty hands" debate represents a 
particular instance of the ethical argument. The recommendations which 
emerged from that discussion could be summarised briefly as follows: (a) 
in public life, there are not two spheres with separate moral codes, but 
one with the same moral code applied in different ways as appropriate to 
the situation; (b) there is no escaping an occasional conflict of 
obligations for anyone in a post of responsibility; (c) as it is 
inevitable, we had better prepare for it, learn how to respond 
appropriately and how to live with the consequences. In other words, 
getting one's hands "dirty" goes with the job;" it is inescapable in 
positions which represent a variety of codes of behaviour, where one is 
required to negotiate with others of a different or no moral standpoint. 
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Nor is there escape from responsibility by recourse to the utilitarian 
argument that "where the act accuses, the result excuses" (Machiavelli, 
Discourses book 1 chapter IX). Machiavelli was clear that learning "how 
not to be good" still left you, a guilty if successful leader, within the 
one moral sphere applicable to all human beings (6.1.4). 
It was suggested (6.2.7) that the fact that experience of dilemma was 
universal and inevitable did not mean that the postholder was exonerated 
from all blame, allowed to live in a cocoon of alternative moralities. 
What was required of individuals was neither a Krishna-like detachment 
from the moral maze (58 6.1), nor an escape from their obligations altogether, 
but, as Walzer-suggests (6.1.5), an appropriate attitude of humility and 
penitence, a willingness to make reparation when possible (unlike 
Agamemnon), to take responsibility for the decision they had taken and to 
remain sensitive to the codes they had transgressed. 
It was argued (6.0) that this conflict between the judgments made as a 
private individual and those made when occupying a post of responsibility 
applied not only to politicians or generals, but club secretaries, 
college governors, prefects, board directors, members of foreign 
delegations, insurance brokers, in fact to any person with an obligation 
to satisfy clients as well as employers, and towards a private as well 
as a public code. What was true of Creon or Agamemnon is equally true of 
any person who holds a position of responsibility. The problem is not a 
measure of the importance of the post but a reflection of the role 
conflict encountered. It is recommended that further study might compare 
the· responses of adults with those of adolescents in regard to the 
recognition and resolution of dilemmas (as was originally intended in 
this research, had time allowed). 
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11.4 Situations which cannot be Replicated 
It has been emphasised (eg 10.5) that a knowledge of the context is 
critical if any tutor or counsellor is to appreciate a student's dilemma. 
This is partly because the ability to recognize dilemma and reflect upon 
it is dependent on the circumstances in which it was experienced. "The 
time and place in which the people live affect their thinking" (Billig 
1991 pI). Partly also, it is because the way forward, that is to say the 
moral judgment required to inform a decision, will likewise be dependent 
on the contextual details of the situation. 
The students' predicaments were found to be distinctive and impossible to 
duplicate (7.0) just as the incidents in which politicians get their 
hands dirty cannot be reproduced. Political arguments ~re never settled 
once and for all; as Lucas argued (6.2.5), even the slightest shift of 
circumstance will mean that they are returned to and reworked. Each 
situation demands a reaction in which consistency with the past will rest 
~ 
upon the core of the person's character, individual moral sensitivity and 
perception, but not upon a neatly replicated answer. 
11.5 The Individual's Freedom to Question 
Several perspectives provided grounds for respecting the individual as an 
autonomous thinker. The Marxist tradition that the ordinary working man 
or woman has their thinking determined for them by the ideology of the 
.' 
ruling class in practice demeans the very class that is ostensibly being 
defended. Ordinary people, howeve~, are not pupp~ts, incapable of 
questioning, arguing or reflecting. They, too, have the power to create a 
philosophy; in such an instance, ideology regains the dignity which was 
lost when it was only seen as an instrument of oppression. 
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This raises an interesting variant of the freedom vs determinism 
argument. Just as the question was asked, in the tragedies of Sophocles 
and Aeschylus, whether or not Agamemnon, Orestes, and Antigone were 
trapped in a framework beyond their contr~1, in the same way it was an 
issue whether students were architects of their own misfortunes or caught 
in a web of parental,·circumstantial or college constraints. Where 
traditional Marxist ideology has sometimes portrayed the agent as 
deceived, controlled by outside forces, the rhetorical debate stresses 
the very existence of argument and vibrant thinking and underlines the 
ability of individuals to question their cultural inheritance, to 
criticise the "common sense" into which they were conditioned. 
11.6 The Resolution of Dilemmas 
Turning now to the issues surrounding the "resolution" of dilemmas, it 
was no surprise to find that students wished in nearly every case to 
reach conclusions on their own. Other people could be used to share the 
problem, discuss it, to learn from it, but at the end the decision had to 
be owned. This accords well with other findings about autonomy and the 
search for identity, the escape from parental and childhood constraints 
which is experienced in late adolescence (see 10.5.2) .. 
"Common Sense" is a deceptively simple expression and by no means all the 
uses of it which have been quoted share identical meanings. Nevertheless, 
in this study, it is argued that this is the only principle to which one 
-
can appeal_ To decide which of the four bioethical principles has 
priority in a given case where they conflict~ is a matter of having 
recourse to what Mill (1974) called the "umpire"; in his case such an 
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arbiter was to hand, in the shape of the utility principle. However, it 
has been argued here that to accept that priority principle, or any 
other, is itself to express a moral preference, be it for the standard as 
utility, as divine law or as the moral imperative, and would be also in 
the final analysis a question of common sense. This is partly derived 
. . 
from one's culture an~ as such is likely to reflect the norms and moral 
sense of one's society; it is also however, the outcome of the 
argumentation and debate which takes place within the individual. 
11.6.1 It has been argued that pluralism is a fact of experience and 
that, even though rationalists may not find it tidy or coherent, it is 
the nature of the world, including the mental world, around us. Conflicts 
and contradictions are what we should expect and this is why we are 
brought up to hear contrasting maxims and proverbs. Much religious belief 
is concerned with the reality of conflicting forces and their adherents 
are expected to learn the mythology by which these beliefs are preserved 
and transmitted. The Taoist perceives reality.as the Yin and the Yang, 
the two great opposites which permeate the entire universe and on whose 
interaction everything depends (5B 4.1). Other religions believe in the 
idea of conflicting cosmic forces (eg Zoroastrianism 5B 4.2)), which 
humans need to reconcile for themselves by following the right path of 
action. In the Bhagavad Gita, the permanent dilemma of life is the belief 
that whatever one's choice of action, the cost will be bondage to this 
world (5B 6.1); reconciliation comes only by renouncing false desires. In 
these and other ways, an attempt is made to explain the sense of eternal 
contradiction. Some beliefs seem more passive than others, some absolving 
us from responsibility to consider or challenge the conflict, others 
prescribing the "correct" way to find a resolution and the path to 
salvation. 
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The argument of this study is that, whether the reality of conflict is 
described in secular or religious language, .whether it is perceived as 
ideological, sociological or cosmic it is necessary to accept that 
reality. This is preferable than to deny its existence or to suggest that 
a rational priority, or intuitive (even divine) principle, can be sought, 
discovered and used to resolve all contradictions. 
11.7 The Place of Dilemma in Education 
It has been the contention of this thesis that the ability to recognize 
dilemma should have a far more prominent place in the education of 16-19 
year olds, and -that it has a positive contribution to the curriculum and 
in the objectives of all courses. A number of threads can be drawn 
together at this point in support of this claim. The Heads of Department 
who took part in the survey (10.3) saw it as "worthwhile", 33% said 
livery worthwhile", to study dilemmas. Typical examples offered were: 
Whether to seek full employment or reduce inflation (Economics). 
The morality of feeding grain to cattle in the rich world whilst 
approximately one billion starve (Geography). 
Siting a chemical plant (chemistry). 
The impact of science on military decisions (Physics). 
These examples supported the earlier study (10.1) where it was argued not 
only that each subject discipline had a distinctive type of dilemma (e.g 
in modern languages it was the search for the "right" translation to 
convey the intended meaning; in P.E it was the instanteous decision 
whether to cross the ball or shoot, lob or playa passing shot) but also 
that cross curricular study skills could be uncovered. For example, the 
classicist suggested that when an able student preferred to play safe and 
opt for description rather than risk an opinion, it could be compared 
with the swimmer who dared not "let go of the side" (10.1.5). 
- 240 
On might summarise the skills acquired by an education which included 
more explicitly the study of dilemma recogn~tion and resolution as 
follows: 
(a) The ability to accept the validity of conflicting alternatives. This 
develops the thought processes, the intellectual and rhetorical skills 
(Billig 1988); as Sinnott Armstrong described it, "people can disagree 
without arguing that the other side is defective or mistaken" (1985 
p325). Moreover, it encourages a reflective judgment (Kitchener and King 
1981), a common sense morality (Gaut 1993) and a more mature self 
awareness (Nussbaum 1985). 
(b) Practice in resolving dilemmas. By entertaining alternatives, 
weighing the various courses of action and their consequences, it is 
possible to plan strategies that will improve the quality of decisions 
taken. 
(c) The appropriate post decisional attitude. It is necessary to learn 
how to live with the consequences of a difficult, marginal decision 
together with ,an ability to deal effectively with the issues surrounding 
guilt. Contrary to a "my country right or wrong" approach, this is likely 
to improve the effectiveness of modern leadership by increasing its 
acceptability and developing a confidence which rests ~ore upon the care 
and thoroughness of the balancing process than upon blind assurance or 
arrogance in presentation. Including both emotion and reason in the 
process of resolving dilemmas develops the concept of the whole person 
(see 11.7.3 below) and in a world of increasing technological complexity 
assists decision takers to come to terms with conclusions which are not 
cut and dried, black or white, either-or, but sometimes finely balanced, 
costly, both-and. 
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(d) Relativistic thinking. Perry referred to the "journey from 
adolescence into adulthood" consisting of "sequential challenges" until 
one reached the maturity of "a changing pluralistic culture, in which 
man's very knowledge and values are seen to be relative" (1968 pix). The 
study of dilemma assists such a journey by providing opportunities to 
adopt different standpoints, tryout a variety of arguments "as if" they 
might be true (as Kelly [1955] proposes as a constructivist approach), 
before reaching the commitment which is also a part of maturity. 
The students interviewed (7.0) tended to look positively at the benefits 
of their dilemmatic experiences. Whilst they admitted they might not 
resolve a repeat dilemma with any greater speed or certainty, they had 
learned awareness, caution, self reliance, independence and much else of 
value besides. Many of these educational advantages were seen by Postman 
and Weingartner (1969) as producing "good learners": 
Good learners prefer to rely on their own judgement ... Good learners 
are usually not fearful of being wrong. They recognize their 
limitations and suffer no trauma in concluding that what they 
believe is apparently not so. In other words, they can change their 
minds. Changing the character of their minds is what good learners 
are most interested in doing ... Good learners· are emphatically not 
fast answerers ... 
Perhaps most importantly, good learners do not need to have an 
absolute, final, irrevocable resolution to every problem. The 
sentence, "I don't know", does not depress them, and they certainly 
prefer it to the various forms of semantic nonsense that pass for 
answers to questions that do not as yet have any solution - or may 
never have one. (1969 p42) 
This accords well with the argument that classical rhetoric has much to 
teach us (Billig 1991 pI). Rhetoric was primarily an educational 
programme and an increasing number would say that when it fell into 
disrepute, much was lost. To teach the power of persuasion was regarded 
negatively during the last century (a question of "mere rhetoric") the 
ability to make representation triumph ~ver truth. There is now, however, 
- 240 (&)-
some evidence of a renewed respect for the skills taught and the 
assumptions made by the original teachers of rhetoric (9.3). 
It has, therefore, been argued that there should be increased 
opportunities created for the study, experience and reflection upon 
dilemmatic situations. This need can be justified, as an enrichment for 
all students, but Special Needs students would benefit considerably from 
greater use of such materials, as would th~ "gifted" or the very able. 
More re~earch is required here, and one should not rule out the 
possibility of a study looking at the effects on young people of studying 
dilemma (3.2). 
11.7.2 It may be objected that consideration of dilemmas in schools or 
colleges is somewhat artificial, since both the emotional involvement and 
the urgency of decision may be lacking. On the other hand, too often 
education is concerned with finding "answers" to defined and closed 
questions (10.2). This is surely an inadequate preparation for a life in 
which most issues of any complexity are open ended. Practice in weighing 
alternatives in an environment in which the cost of a "mistake" is not 
too high can only be beneficial. 
11.7.3 It might also be asked whether there is any place for the 
development of conscience within the school or college system? The 
stance taken in this thesis has been that education is a holistic matter, 
concerned for the moral, spiritual, physicil and aesthetic as well as the 
intellectual development of students (10.4). This will include the growth 
of personal integrity, and preparation for future responsibility. This 
policy would hardly be questioned within the British tradition and is 
enshrined within the various education Acts since 1944. 
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11.7.4 There is, therefore, a clear justification of a tutor system, of 
appointing counsellors, Year Heads, and the various structures of 
pastoral care, as well as of a general education which reaches beyond the 
limitations of particular examination syllabuses. Whilst there are those 
who would prefer to leave such matters to the home, and many more who pay 
mere lip service to a~ything other than examination courses (driven 
increasingly by a payment by results funding methodology, and public 
competition, league tables and the like), the tradition of education of 
the whole person has not yet disappeared, starved by lack of funds. The 
fact that it has not done so is probably due to the idealism of the 
teaching profession and to parents who wish to ensure its survival. 
A number of ideas have been offered regarding the opportunities which 
exist, or could readily be created, for the development of experience of 
dilemma. Some were described in 10.1.1-8, others in 10.3. These 
opportunities occur in different disciplines and in both examination and 
non examination courses. 
11.8 The Value to Counsellors and Personal Tutors 
This study has concentrated on the potential use of a greater 
understanding of dilemma in educational contexts, where most teachers, 
within the English tradition at least, are inevitably dealing on a daily 
basis with students as personal tutors, counsellors and such like. Post 
sixteen colleges aim to treat pupils as individuals, holistically. This 
is r.endered less effective when the advice offered is informed mainly 
from a single and fragmented perception. 
It has, therefore, been recommended that at least some theoretical 
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understanding of dilemma is important to the work of counsellors and 
tutors. Similarly the perspective from psychology suggested a way to 
understand the stage of maturation that adolescents have reached. It was 
argued that a pattern of post formal thinking could be found and that 
many 16-19 year olds reveal signs of it: relativistic reasoning, 
dialectic thinking and reflective moral judgment (8.0). The counsellor or 
tutor needs to be conscious of the potential implications when a student 
first accepts relativism, the resulting difficulties and conflicts that 
can arise at home, at churches, at work, as well as more positive 
outcomes, such as the increasing ability to reflect on their own 
prejudices and to be able to empathise with those from different 
cultures, classes or backgrounds. 
11.8.2 These last outcomes indicate that a positive view of dilemmas 
should be held by educationalists and counsellors. We should not regard 
them only as choices between negative poles, but as choices between 
alternatives which may have positive as well as negative outcomes, not 
the least of which is the relief at having arrived at a decision. 
Furthermore, we should welcome their occurrence, not only as a sign of a 
healthy degree of argumentation within society, and of alertness in a 
democracy, but also a prerequisite of developing tolerance and even of a 
religious understanding of reality. Students have claimed with some 
justification that they learn from their experiences (even though they 
might not resolve a repeat situation any more rapidly). What they gain is 
self knowledge which is an important strand in a general education. As 
Nussbaum (1985) has expressed it: "The experience of conflict can also be 
a time of- learning and development ..•. a progress that comes from an 
increase in self-knowledge and knowledge of the world" (p260). 
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11.9 Towards Developing a Typology of Dilemma 
Dilemmas are problems that will not go away. We may "solve" some of them 
but still have to learn to live with the consequences of our decision . 
. Even when a form of resolution is found, a best-in-the-circumstances 
decision, the dilemma does not disappear, as it would with a brain teazer 
or "problem". With this in mind, it has been recommended that dilemmas 
are categorised under six headings (see 58 16), three of which are 
resolvable and three of which are irresolvable. It would be useful for a 
further study to test how helpful such a conceptual framework was in 
practice. 
11.9.1 Some dilemmas can be resolved without second thoughts or regrets 
(Type Ai). The incident in the tent was such a case, as was the question 
whether or not to drop AS Art. The best all-things-considered decision 
was taken in the circumstances. These differ from "problems" simply in 
the fact that there was a personal involvement and the memory, the 
sharpness and intensity still remains. 
Other dilemmas are resolved but only by leaving a feeling of regret that 
one was unable to select the second alternative(Type A2). Not all such 
cases are a matter of indecision, weakness or the simple inability to 
stand by one's decision. The choice between entering Higher Education or 
taking a job is such a case (interview 5) as was the question of studying 
in Australia or in England (interview 14). There are yet other dilemmas 
which, though resolved by an all-things-considered best decision, leave 
such a serious remainder that one can only use the word "guilt" or 
"remorse" to explain adequately the feelings that recur afterwards (Type 
A3). The issue of dropping old friends in order to participate fully in 
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one's new life might well be such a case (interview 15). Sophie's Choice 
was almost certainly another. 
11.9.2 There is a second class of dilemmas which is irresolvable (81). 
Again, some leave a memory of piquancy or emotional involvement. Whether 
or not to keep mother's secret (interview 10) were such cases. Some leave 
a post decisional remainder of regret (82), as with the problem of moving 
house or staying with grandmother (interview 1). A third group (83) leave 
more than regret, but something akin to moral anguish at a wrong action, 
however unavoidable it was, and therefore a justified feeling of guilt, 
such as the student who had to choose whether to live with his mother or 
his father (interview 12). 
11.10 Between the Hammer and the Anvil 
Inter malleum et incudem - "Between the hammer and the anvil" - would be 
a fair description of the way in which this thesis was wrought. At every 
stage there have been conflicting constraints. The requirement to be 
thorough conflicted at times with the constraints of time and finance; 
ideally, it would have been desirable to continue with the fieldwork, 
interview more students and to follow these up later to discover what 
changes in perception, if any, had taken place; particularly regrettable 
has been the impracticality of returning to the many Heads of Department 
who sent interesting examples of work, some challenging ideas of their 
own and suggestions for curriculum development. Each research decision 
taken left one with a sense of regret about the rejected alternative, 
however necessary the various compromises were in practice. 
There were also frequent tensions between the responsibilities of one's 
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job, family and research interest. The difficulty of divorcing the 
"subjective" experience from the "objective" study was unexpectedly 
sharp. It compelled one to face directly and personally the 
phenomenological technique of epoche and to bracket out one's own 
personal bias. However, it has to be said that, although no person is an 
expert at dilemma resolution, a great deal has been learned of personal 
benefit during this research, from discussions with colleagues, from 
.' 
reading, from letters and responses, and not least from the students 
themselves, proving once again that there is an immense amount to be 
discovered from those whom one is committed to teach. 
Undoubtedly dilemma is a widely, perhaps universally, experienced 
phenomenon. As such, studies which offer support, a wide range of 
examples, and provide categories for the analysis of dilemma will very 
probably be welcomed by many people other than academics or teachers. One 
outcome which should be of considerable benefit to tutors and counsellors 
of post sixteen students will be the increased awareness and wider 
understanding of this complex phenomenon. Postman and Weingartner (1971) 
described well the almost impossible educational dream that is 
permanently under threat: 
The new education has as its purpose the development of a new kind of 
person, one who •.• is an actively inquiring, flexible, creative, 
innovative, tolerant, liberal personality, who can face uncertainty 
and ambiguity without disorientation. (p204) 
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APPENDIX 1.1 
ESHER COLLEGE 
RESEARCH INTO THE RECOGNITION OF DILEMMA 
Student: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. TG: Da te : .......... . 
Dea r ........................ . 
I am writing to ask if you will help with a research project which I am 
undertaking. 
I am interested in the way students take difficult decisions and the way they 
resolve problems where the alternatives make the choices very hard. So I am 
writing to a random sample of students to ask whether there has been any such 
situation in the last year which they would, in confidence, be prepared to 
describe. Would you be prepared to help? 
Ideally I would like to have an individual interview when you could describe 
the situation, what you thought and felt about it and the way you tried to 
resolve it. It will not mean doing extra work! It would involve a short 
interview of about 20 minutes, at lunchtime on either a Monday, Tuesday or 
Friday. . 
Your name would be kept confidential and I would see to it that anything you 
said could not be traced back to you. Also I would show you the transcript of 
the interview afterwards for your amendment and agreement. 
If you are willing to help please return the tear-off slip below to my 
secretary, Sally, and I will contact you shortly. 
Thank you. 
Yours sincerely, 
Patrick Miller 
Principal 
ESHER COLLEGE R.D. RESEARCH GROUP 
I am/am not* willing to be interviewed in connection with the research into 
the Recognition of Dilemma amongst students. 
I understand that this will be in confidence and whatever I say will not be 
traceable to me personally. 
Signature: 
Name: TG: 
*Please delete as applicable. 
PLEASE RETURN TO THE PRINCIPAL'S SECRETARY NOT LATER THAN MON. 1ST FEBRUARY 
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THE EXPERIENCE OF DILEMMA 
CHECKLIST FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED STUDENT INTERVIEWS 1992/1993 
1. Thank you for agreeing to help. You understand what its 
about? Confidential, will show you the transcript and ask 
for your comments before its used. 
Are you happy/comfortable about this? 
2. Can I first ask what you understand about a difficult 
decision? Why did you choose this? 
3. So has there been a situation like this for you in say the 
last 12-months? 
4 Would you describe it for me please? (draw out the who, 
what, when and where of the situation, including how long 
ago) 
5. What alternatives were there? What choices did you have? 
What other options did you consider? What else might you 
have done? 
6. How evenly balanced were the choices? Any clear advantages? 
What factors did you consider? What were the pros and cons? 
How far did you think of these? What were the decisive 
factors, what made you decide? 
7. Reaction/ effect. How did you feel at the time? How did you 
take this situation? What effect did it have .on you? Was it 
at all worrying? 
8. Resolving the problem. What did you do about deciding? What 
steps did you take? Ask any advice? Talk with anyone? To 
what extent was it your own decision? 
9. Afterwards. Did you have any second thoughts? Did you ever 
wish you had made the other decision? Any regrets? (if R 
mentions 'guilt', ask what did that mean for them?) 
10. What have you learned from this? Would you be any better at 
deciding a similar question if it came up again? 
11 OK if I come back to you again later? 
Thank you. 
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APPENDIX 1.2 
Interview 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
-
.' •. 
APPENDIX 1.3 
INDEX OF INTERVIEWS 1992/1993 
Respondent 
Reference 
R921 (T) 
R922 (F) 
R923 (H) 
R924 (D) 
R925 (A) 
R931 (R) 
R932 (E) 
R933 ( I ) 
R934 (Z) 
R935 (He) 
R936 (8) 
R937 (N) 
R938 (K) 
R939 (M) 
R940 (AM) 
Dilellllla Subject 
Move house with parents or live with Gran? 
Leave home or stay? 
Drop Art AS level or continue? 
Come to College or take a job? 
Enter Higher Education or take a job? 
Help friend with problems or not? 
Remain at college or return to school? 
Stay inside tent or make a run for it? 
Take holiday in Florida or go with fami)y? 
Keep Mum's secret or tell younger sister? 
Make choice between College and school? 
Live with Mum or Dad after divorce? 
Cover up for sister or tell the truth? 
Study in Australia or England? 
Keep up with old friends or not? 
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INTERVIEW APPENDIX 2.1 
I = PFM 
R = No R922 (F) 
Date: 1 July 1992 
I Well F. Thank you very much for agreeing to help and I think you 
understand what I'm interested in, as I put in my letter, it's the way 
students resolve problems where there is a difficult choice to make ... and 
your name came out of that random choice. 
Can I just reassure you that your name will be kept confidential and 
the interview will just be referred to as 'a number. And I will show 
you a transcript at the end. Can I ask you, are you happy with those 
arrangements? 
R Yes I suppose so (nla) 
I Can I ask then whether there has been in the last twelve months or 
so what I'm calling a dilemma, there has been a difficult choice to 10 
make? 
R Yes I think so, (nla) there has 
I Would you like to describe it to me? 
R Urn well my parents and I haven't been getting on now for a very long 
time emotionally ... and we don't get on personally .. and the 
choice has been to move out and leave them behind basically, because 
we don't get on at all .. 
I Right, how long has that been a problem? 
R Well about three or four years and •• I moved to a place in Kingston 
which I couldn't really afford, so I moved out and about well eight 20 
weeks ago I decided to leave again and I never intend to move back, 
basically •• 
I Right .. right •. quite a difficult problem (yes a bit of a hassle 
really) when did you make the decision to move out? 
R 
I 
(microphone too far from I. This means tape is almost impossible to 
use or to hear interviewee's replies) 
I made it basically in October last year, but I couldn't, I didn't 
have the resources .••• I went to the YMCA which took all my Summer 
40 
savings ..• we basically haven't got on for a very long time, 
particularly with my mother .. but me and my Dad haven't got on 
either, because together they think I'm a failure, I just haven't 
achi~ved what they want (unclear) but at home a. lot of it comes from 
me •.• basically its a two way thing 
What are the pros and cons, I mean if we go back to the time when 
you hadn't made up your mind, was it really a difficult choice or 
was it relatively straightforward, were there advantages and 
disadvantages? 
-z~-
R Well, there aren't any advantages but the disadvantages were that my 
parents weren't there, I mean I saw them again this weekend and we 
didn't exactly get on (unclear) .. I was hoping that we might get 
back together but I know I'm not going to go back there again ever, 
we just don't mix' (right) so it was fairly straightforward, but 
financially it was very hard for me to go to college, because they 
aren't supporting me at all so I have to earn my money plus, urn, I 
get eleven quid (?handed) me per week •. so to get it to balance is 
pretty hard. 
I Right, so it was a really dificult choice then? 
R Pretty hard yes (nla) •• so •. then .. 
I Could I ask how this affected you ,what sort of influence did it have 
on you to have this choice to make? 
~ 
R I was under a lot of strain, but I was really lucky to have one of 
the teachers to help me a tremendous lot .. which was great (unclear) 
and that was really great, but emotionally, though I didn't show 
anything on the outside but on the inside my emotions were totally 
screwed up, putting it plainly, so I've been feeling pretty rocky 
these past few months and especially evening outs because the whole 
evening I had to think a lot, to make a budget .. because at my age 
you don't just go out to the pub, or anything, I can't do that. My 
work's gone off as well •. 
I 
60 
But before you made the decision .... it really worried you inside? 
Is this what you're saying? 
40 
50 
R Yes, it put quite a lot of pressure on me, (yes) because, like I knew 
I 
R 
I 
what I wanted to do but I knew that once I'd moved out the contact 
between me and my parents •• I mean however much we argued we'd still 
lose each other, sort of thing (yes) it was pretty hard to take, yes. It 
probably put my parents under a lot of mental strain as well •••• its not 
the best thing that happened between a kid and his parents (unclear) • 
But it was a lot of me and a lot of them, so it was a fair share. but it 
happened I suppose, so •• 
70 
Yes, can I ask, the main decision as you're describing it was to 
move out in the first place, last October, and in fact you chose the 
YMCA because you had no other choice at that time (yes' basically) 
but that was the main decision (yes), you haven't had to make one 
since .. 
I knew I'd have to move back then, but the decision to move out and 
never to move back again happened in March when I started looking 
again for places, and I was pretty lucky to get the place I've got (Right). . 
So you did move back to your home? 
80 
R Yes I moved to my house between October and about May but all that 
time I was under constant pressure to find somewhere else to go 
(right) •. only I left it for, well from the start of the year to 
March (right) but I felt pretty hassled .. 
I So the key decision was in March? (in March, yes) 
R And my work was, urn, I couldn't keep everything up (right) •• so my 
work seems awful. 
I When you took the decision F. did you have any second thoughts, any 
regrets? 
R Yes 'cause I didn't like leaving my brother and sister behind, 
because I used to see them a lot •••• I don't want to blame my Mum 
and my Dad but emotionally they didn't understand me at all, I mean 
my Dad thinks of me .as a shy, retiring person. 
90 
I So you had regrets but not sufficiently to make you change your 
mind? (no) ... I'm also very 9rateful to you for sharing this with me 
F. because its a real tough one. I'm interested in one other aspect 
and that is, how did you reach your decision. Did you talk it over 
with anybody? Is it something you did entirely on your own, how did 
you reach that decision? 
R Well I had a lot of help from.. I started off talking to one of my 
teachers (right) and she sent me to my tutor who's a counsellor 100 
anyway, but, I'm not being rude but I didn't really feel that 
confident with X as I had with the teacher (right) but we kind of 
worked things out and the decision, the decision came from me 
(right) and my teachers supported me and everything. 
I So you used them to sound your ideas and to support them. 
R Yes to support basically (Yes) but I knew what .• 
I They didn't advise you? 
R No, as I said the decision's got to come from you (right) 
Its just that I didn't feel that confident talking to my tutor 
(Right) without being too rude and that •• but the decision did come 
from me (Right). 110 
I May I ask if that's the way you normally resolve a difficult issue, I 
mean on the whole do you do it on your own? 
RYes thats it basically. Its just that I needn't have gone to talk to 
anyone unless I was in really dire straits which I was, But 
emotionally it really affected me. 
I It was so exceptional that my next question may seem a bit curious 
but I'm interested to know whether you've had other dilemmas, other 
problems in which you've really not known which way to turn, you've 
had a difficult choice to make. Have you had any others in the last 
year? maybe not at the same level of personal seriousness but .. any 120 
others? Is it common? 
~ . 
R Well ••• , .••• I've always had a lot of problems, emotionally, but 
most of them were generated between me and my parents. 
I In other words extensions of the same problem? 
R Yes, because at my old school (X) I wanted to stay there and most of 
-zS'~-
my teachers, well all of my teachers wanted me to stay, but my 
parents were really set on my coming here because they didn't think 
that I had made use of my private education and that my grades 
weren't good enough but I thought they were pretty high as far as I 
was concerned, I got two As and 7 Bs which wasn't what I wanted, I 
should have got higher I know that but they constantly got on to me, 
in a way ••• they sent me here because they didn't feel I'd used my 
private education enough and the idea was I was being snobby, you 
know I didn't want to come here because it was you know like state 
run, and it wasn't that at all it was because that school changed me 
a lot, I became a personality by myself and the teachers could see 
what was going on, and could see that things were going wrong, and 
they knew me, and coming here and having to leave all that behind, 
130 
and there again it was going to be so much of a hassle and anyway I 
was really content there. Everyone in the school knew me, so •• you 140 
know, so it was just having to leave all that and come here, my 
parents, it wasn't financial, they told me it wasnt financial, and 
there was a big hassle about that, it was just that things had gone 
really wrong ••• I hadn't done what they wanted me to do, and 
that •.•• 
I I'm going to end the interview now, and we'll just go on talking in 
a different way, but can I just end by thanking you F. very much for 
your help. 
nla = nervous laughter 
INTERVIEW 6 APPENDIX 2.2 
I = PFM 
R = R931 (RF) 
Date: 12th March 1993 
I OK R thanks very much for agreeing to help. You understand what it is 
about and what I am interested in? (yes) and are comfortable about the 
arrangements, that it is going to be confidential (yes I am) thank you. 
Well can I first ask you, what you understand by a difficult decision. 
R Well I think it is something that will make a big impact on your school 
life or further life, whether it is really going to make a difference to 
you or not. Most decisions in life will make a big difference as you 
live on. 
I That's fair enough. So that is what you see as a difficult decision? 
(yes). Has there been that kind of situation in the last 12 months or 
so? 10 
R Yes there was quite a difficult one I had, maybe about two or three 
months ago now. It would have affected my school work if I hadn't made 
the right choice I think and it was due to a friend who himself was 
having family problems. Instead of trying to seek some professional 
help he kept coming to me every day. 
I Was this a close friend? (yes it was) So you saw him every day? 
R Yes and most evenings, although I don't see him so much now. 
I But at that time you would have seen him anyway every day and he would 
now come up and ask you your opinion of this situation. 
20 
R Yes he would ask me what to do and he always asked me what was best, he 
could never decide himself. Towards the end it began to annoy me and 
I Are you able to tell me what the situation was? 
R Yes his parents were just going through a divorce, His father's second 
divorce, and my friend was very upset because it is the third time it had 
happened and he felt that through all the divorce he has been very much 
neglected by his father. He felt as though he didn't belong to the 
family and that upset him. 
I So what was he facing a choice to do - leave or .. ? 
R He was talking about leaving College at one time and moving away from 
his family altogether or trying to patch it up and help himself but hio just couldn't decide which one - so every day he would come to me and 
discuss all the arguments they were having at home, telling me what's 
happening and asking me what I thought he should do. He just really 
wanted to be with friends because his family never wanted him. 
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I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
Right. So he was upset, didn't know what to do - was he actually 
thinking about other things like whether to go with his mother or step-
mother? 
Well he had already tried going with his mother and she had sent him back 
to his father so (right) so he didn't really have a choice .. 
40 
His real choice was whether to stay with his father or leave altogether 
(yes) and that would mean leaving College? (yup) so he laid this on you 
(yes he did). Was it mainly to get advice, do you think, or was it 
mainly to get your friendship and just any opinion? 
I think it was both. He really didn't know what to do himself and just 
wanted to be with friends all the time, so he mixed both of them 
together. 
But m~in1y he focussed on you, not other people, he wasn't talking about 
it with everybody? 
Yes it was me. 
50 
I OK well of course it is your dilemma, or problem, that I am mostly 
interested in. So what choice did you have? 
R Well I thought whatever choice I did make was very important because it 
was for his life. I thought either I could just do my best and risk 
messing up his life or get him some professional help and risk ruining 
our friendship, so I know that would have offended him if I did go for 
professional help. I tried to make the choice whether or not to tell him 
I was going to get some help, because there was a risk that he would 
think that I was now neglecting him as well as his family. 
I So quite heavy for you? (yes it was) May I ask you what kind of 
friend he was, how long had you known him? 60 
R I had only known him about four months but we moved to the area at the 
same time and started school at the same time and because we were both 
new we just stuck together. . 
I Do you mean school or do you mean (X) College? 
R No (Y) School. (right) and then.. (you came here together) right 
from the start he wanted someone to basically cling onto and I don't like 
being like that. I just want to be free to mingle, I don't like to have 
'best' friends, I like to get on well with everyone. 
I So you liked him and he was a good and close friend (yes) but 
perhaps not a best friend? 70 
R He thought, I mean I was his best friend he kept telling me, but I never 
re~lly wanted to tell him that he wasn't my best friend. 
I So you were worried about hurting him? (yup) and about letting him down 
(yup) and adding to his pressure. So those were your choices, well what 
would you say were the advantages and disadvantages as they seemed to you 
then? 
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R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
What of seeking help? 
Yes. 
Well it would obviously get him off my back and allow me to carryon with 
my life and the disadvantage would be that he was bringing down my 
school work and he was always asking me to go places with him, so I 80 
wouldn't be able to get my work done and handed in on time. So I knew 
there was only one choice to get him off my back as soon as I could, 
because it started to irritate me towards the end. 
Yes and what steps would that mean you had to take, would you just 
recommend professional help? 
No I remembered at the beginning of term we had been given a problem 
sheet with all the professional help and I went to my tutor and talked 
about it and she gave me some people that he could talk to, who work 
in the_college as counsellors and so •.• 
So the actual choice was whether to give him this name. 
Yes that's what I thought I would do. 
90 
And persuade him and say look enough of me now it's time you got in touch 
with this counsellor (yes) I see. Did you do that in the end? 
No I never actually gave him the name. I offered it and he got upset and 
he started asking me if friends are supposed to help each other and sort 
problems out. But I told him you have just got to do it yourself, 
because I had never been in that position as my parents had never 
divorced so •• I don't really know how it feels. I told him I was 
completely .. the wrong person to go to, he needed someone who knows 
what they are talking about. 
Right. Can I ask how this affected you? Before you made the decision 
and while you were telling him, getting him off your back as' you put it, 
what effect did it have? 
On our friendship? 
I Well on you generally. Did you worry, did it affect your work, your food 
or your sleep? 
R 
I 
R 
It is not the actual worrying that affected my work, I mean I didn't lose 
sleep at night over it, but it was just him constantly wanting me to talk 
to me. Even if I wanted to go to the library to do some work he 
would follow me in there and start talking about it. 110 
So really you were clear, am I right, you were clear from the start what 
you ought to do? (yup) So why was it a difficult decision, in other 
wo~ds what were the disadvantages of doing that? 
I felt inside I might be upsetting him more, because by that time 
everyone had started neglecting him even his friends because he was 
annoying them as well. So I thought well I am the only person who 
actually speaks to him much now and it would affect him a lot if I sent 
him off. He would have basically had no friends. I always felt inside 
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that it was up to me to do something. 
120 
I Would you describe yourself as a sensitive lad, do you get easily upset 
by .? 
R No nothing really upsets me much, I don't really normally think much 
about it, I just let it happen. 
I So you haven't had a lot of friendships which have been involved? 
R No this is the first one. I didn't like it when it was happening I just 
didn't want to be there, so I just wanted to get some help as quickly as 
possible, but there was always that thing in my mind whether I should or 
not. 
I What was the worse thing that came to you about letting him down, if 
1 ok ? 130 you 1 eo 
R I just kept imagining him like leaving College and ruining the rest of 
his life and (blaming you perhaps?) yes and blaming me. I always 
thought that people might drive him a bit crazy in the end and he will 
always have hatred for me and I was a bit scared because he was the sort 
of person who-could get a bit crazy so I wanted to bring him down slowly 
and easily and didn't just want to tell him to go away. 
I Yes difficult for you. Tell me how you reached this decision, did you 
need any help, did you take any steps to make it, you mentioned a tutor 
but what else? 
140 
R Yes I spoke to my parents about.it and they told me it was best if I just 
got him professional help, but they didn't seem to really understand the 
full details about it. 
I You mean the full weight on you, that kind of detail, the full pressure on 
you? (yes) So who did you speak to that did understand, anybody? 
R No in the end I just decided on my own. 
I So really it was just your decision (yup in the end) and although your 
parents supported you it was support in taking the right decision not 
support in understanding the pain of taking that decision. Well turning 
now to the situation afterwards did you have any second thoughts, have 
you ever regretted the decision? . ~o 
R No not at all, because it has allowed me to get on with my life now and 
not worry. I mean I have got enough worries in my life without worrying 
about someone else. 
I (laugh) Carry someone else on your back. ·Fine well that is straight 
forward. Do you think you are better at taking decisions now, of that 
kind, what have you learnt from this would you say? 
R Well I have learnt how people do get very sensitive over certain things 
which I never thought of before, but I prefer not to think about the pain 
other people are going through. I am always thinking 'I'm alright 
Jack' and although it is not really right I just think it is the best1~ay 
- the only way you can get on. 
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I Have you become more independent or more like that? 
RYes 
I Do you think you are more emotionally independent now? 
R Yes I would say very much and I also now can spot a problem if someone 
has got a problem, if I feel they are trying to put it on my shoulders, I 
more or less back off whilst I can. Because I would not fancy getting 
into any more problems like that. 
I Involved like that again? (No) fine. Well thank you very much 
indeed, if I get this typed up I will show it to you, and is it alrigWt 
if I come back to you at that point. 
R Yup that's fine. 
I Thank ~ou very much. 
That is the end of interview No 6 R931 (RF). It took about 20 minutes. 
- 258 -
APPENDIX 2.3 
INTERVIEW 10 
I = PFM 
R = R935 (He) 
Date: 10 February 1993 
I Right H thank you v~~y much for agreeing to help me; Can I ask do you 
understand what I am interested in? (Yes) I think you know what I mean. 
Are you happy about the arrangements the fact that it is going to 
confidential and that it won't be traceable to you? 
R Yes I am perfectly happy with that. 
I Good, well could I begin by asking what you mean by a difficult decision? 
R A difficult decision is when you have to make a choice between something 
that you want-to do and something that you don't want to do and you have 
to decide which is the right way to go. (Right) So if you want to go to 
university or you don't want to go to university and your parents are . 
going to make you, that's a difficult decision (Yes) as to whether to say10 
what you want to do. 
I Fine, yes that's just what I wanted to hear. Well H have you got such a 
example in your last year that you would be prepared to talk about? 
RYes. 
I Do you mind telling me about it then? 
R Well about 9 months ago now I found out, completely by accident, that my 
Mum was pregnant again and nobody had,even thought about it because she 
had another baby ten years after my last brother was born and we thought 
that would be the end of it. My aunt swore me to secrecy and said not to 
tell anybody else because she said it wasn't any of our business and 20 
wasn't our concern and it wasn't going to effect us. I didn't believe 
this because it was going to effect us, and I knew it would effect us 
because I had already gone through the experience with my little brother, 
who is now two. My Mum went through deep post-natal depression when she 
had my little brother and I spent most of my first GCSE year looking 
after him and doing the housework and things like that so I knew what was 
going to happen. I didn't want to spend 6 months knowing that this was 
what was going to happen and not being able to tell anyone else about it, 
so I wanted to ta 1 k to someone about it. .. 
30 
I Can I just stop you there and ask you are you in your first year H? (Yes) 
And how many brothers and sisters are there in your family already? 
R I have three brothers and three sisters and they are all younger than me. 
I Right so you're the eldest, you carry the can as it were? 
R Yes and all the responsibility and my Mum did it just at the time when my 
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sister was starting her GCSE's and I was staring my A levels, so she 
picked the most difficult time. It was a planned pregnancy as well and 
she didn't ask us what we thought about it. I didn't really understand 
why she didn't ask us because it would affect us, and I didn't think it 
was fair that she should let all the weight of the knowledge lie on me 
and not be able to talk to anybody about it, just because she wouldn't 
talk about it. I was suppose to keep silent until it was the right time 
to tell everybody, so I wasn't even supposed to tell my sister who is my 
closest friend. 
I How old is your sister? (14) and how are you spaced in ages? 
R I am 16, my sister is 14, I have a brother who is 13, a brother who is 11 
nearly 12, a brother who is 2 and a sister who is now four months. 
I Right so there is a big gap between the 12 year old and the 2 year old. 
R I was 14 when my brother was born, so the same age as my sister is now. 
I Is it the same father? 
50 
40 
R Yes for all of them (nla) my Mum is a Catholic which doesn't actually 
have anything-to do with why she has so many children, because otherwise 
I would have about 15 brothers or sisters. She just decided after 10 
years that she would like to have another baby and at the time I thought, 
oh yea that would be quite nice and it was fine for the first two or 
three months. Then she got tired and depressed and bored with him and 
she didn't want to look after him anymore and she said that she had done 
it 4 times before and had had enought of it. Which is why I was really, 
really angry with her when she got pregnant again because she already 
knew she had gone through it two years earlier and 4 times before that 
and she said when she had Joshua, my little brother, she was never going 60 
to do it again, but she did. 
I Joshua is the one who is four months? 
R Two years (sorry yes) my sister Sophie is four months. 
I But even with Joshua she said she was not going to do it again? 
R Yes she said I won't do it again, which is what she said after my brother 
Nicholas, he is nearly 12, and she went into it thinking, which is my 
Mother's fault you know, babies, she likes babies, but she doesn't like 
them after that. She is getting really frustrated with my little brother 
now because he is getting to the 2 stage, which is a really naughty age, 
when they are not old enough to understand that they are being bad but 
old enough to be bad and do naughty things. Her way of dealing with that 
is to lay him on everbody else and say Sophie is my darling little baby 
so that he gets really upset. ' 
I Well I can see how this is bound to affect you. What was the choice that 
you had, whether to tell somebody or not, whether to tell your nearest 
sister or not, was that it? 
R That was the choice and in the end I told my sister because I didn't 
think my Mum was being fair to us to go through that again and then to 
expect me to not say anything to anybody and just keep quiet about it. 
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I So you told your sister? 
R So I told my sister (how long ago?) I found out when my Mum was about two 
months pregnant and I told my sister when she was about four months. So 
I waited two months before I told anybody. My sister had already 
suspected something by then because my Mother was acting really strange 
as she does. We didn't know what to do then either, the only thing we 
could do was talk to each other about it. We still couldn't tell 
anybody. 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
So how did you see it then? What were the pros and cons - how did you 
see the advantages ~nd disadvantages of talking to your sister. 
90 
The advantages were that I could get all my anger out about it to her 
because I really didn't think it was fair that Mother was doing this 
again and also that she hadn't involved us and then said that it didn't 
affect us, all of which was not true. So I got my frustration out by 
talking to my sister and it just helped to decide what we were going to 
do when the baby was born because we were expecting it to be the same as 
last time. We just needed to prepare ourselves for the amount of work we 
were going to have to do when the baby was born and what responsibility 
we were going to have to take, because two years on it would be different 
responsibilities. I have a social life now as well and I was quite 
worried that it might affect that because I am quite often expected to 100 
baby sit or to. look after the baby when Mum gets home from work. I was 
worried about my work as well because it did effect my GCSE's. 
So the advantages were that you would have somebody to share and plan 
ahead. 
Plan ahead and see what we could do. 
What were·the disadvantages? 
The disadvantages were in case my Mother found out, as she would 
absolutely kill me. I wasn't suppose to tell anybody, and she trusted me 
in that, but I didn't think that she trusted me really because she 
wouldn't have told me •• 
But how long could your Mother be pregnant without it being obvious 
visibly? 
110 
She didn't tell anybody until she was six months because she had put on a 
lot of weight anyway so she looked quite big and didn't really start 
showing until she was six months and that is when she told everybody. 
Did she know that you told your sister? 
She found out afterwards, after she had had the baby, because I told her. 
So the only real disadvantage was what your Mother might say or do? 
Yes that was the only disadvantage. 
120 
I Was it evenly balanced in your mind? 
R No it wasn't, because I felt very confused for the first month because I 
sort of felt I should be loyal and not say anything. But after the first 
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month had gone and she was still pretending, she still hadn't told 
anybody and she was nearly four months by this time, I thought no its 
about time you started telling everybody. I really thought then she is 
not going to tell anyone, she is going to hang on as long as possible, 
and I can't wait to keep quiet about it, because by that time it was 
really, really worrying me. 
I wanted to ask you about that H. Leaving aside your anger about the 
situation and about it being put on you as you described, what was it 
like to live with this secret and live with the decision whether or not 
to tell your sister - before you actually took the decision. 
R It was horrible because I really didn't know what to do and I was really 
afraid that if I told someone my Mother would be really, really angry 
with me. But at the same time I did wantdto tell someone, because I 
didn't think that what she had done was right and I felt very confused 
about it. It was worrying me quite a lot at the time and really just 
didn't· know what to do. 
130 
I Did it worry you all day, I mean did it interupt your classes for example 
or was it just in the evening when perhaps you had less to do? 140 
R When I was around my Mum and around my family it worried me the most 
because I kept wanting to say something but I couldn't. When I was at 
school and people said things like, DOh your Mother's not going to have 
any more is she?" it made feel guilty or when they were talking about my 
little brother. But on an ordinary every day basis, if I was in the 
classroom doing my lessons I wouldn't think about it so much. 
I At night? (Yea) kept you awake perhaps? (Sometimes). Right well now you 
made_the decision what steps did you take, if any, either on your own or 
to talk to other people, to help you make the decision? How did you go 
about it?" 
R Well I asked my sister what she would do if she wanted to tell me 
something but thought she shouldn't tell me. She said she wouldn't tell 
me and I said that if it was really important thing and you really felt 
that I should know would you tell me then. She said it would depend what 
the reason was for not telling me, so I said well Mum would kill you and 
she said she would tell me then (n7a). 
I You really prepared the ground with your sister and she probably was 
guessing. 
R She knew that I wanted to tell her something. 
160 
I Did you talk to anyone else. (No) Not your Father? 
R No my Dad's the same as my Mum he doesn't-like talking about things like 
that. He was the same as my Mum he didn't want anyone to know for some 
reason, so kept quiet about it for quite a while. My Dad said I wasn't 
suppose to tell anyone either. 
I So really you made up your mind on your own, is that a fair description? 
(yea) because your sister really helped without you giving it away (Yea). 
OK well now you told your sister, since then a lot has happened including 
the birth, have you had second thoughts in that time? 
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R No I still think I was right to tell her because for one thing she has a 
right to know because she is part of the family as well. I thought it 170 
was really bad that they hadn't just sat us down and said look this is 
what is happening and we don't want you to tell anybody. I found out by 
accident anyway and it made me wonder how long they would have left it 
before telling us, so I didn't have any second thoughts about it at all. 
I So you would do the same thing again? 
R Yes I would do the same thing again, except I would probably do it sooner 
this time, I wouldn't leave it so long. 
I Do you have any feelings about the decision in terms of regret or seeing 
disadvantages about telling your sister. Have you had any second 
thoughts even if you would do the same again, have you had regrets? 180 
R I didn't have any regrets because my Mum had done much the same to us in 
a way and although it wasn't revenge, because that is too strong a word, 
it was sort of quits in a way. She wouldn't tell us so I thought it was 
then fair to tell my sister. She did have a right to know and I didn't 
have any regrets about that. If I had been an only child and my Mum said 
don't tell anybody and I had told my best friend I would have felt very 
guilty about it. 
I I have one last question for you and that is - do you think that having 
wrestled with this decision that you would be better at taking it again -
do you think it has taught you anything? 190 
R After I had told someone it made me feel clear in my mind about what I 
would do next time, because the advantages of having someone to talk to 
about something that is bothering you are far greater than sitting around 
worrying about it. Even if you are not suppose to tell someone else, if 
you can find someone neutral who is not involved in any way, so that it 
will not get back to the person involved, then I think it would be better 
than just worrying about it. My sister was quite involved actually and 
so I wasn't so worried about my Mum finding out. 
I So it has taught you? 
R Yea, if something was bothering me now and I had been told not to tell 
anybody about it then I would try to find somebody completely neutral who 
could talk to me about it without getting involved. You definitely have 
to try and release it, if you don't it can get you really worked up even 
if it is not really a big thing. 
I Well H I am very grateful to you for sharing this with me. Would you 
mind if I came back and saw you again perhaps later if necessary (No I 
don't mind) - thank you. 
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APPENDIX 2.4 
INTERVIEW 12 
I = PFM 
R = 937 (NW) 
Date: 15th March 1993 
I Well N thank you for agreeing to help. You understand what I am 
interested in (yup) .and you understand that it will be kept confidential 
and I will see that it does not get traced to you? 
R Yes I understand. 
I And are you happy with those arrangements? (I am very happy) thank you. 
Well can I ask you first what you would understand by a difficult 
decision? 
R A decision before the actual event, you know which is going to take 
place, or to go with it, if you see what I mean. 
I Yes and what is the nature of it being difficult. What makes it 
difficult? 
10 
R What do you mean, the decision I-am trying to make? 
I Yes - how would you decide whether it was a difficult decision or not? 
R If it was a decision that was going to hurt someone in·a way or you· 
know what I am going to talk about now basically. You know, whether, to 
decide to live with my Mum or my Dad, either way it is going to hurt one 
of them. -
I That is interesting yes. 
R So basically it is just advantages and disadvantages? 
I Right so thank you. So we know what we are talking about. Have you had 
such a situation sufficiently recently for you to be able to describe it? 20 
R Yes the divorce of my parents basically. 
I Right could you tell me about that. To start with when was it and what 
happened? 
R It was about four/five years ago now and how it happened •..• 
I Well how did it affect you? 
R Well you know there was quite a bit of arguing going on in the house 
which got me down basically. I started to get depressed and started to 
hate both them and you know I just knew they were going to get divorced. 
I felt"myself that it would be the best thing for them to, but when it 
came down to it I was pretty upset that they did get divorced. The 
changes in the household once one of them has gone, you know the 
different personality change with my Mum so I stayed to live with her. 
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I Right. Obviously there is much we could describe here and talk about, 
but for the purposes of this interview all 1 really want to focus on is 
what your decision was. What did you have to decide at that time? 
R Whether to live with my Mum or my Dad. 
I Right and was this really down to you. Did you have to make that 
descision yourself? 
R Well 1 did'nt really have to make it myself but they asked me and 1 
did'nt really want to say it is not up to me you know, 1 don't mind who 1 40 
live with, because 1 did at that time. 1 wanted to live with my Mum 
because 1 was closer to her than my Dad. 0-
I So you felt that you had a decision to make because you were being asked? 
(yes) right. Can you say how that affected you having to make that 
difficult decision? 
R Well as 1 say, you know, 1 knew it was going to hurt one or the other so 
it was so hard just to make the decision who to live with. 
I Did it have a personal effect on you, on your eating or sleeping or work 
or games or any aspect. Did it affect that? 
50-
R Yes it did affect my appetite and stuff, you know 1 was nervous in a 
sense, 1 had to make a-decision and basically ... 
I You knew you were worried about it and didn't want to eat as much (yea). 
Was there a date by which you had to decide, did you know there was a 
court case coming up by which you had to decide? 
R Yea 1 was in court •. you know they asked me as 1 was sitting in the 
court room and they said 'who do you want to live with?' • 
I Right and they asked you that you in court - in front of your parents? 
R No, no, they left the room and 1 went to another little room and the judge basically just said 'who do you want to live with?' because there 
was evidence for and against both my Mum and Dad. Both sides of the 
family were saying this could be better for you or wo~se for you. 
I You knew this date was coming up? So you were prepared for that 
question? (yup) and you had made up your mind how to answer it and you 
were worried about that decision of course? 
R Yes, because 1 had lived with my Mum until the court hearing so you know 
obviously she was saying if you don't want to live with me 1 will 
understand and still love you. But it was much easier saying that 1 
wasn't going to live with my father because 1 wasn't in his presence up 
until the court hearing. - ' 
70 
I But you sill worried about that. Can you tell me - I mean the 
alternatives were clear it was either your mother or your father, there 
wasn't a third alternative was there open to you like staying with an 
aunt? 
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R Not really, I really didn't want to do anything like that. 
I No. It was definitely one or the other. So what were the advantages and 
disadvantages as it seemed to you? 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
At the time (take one alternative first what were the advantages and 
disadvantages of remaining with your mother for example?) I was much 
closer to her, I could talk to her much more personally 
80 
And remind us of your age? 
I was about 10 at the time but I didn't know what was going on so .. the 
disadvantage was at the time, it might sound stupid now but, you know my 
Dad used to spoil me more and I was thinking, it was always in my sub-
conscious, that if I lived with my Dad would it be more fun, you know 
what I mean he used to play football and stuff ... 
Well these are good reasons. So do the same pros and cons apply with 
your choice with your father. Obviously the reverse of what you just 
said applies --but was there anything else about the advantage of going 
to your father? 
90 
Also my father was much more strict on certain matters and issues. You 
know he would be (that was an advantage or disadvantage?) disadvantage 
(right). He would be much more strict when it came to going out to 
places and around the home, he was always the one to tell me off, so I 
was more scared of him in a sense. 
Was it an evenly balanced choice? 
Urn •• I would say so but I would have preferred to live with my mother at 
the time. 
So what was the difficulty, not the choice itself, but stating it? 
Sorry? 
I Well what was the nature of the difficulty, was it the choice itself -
like which was preferable your mother or your father - or was it the 
difficulty of having to say that in court or having to say that in front 
of your parents? 
R Yea it was just like facing them afterwards, after I had made the 
decision. 
I So you were clear about the decision, it wasn't a really evenly balanced 
choice? 
R Well it was pretty even, but I preferred to live with my Mum. 
I Right.:~ So most of the difficulty was what to do after you had taken the 
decision? 
R Hmm that is all I thought about. I could easily say to one or the other 
at the time I would rather live with Mum but afterwards I would feel so 
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guilty and like afterwards I saw my Dad and it just didn't feel right at 
all. 
I Were they both pulling, were they both in their own way making it clear 
they wanted you? (Hmm) you felt the pull? 
R Yes. I would get treats and all sorts. 
I They both wanted you? 
R Definitely. 
to me. 
It was just I don't know morally - the things they would say 
I There was pressure being put on to you (hmm) right. Was it more strongly 
from one side than the other? - the pressure I mean or the pull. 
R I don't know, I think it was stronger on my Dad's side because he was not 
as tactful as my Mum is, you know my Mum would say if you go and live 
with your Dad don't worry about it I will still love you. My Dad would 
say the same thing, but not in so many words and it would sound much more 
like come and live with me. 
I Right. In making the decision what did you do? Did you go to different 
people, how did you help solve this? 
R I spoke to my grandparents about it, on my Mum's side because I don't 
really know the other set of grandparents, and they were basically saying 
it's just your happiness we are worried about and if you are going to be 
happier with your father, which we don't think you are, we don't mind if 
you go and live with him. They gave me quite a lot of moral support. 
I Did you see this as even handed advice, or just subtle pressure? 
R Hmm. 
I Did you know you were being got at as it were, being persuaded or did you 
think of it as being fair? 
R It was quite fair I thought. Because they didn't put any pressure on me 
at all. 
I Right. Did you talk to anyone else? 
R Not really. Not about my decision making. You know I just told my 
friends and they said what are you going to do then and I said I am not 
sure. 
I So would you say that this was your own decision, you reached it just by 
talking with your grandparents on your mother's side? 
R And my sister as well (agh) she is about four years older than me and she just said straight away that she wanted to live with my Mum. And because 
she stayed with my Mum I thought hey I want to stay with my sister also. 
You know I don't want to be split up from her as well. 
I So that is another factor. How much did you feel it was your decision in 
the end? 
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R Umrn .• I am not quite sure actually because in the court hearing they 
were just saying all the pros and cons of living with Mum, her wage 
coming in cannot support us •. (and you listened to all this?) ya and it 
seemed like they may have just been asking me to make me feel a whole lot 
better about it and stuff .• because I have known a lot of people who 
have got divorced and no one has even asked the children where they 
wanted to live, it is just a fight between the father and mother. 
I Yes and legally I suppose that is the case, but they do take notice and 
so that was the pressure on you, you knew you had a real point to make. 
So it was partly your own decision. 
R Yes and partly the pressure from the court •• 
I And your sister and grandparents. Fine, afterwards did you have any 
second thoughts? and have you had any second thoughts, we are of course 
talking about something that was five years ago. 
R Yea I did have second thoughts afterwards, you know as I said the 
response between my Dad and myself wasn't quite right and I thought my 
Dad's been quite depressed and if I went to live with him it might cheer 
him up and he wouldn't feel that way. 
I How long did this last? 
R What my second thoughts? (yes) I am not sure it took about .• initially 
about six months but lingering about two years or so. like whenever I 
saw him on visits and stuff and I went on holiday with him. When I came 
back I just felt quite bad that I was leaving him. I enjoyed his company 
so much because we ari just like really good friends. Nothing like father 
and son relationship now at all and I could never imagine living with him 
now, but then definitely. 
160 
170 
I So you did frequently regret your decision (hmm) but was your regret only 
when you had just seen your father or did the regret live with you 180 
afterwards? 
R It didn't so much as live with me but whenever I spoke to him it always 
seemed to make it worse and so on. 
I You sound as if that regret is with you now. 
R Yes I could say it is in a way because I am thinking back now how it used 
to be and it would have been fun to live with him. 
I So it was all along a very even handed decision, I mean it wasn't clear 
which way you would have been happier. 
R I think I would have been happy living with my father as well, but it was just at the time ... 
I Would you say that has affected you now? 
R In what sense? 
I Well you say you haven't got a father/son relationship, is that partly 
because of your decision to go with your mother, or would it have 
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happened anyway? 
R No I think that's just because I went to live with my mother. If I had 
gone to live with my father I am sure it would have saved my Mum feeling 
we are more friends. 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
R 
I 
Rather than feeling you were their child? 
Yea because he hasn't had~~he responsibility for me living with him. 
So you concentrated on the things that you have been doing together, your 
football and your holidays. Well my last question really is do you think 
you have learnt something from this-very difficult decision? Learnt 
about making decisions I mean. Is it possible to say whether you would 
be better at making a personal decision again. 
Well definitely I don't jump to conclusions at all about anything any 
more, you know if I was asked that question I would just sit down and 
think about it. If I am given a request on a piece of paper or something 
I will sit down and think it through. 
210 
Because you are aware that you might have second thoughts? (hmm) That's 
interesting. -Does this mean you take longer over making all decisions or just difficult ones? Has it made you less decisive? 
No it doesn't really make you less decisive I think it makes you more .•. 
hmrn how can I put it .~ more on the ball. It doesn't really take long to 
make decisions but you are more precise with your decision making and 
You don't mean cautious? 
Yea I do, you could be more cautious. 
Does it mean you go for the safe decision, the safe alternative more 
often now? 
R Not always but if I go for a risky alternative, you know I make myself 
aware of what could happen, the pros and cons of what could happen. 
I Yes. Well N thank you. I very much appreciate you sharing that 
difficult decision with me. If I needed to come back to you would that 
be alright? (yes) thank you. 
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31 Hare Lane, 
Claygate, 
SURREY KT10 9BT 
I am taking the liberty of writing to you, with the permission of 
your Principal, to ask if you would be prepared to help me with 
some research I have been doing into the nature of "dilemma" 
thinking, especially amongst 16 to 19 year old students. I hope it 
will not take more than a few minutes of your time, although I 
appreciate that any request like this will seem something of an 
intrusion. 
Dilemmas raise a number of interesting psychological and 
philosophical questions. My present interest, however, is in the 
extent to which there are opportunities to "practise" this common 
predicament in college based examination courses (l.e. not simply 
in general courses or-tutor periods). It is hoped that the results 
will be of some benefit to counsellors as well as subject tutors. 
Briefly, by "dilemma" I mean a situation in which a choice has to 
be made between at least two pressing alternatives, where there is 
no obvious solution. I am not particularly concerned whether these 
are perceived as moral problems (eg you ought to do A and you 
ought to do B but you cannot do both) or non moral problems (eg, 
perhaps, the choice between two experiments). 
Common examples are: a person has made two promises but can only 
keep one; a planning decision has to be made about the siting of a 
nuclear power station or a ring road; a doctor can only allocate a 
scarce resource to one of two equally deserving patients; a 
business manager has to choose between two contracts each bearing 
serious disadvantages. 
Normally, in a dilemma situation, whichever decision is made will 
leave you with some kind of remainder as an opportunity cost, 
perhaps in the form of regret or guilt about the rejected 
alternative. In other words, whichever choice you make you will 
regret it. As we know, dramatic literature abounds in such 
dilemmas, from Sophocles' Agamemnon to Styron's Sophie's Choice 
and it is an everyday predicament for most adult occupations. This 
seems to me to raise the question whether or not we prepare 
students to face such dilemmas and learn to live with the 
consequences of marginal decisions. 
I would be~very grateful if you would be prepared to take the time 
to complete the endosed questionnaire and return it in the s.a.e. 
provided. Thank you. 
Yours sincerely, 
~u t0Lu 
Patrick Miller ~ 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
THE RECOGNITION AND RESOLUTION OF DILEMMA 
N.B. Please see the attached letter for a working definition of what is meant 
by "dilemma". For the purposes of this questionnaire, please select one of the 
examined courses you teach or for which you are responsible. 
1. Name of subject 
Name of course and/or syllabus 
2. How frequently do students consider "dilemmas" (as defined) as part of 
this course? 
Monthly Weekly Occasionally Never 
[I f the answer was "never" please go to Q.7] 
3. Please describe a typical example of a "dilemma" which students consider 
as part of this course (perhaps as a set assignment, an essay topic, part 
of the coursework, a practical or experiment). 
4. Is this work assessed as part of the course? Yes ... No 
5. If "yes", what proportion (approximately) of the total assessment of the 
course would you estimate is occupied by such dilemmas? 
Less than 5% ... 5% ... 10% ... 20% ... More than 20% ... 
6. Do you consider that the time spent on "dilemmas" in this course should 
be: 
Increased Left as it is Decreased 
7. What value would you personally place on the consideration of "dilemma" 
type problems for a student's general education? 
Very worthwhile Quite worthwhile Not worthwhile 
8. Similarly, what value would you personally place on the consideration of 
"dilemma" type problems for a student's vocational ed~cation? 
Very worthwhile Quite worthwhile Not worthwhile 
9. Can you recall having had any teacher training or preparation in the 
recognition or resolution of dilemma? .' Yes... No ... 
If "yes", what form did it take? 
10. If you think that the consideration of "dilemmas" in the curriculum 
(examined or non examined) is worthwhile, how would you like to see this 
implemented? 
Than~ you for completing this questionnaire. 
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